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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
More than 30 years after being sentenced to death for the murder of his ex-wife, 
Jaimi Charboneau was handed an envelope full of documents showing a vast 
conspiracy by those in law enforcement to wrongfully convict and punish him, and then 
to cover up their misdeeds for decades. Perhaps the most critical document in that 
envelope was a letter written by the daughter of the victim (who had been one of the 
State’s key witnesses), addressed to the presiding judge, and alleging:  she had been 
encouraged by the police and prosecutors to testify falsely on certain critical matters; 
her family had planted physical evidence; and the prosecutor had asked her family to 
bury a firearm involved in her mother’s death. Other documents suggested this letter 
had been mailed to the judge in 1989—while Mr. Charboneau’s case was still pending 
re-sentencing—but had been intercepted by those in law enforcement and/or the 
prosecutor’s office, and, with the help of individuals at the Idaho Department of 
Correction (“IDOC”), was successfully concealed from Mr. Charboneau from 1989 
through 2011.  
Within 90 days of his receipt of this newly-discovered evidence, Mr. Charboneau 
filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief alleging the State had withheld 
favorable, material evidence (the letter) in violation of his right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. After holding an evidentiary hearing and making extensive 
factual findings, the district court eventually granted summary disposition in 
Mr. Charboneau’s favor. The district court granted Mr. Charboneau a new trial and set a 
reasonable bond, which Mr. Charboneau posted. 
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The State appeals, asserting five claims of error and asking this Court to have 
Mr. Charboneau returned to custody immediately. Mr. Charboneau cross-appeals. He 
contends that rather than just granting him a new trial, the district court should have 
barred the State from re-trying him.  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case has its genesis in events occurring more than 30 years ago. Those 
initial events were previously summed up by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Jaimi [Charboneau] and Marilyn [Arabaugh] lived together for 
approximately two years before they were married in June 1983. Marilyn 
had two teenage daughters, Tiffnie and Tira.[1] The relationship between 
Jaimi and Marilyn was stormy. There is evidence that Jaimi physically 
abused Marilyn. In August 1983 Marilyn shot Jaimi with a .22 caliber pistol 
during a dispute. An aggravated battery charge was filed against Marilyn 
but was subsequently dismissed on the motion of the prosecuting 
attorney. In the spring of 1984 Marilyn filed for divorce. A default judgment 
was granted on June 13, 1984. There is evidence that Jaimi and Marilyn 
continued to see each other and were sometimes intimate after the 
divorce. 
On June 21, 1984, Jaimi went to the cafe where Marilyn worked. 
They left in Marilyn’s car. There is some dispute whether Marilyn went with 
Jaimi voluntarily. The next day Marilyn reported to the police that Jaimi 
had kidnapped and raped her and had stolen her car. There is evidence 
that Jaimi traveled to Nevada after June 21. The burned remains of 
Marilyn’s car were found in southern Idaho in late June 1984. On June 25, 
1984, Jaimi was charged in Jerome County, Idaho with first degree 
kidnapping of Marilyn and grand theft of her car.[2] 
                                            
1 Tiffnie and Tira Arbaugh are individually referenced herein by their first names or, 
collectively, as “the girls,” as the Supreme Court did in 1989. Mr. Charboneau does so 
to avoid confusing them with their mother, whom he refers to as “Ms. Arbaugh.”  
 On July 1, 1984, the most critical date in this case, Tiffnie was sixteen (16339 
Trial Tr., p.595, L.24 – p.596, L.5), and Tira was fourteen (16339 Trial Tr., p.1234, Ls.5-
6). 
2 Mr. Charboneau was also charged with rape in a separate Lincoln County case. 
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On June 28, 1984, Jaimi purchased a .22 caliber rifle from a 
hardware store in Gooding, Idaho.[3]  
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 132-33 (1989). The .22 rifle Mr. Charboneau 
purchased was manufactured by Remington and had a nylon stock.4 
The tension in the relationship between Ms. Arbaugh and Mr. Charboneau came 
to a head on July 1, 1984. Based on the evidence from Mr. Charboneau’s trial (much of 
which Mr. Charboneau disputes), the Idaho Supreme Court has described the events of 
that day as follows: 
About mid-morning on Sunday, July 1, 1984, Marilyn returned to 
her residence on a ranch near Jerome,[5] after being gone since the 
evening before. Some time after 11:00 o'clock that morning Marilyn went 
out to check some horses in a corral near her home. Shortly after that 
Marilyn’s daughter Tiffnie heard shots outside, grabbed Marilyn's .22 
pistol,[6] and went to see what had happened. She found her mother sitting 
on the ground in the barn with blood on her. Jaimi was standing close to 
Marilyn with a .22 caliber rifle pointed at Marilyn. Tiffnie asked Jaimi to 
leave and told him she was going to call the police. Jaimi told Tiffnie that 
he would take Marilyn to the doctor. Both Marilyn and Jaimi told Tiffnie to 
leave. 
At 11:38 that morning Tiffnie called the Jerome County Sheriff’s 
office and said that Jaimi had shot her mother. Tiffnie then told her sister 
Tira about the shooting, and they both got dressed. They heard more 
shots and ran outside where they hid behind a sheep wagon and called to 
their mother. Tiffnie had her mother's .22 caliber pistol with her, and it 
accidentally discharged behind her. She ran into the house, hid the gun, 
                                            
3 The rifle was actually purchased from Hagerman Hardware, a store in Hagerman, 
Idaho. However, the Supreme Court’s reference to Gooding is not necessarily incorrect. 
The proprietor of Hagerman Hardware owned a second store in Gooding, and he 
testified that is where his firearms are kept. (See Trial Tr., p.552, L.20 – p.553, L.1.)  So, 
while Mr. Charboneau purchased the gun from Hagerman Hardware in Hagerman, it 
actually originated from a store in Gooding. 
4 This particular rifle is referenced herein as the “nylon Remington.” As will become 
clear, this designation is important because there are multiple rifles at issue in this case. 
5 The ranch was known to the Arbaugh family (and, apparently, to friends and 
neighbors), and was described at trial, as “El Rancho 93.” Thus, that moniker is 
sometimes used herein. 
6 The pistol was manufactured by Ruger. It is referenced herein as the “Ruger pistol,” or 
just “the pistol,” since it is the only pistol at issue in this case. 
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returned to the sheep wagon, and then ran to the barn. Tira followed close 
behind. Marilyn was lying on her back with her arms over her head. The 
girls ran back to call for an ambulance. At 11:42 a.m. Tira telephoned for 
assistance and reached the Jerome County Sheriff's office. She told them 
to get an ambulance and that her mother was dying. When the sheriff’s 
deputies arrived at the scene, they found Marilyn’s body in the barn and 
located Jaimi in a field near the barn with a .22 caliber rifle lying nearby. 
Jaimi was arrested and charged with first degree murder. At the time of his 
arrest, Jaimi acknowledged that he had shot Marilyn, although he stated 
that he did so because she was going to shoot him. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 133. This summary is derived primarily from the testimony of 
the Tiffnie and Tira since, other than Mr. Charboneau (who did not testify) and 
Ms. Arbaugh (who died), they were the only ones at the residence on the morning of 
July 1, 1984. (See generally Trial Tr., p.594, L.1 – p.730, L.11 (Tiffnie’s trial testimony); 
p.1233, L.1 – p.1304, L.22 (Tira’s testimony); p.1420, L.1 – p.1425, L.4 (further 
testimony from Tiffnie).) 
Mr. Charboneau’s case was tried in late-April through early-May 1985. At trial, 
the State offered evidence tending to support the above summary of the facts. The 
State theorized Mr. Charboneau had been lying in wait for Ms. Arbaugh for days prior 
her death. (See, e.g., 16339 Supp. Tr., p.1464, L.21 – p.1465, L.7 (State’s opening 
statement).) This theory was supported by physical evidence suggesting 
Mr. Charboneau had been in the barn and potato cellar for a prolonged period (see, 
e.g., 16339 Tr., p.980, L.14 – p.1014, L.16), and the girls’ testimony that they did not 
know he was on the property (see 16339 Trial Tr., p.680, Ls.3-9, p.700, L.13 – p.701, 
L.6, p.1246, L.19 – p.1247, L.12, p.1252, Ls.8-10). The State also sought to connect 
Mr. Charboneau to the fatal shots. (See, e.g., 16339 Supp. Tr., p.1468, L.10 – p.1469, 
L.17 (State’s opening statement).) It did this by matching the fatal shots to the nylon 
Remington (see 16339 Trial Tr., p.1018, L.1 – p.1123, L.12, p.1125, L.1 – p.1194, L.19), 
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which the State placed in Mr. Charboneau’s hands (see 16339 Trial Tr., p.532, L.1 – 
p.577, L.6, p.629, L.14 – p.630, L.14, p.1297, L.16 – p.1298, L.4, p.1420, L.12 – p.1424, 
L.24). Finally, the State argued Mr. Charboneau not only had to be Ms. Arbaugh’s killer, 
but he premeditatedly executed her. (See, e.g., 16339 Supp. Tr., p.1469, Ls.7-13, 
p.1371, Ls.12-15.) This contention was based on the girls’ testimony that they heard a 
second round of shots after Tiffnie saw Mr. Charboneau standing over their already-
wounded mother with a rifle, and while both girls were in the house. (See 16339 Trial 
Tr., p.640, L.21 – p.642, L.16, p.644, Ls.10-23, p.1266, L.12 – p.1268, L.10.) Ultimately, 
the jury found Mr. Charboneau guilty of first degree murder.7  (16339 R., pp.1035-38).  
Two months later, the State filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. 
(See 16339 R., pp.1048-49.) Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing on aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances was held over the course of two days (September 2 and 
December 19) in 1985. (See Sent. Tr., p.7, L.1 – p.203, L.21, p.204, L.1 – p.289, L.12.) 
On January 28, 1986, the district court held a hearing to pronounce its sentence:  death. 
(See 16339 R., p.1250; 16339 Sent. Tr., p.291, L.1 – p.306, L.10.) It also entered a 
written order stating its findings of fact with regard to the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and explaining its rationale for imposing the death penalty. (16339 
R., pp.1230-42.) In so doing, the district court placed special emphasis on the evidence 
suggesting that, after the first volley of shots, Mr. Charboneau had time to consider his 
actions before choosing to fire a second, fatal round of shots in Ms. Arbaugh: 
                                            
7 The kidnapping and grand theft counts had been dismissed by the district court during 
the trial, based on the fact that there had been no evidence presented that those crimes 
had been committed in Jerome County. Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 135. Incidentally, the 
Lincoln County rape charge that had not been consolidated with the murder case was 
eventually dismissed on the motion of the Lincoln County prosecutor. (16339 R., p.476.) 
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[I]t is obvious that the defendant intended to and did shoot and kill Marilyn 
Arbaugh. That after firing the first volley of shots the victim Marilyn 
Arbaugh was wounded but her life could have been saved if she had 
received necessary medical attention. At that moment the defendant, 
Jaimi Charboneau had a choice. He could have saved the woman he 
professed to love. However, with at least two minutes to give thought to 
the matter, the defendant, Jaimi Dean Charboneau, chose to fire 
additional shots into the wounded and helpless body of Marilyn Arbaugh. It 
appears from the facts that Jaimi Dean Charboneau acted intentionally, 
methodically and violently while he erased from the face of this the life of a 
human being. 
(16339 R., p.1241.) The district court also entered its judgment of conviction on 
January 28, 1986. (16339 R., pp.1243-44.) 
On March 11, 1986, Mr. Charboneau filed his first petition for post-conviction 
relief. (See 16741 R., pp.1-4.) Following multiple amendments, portions of that petition 
were summarily dismissed in July 1986 (see 16741, pp.140-42) and, in October 1986, 
the rest was denied following an evidentiary hearing (see 16741, pp.203-10). 
Thereafter, in January and February 1987, Mr. Charboneau made numerous 
filings, including a second petition for post-conviction relief, all of which challenged 
defense counsel’s questionable performance. (See, e.g., 16741 Supp. R., pp.95-96 
(motion for a new trial), pp.97-98 (motion to reconsider sentence and denial of post-
conviction relief), pp.119-27 (second post-conviction petition), pp.153-55 (petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus), pp.128-31 (petition for a writ of coram nobis).) Through multiple 
orders entered in April and May 2007, all of Mr. Charboneau’s requests for relief were 
denied. (See 16741 Supp. R. Vol. II, pp.150-54 (findings of fact and conclusions of law), 
pp.157-58 (order denying all motions and petitions in all cases), pp.165-67 (order 
overruling Mr. Charboneau’s objections to the previously-entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law).) 
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In the meantime, on December 8, 1986, Mr. Charboneau had filed a joint notice 
of appeal for both his criminal case and his first post-conviction case. (16741 
R., pp.231-33.) On July 20, 1987, he filed a second notice of appeal bearing the case 
number of the second post-conviction case (see 16741 R., pp.212-15) and apparently 
bringing all of the post-judgment rulings in all of the cases into the consolidated appeal.  
Mr. Charboneau’s consolidated appeal was decided by the Idaho Supreme Court 
on April 4, 1989. The only reversible error found was with regard to the capital 
sentencing proceedings, so the Court vacated Mr. Charboneau’s judgment of conviction 
and remanded his case to the district court for re-sentencing. See Charboneau, 116 
Idaho at 145-54. Following issuance of the Idaho Supreme Court’s Opinion, both parties 
filed petitions for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court; however, 
those petitions were denied on October 16, 1989. Charboneau v. State, 493 U.S. 922 
(1989); Idaho v. Charboneau, 493 U.S. 923 (1989).  
Upon remand to the district court, the State abandoned its request for the death 
penalty. See State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 499 (1993). Ultimately, on 
October 15, 1991, the district court8 imposed a sentence of fixed life. Id. In a 
subsequent appeal, decided in 1993, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that sentence. 
Id. at 499-500. 
Roughly nine years later, in 2002, Mr. Charboneau filed another petition for post-
conviction relief. (See 29042 R., pp.5-14.) In that petition, Mr. Charboneau sought relief 
based on his discovery of new evidence. (See generally id.) In particular, 
                                            
8 Whereas Judge Phillip Becker had presided over all of the prior proceedings, including 
Mr. Charboneau’s 1985 trial, Judge George Granata presided over the re-sentencing in 
1991. 
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Mr. Charboneau’s petition identified two new pieces of evidence that had come to light. 
First, the petition discussed a letter Mr. Charboneau had received from Jerome County 
Sheriff Larry Gold.9 (See id. at 8-9.) That letter (the “Gold Letter”), which 
Mr. Charboneau provided in support of his petition, was dated June 3, 2001, and 
indicated Sheriff Gold suspected there had been misconduct in Mr. Charboneau’s case. 
(See id. at 48-49.) It stated, in part, as follows: 
The most disgusting issues were the apparent acts of a few people 
that “appeared to conspire” to punish a person far beyond the limits of the 
law, because the law “if fully enforced” may have required a “Guilty Man” 
to go free. How could this sleepy little town not be “easily self convinced” 
to “stretch or even manipulate the facts” to arrange for a finding of guilt 
without sufficient admissible evidence, even if the chain of evidence 
needed a little repairing here and there, behind the scenes[?] 
There also appeared to be a “collaboration of minds” intelligent 
enough to control[ ] the events of the time, but “little enough” to feel that 
they “had to collaborate” because the facts “may not have been strong 
enough,” or “evidence that was collected under suspect conditions, 
dismissed because of contamination” and may have required manipulation 
by design. Jaimi, remember that this is just a personal hypothesis now. I 
have no proof of this in your case, just a deep down feeling that I am right 
because I have witnessed this “collaboration of minds” do the same thing 
in a different situation. 
(Id.) The other new evidence referenced in the 2002 petition concerned the fact that one 
of the firearms from Mr. Charboneau’s original case (the .22 Ruger pistol, as it turns out) 
had been found, stashed in a bag in the attic of the Jerome County Courthouse, by the 
courthouse janitor. (See id. at 9-10.)10  Finally, although it was not actually tied to any 
                                            
9 Larry Gold had not been the sheriff when Mr. Charboneau’s case was being 
investigated and prosecuted. Elza Hall was the sheriff at that time. (16339 R., p.6.) 
10 The details of the Ruger’s appearance in the courthouse attic were not made 
particularly clear in the 2002 case. They were better developed in this case. (See, e.g., 
R. Vol. 1, p.36 (2008 affidavit of Melvin Wright, the janitor who found the Ruger, about 
his discovery of the gun in the courthouse attic “sometime between 1992-1993”).)  
However, because the discovery of the gun in the attic is not particularly relevant to the 
present appeal, it is not discussed further herein. 
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claim in his petition, Mr. Charboneau submitted evidence indicating Tira had made 
statements suggesting the State had manipulated the evidence in Mr. Charboneau’s 
case. (See id. at 24, 53, 77.) Specifically, it was alleged that: 
 Tira “had been instructed to remain silent about her knowledge of certain objects 
which had been found at the scene on July 1st, 1984” (id. at 24); 
 Tira told Mr. Charboneau’s mother, Betsy Charboneau,11 the events of July 1, 
1984 “did not happen the way it was played out in court” (id. at 53); 
 Tira told Mr. Charboneau’s mother that the original prosecutor (Dannis 
Adamson), the special prosecutor (Marc Haws), and a policeman (Deputy Larry 
Webb) “did instruct her on what they wanted her to say regarding the events” of 
July 1, 1984 (id.); 
 Tira told Mr. Charboneau’s mother that Mr. Haws and his investigator, Gary Carr, 
“had told her not to reveal certain facts about the things which were found at the 
scene of the shooting,” including “her mother’s holster, and her mother’s guns,” 
and she “had been instructed to say that the only gun that she could remember 
seeing that day was the [nylon Remington] rifle” (id.; accord id. at 77). 
Unfortunately, Tira could not confirm that she had made such statements to Betsy 
Charboneau, as Tira had died in September 1998. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.973.) 
                                            
11 Throughout this saga, Betsy Charboneau has been identified by many different 
names, as she has apparently gone by the nicknames Bessie and Misty at times, and 
she has had other last names, including Cheek (her maiden name), Crabtree (a 
previous married name), and McKeel. 
Betsy Charboneau is not just Mr. Charboneau’s mother; following a strange twist, 
she also became Tira’s mother-in-law. After Mr. Charboneau was sent to prison, Tira 
wound up marrying Jimmy Griggs, Mr. Charboneau’s half-brother. (Evid. Tr., p.453, 
Ls.14-23; 29042 R., pp.53, 76.) 
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Mr. Charboneau’s 2002 petition was first summarily dismissed by the district 
court in September 2002. (29042 R., pp.90-92.) The court reasoned that 
Mr. Charboneau’s petition was untimely, and the “new evidence” was neither new, nor 
admissible. (Id. at 91-92.) On an appeal from that summary dismissal order, the Idaho 
Supreme Court remanded Mr. Charboneau’s case for the appointment of counsel. See 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004). Following remand (and Mr. Charboneau’s 
retention of counsel), the district court again dismissed Mr. Charboneau’s petition on the 
grounds that it was untimely filed, and it was not supported by admissible evidence. 
(See 32120 R., pp.43-64.) In another appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court this time 
affirmed the dismissal, but only on the basis that Mr. Charboneau’s petition was 
untimely; it did not reach the merits of his claims. See generally Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900 (2007). 
That brings us to the present case. On March 18, 2011, while Mr. Charboneau 
was being housed at the Idaho Correctional Institution-Orofino (“ICIO”), he was 
approached by one of his jailers, Corporal Michael Hiskett. (R. Vol. 3, pp.116-17.) 
Corporal Hiskett handed Mr. Charboneau a large white envelope containing multiple 
documents (collectively, “Hiskett Packet”). (Id.) Included in the Hiskett Packet were four 
especially noteworthy items: (1) a seven-page handwritten letter, dated September 6, 
1989, from Tira to Judge Becker (“Tira Arbaugh Letter”) (see R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-28)12; 
                                            
12 The Tira Arbaugh Letter appears in numerous places in the record on appeal. It was 
submitted to the district court in conjunction with Mr. Charboneau’s initial and amended 
petitions (see R. Vol. I, pp.53-59, 158-64), and admitted during the evidentiary hearing 
as Exhibit 14 (see R. Ex. Vol. I, pp.122-28), to name just three. For ease of reference, 
Mr. Charboneau cites to the copy of the letter that was admitted during the evidentiary 
hearing, which the parties below frequently referred to as Exhibit 14. Although he refers 
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(2) an envelope, postmarked September 7, 1989, with Judge Becker shown as the 
recipient and Tira shown as the sender (see R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.97); (3) a typed affidavit of 
Sheriff Larry Gold, dated November 13, 2001 (“Gold Affidavit”) (see R. Ex. Vol. 1, 
pp.109-10)13; and (4) a one-page handwritten note, dated June 27, 2003, and signed by 
A. DeWayne Shedd, who was the paralegal at ICIO while Mr. Charboneau was there 
(“Shedd Note”) (see R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95).14  (R. Vol. 3, p.119.) 
The Tira Arabaugh Letter contains explosive allegations. Written on or about 
September 6, 1989—shortly after Mr. Charboneau’s judgment of conviction had been 
vacated by the Supreme Court and his case was remanded for re-sentencing, but 
before any re-sentencing had actually occurred—and directed to Judge Becker, the 
judge who had presided over all of the district court proceedings to that point, the letter 
alleges the State systematically and fundamentally manipulated the evidence in 
Mr. Charboneau’s case. (See id. at 122-28.) Specifically, the letter alleges: the 
testimony about certain things (whether Mr. Charboneau was lying in wait at El Rancho 
                                                                                                                                  
to it throughout this case as the “Tira Arbaugh Letter,” the State refers to it as “Exhibit 
14.” 
13 The Gold Affidavit also appears in numerous places in the record. For ease of 
reference, Mr. Charboneau cites to the copy of the affidavit that was admitted during the 
evidentiary hearing, which the parties below frequently referred to as Exhibit 8. Although 
he refers to it throughout this case as the “Gold Affidavit,” the State refers to it as 
“Exhibit 8.”  
The Gold Affidavit, dated November 13, 2001, should not be confused with the 
Gold Letter, dated June 3, 2001. Not only are they different documents, but whereas the 
Gold Letter was known to Mr. Charboneau in 2002 when he filed his third post-
conviction petition, the Gold Affidavit was not known to him until he received the Hiskett 
Packet. (R. Vol. 4, pp.547-48.) 
14 As with the Tira Arbaugh Letter and the Gold Affidavit, the Shedd Note appears in 
numerous places in the record. Again, Mr. Charboneau cites to the copy that was 
admitted during the evidentiary hearing, which the parties below frequently referred to 
as Exhibit 4. Although he refers to it throughout this case as the “Shedd Note,” the State 
refers to it as “Exhibit 4.” 
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93, whether he was the one who fired the deadly shots from the nylon Remington, and 
whether there was a second volley of shots at all) was false; the Arbaugh family planted 
the evidence making it appear Mr. Charboneau had been lying in wait for days; and the 
prosecutor urged the family to destroy critical evidence—a second .22 rifle. (See id.)  
Although it is impossible to fully capture the thrust of that letter without quoting all 
seven of its pages verbatim, below is a list of its major points:   
 “I am writing this letter to you because I believe you should know the truth about 
some of the things that happened the day my mom died [and] the truth about 
some of the things that I was told to say [and] told not to say.” (Id. at 122.) 
 “[T]hey all tell me I should only do [and] say what the prosecutor [and] Mr. Carr[15] 
tell me to do. But I believe you should know that some of the things in my 
statements to the police were not all true.” (Id. at 122-23.) 
 “When I wrote my statement on the day it happened I was told by an officer, I 
think his name is Driesal [sic]16 to only say certain things so that my statement 
wouldn’t be confusing.” (Id. at 123.) 
 “I do not recall everything that I said in my statement that day, but I do remember 
that officer Driesal [sic] told me to say certain things that were not really true. 
One thing I remember is when I wrote down the time that I woke up that morning. 
Officer Driesal [sic] told me to write down a specific time which I knew was not 
true . . . . I just wrote down what [O]fficer Driesal [sic] told me to say.” (Id.) 
                                            
15 As noted, Gary Carr was an investigator for the State. He was employed by the 
Attorney General’s office and started working on Mr. Charboneau’s case when Deputy 
Attorney General Marc Haws took over as a special prosecutor. (See generally R. Vol. 
3, pp.344, 347-58.) 
16 It appears Tira was referring to Officer Roger Driesel. (See R. Vol. 3, p.359.)  
Throughout her letter, Tira misspelled his last name. 
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 “What I told [O]fficer Driesal [sic] is that after mom woke up that morning I 
remember her asking Jamie [sic] to go out [and] check on our horse . . . . Before going 
outside I remember that Jamie [sic] tied a new white [illegible] around my neck [and] he 
kissed my forehead [and] he told me that the wrangle horse was waiting on me . . . .” 
(Id. at 123-24.) 
 “Before Jamie [sic] went outside to check on the horse mom came back to my 
bedroom [and] gave me a big box wrapped in decorative paper. When I opened 
the box it had a new .22 rifle in it. That was my graduation gift from mom [and] 
Jamie [sic].” (Id. at 124.) 
 “After mom got dressed she told Tif [and] me that she was going outside to help 
Jamie [sic] with the horses.” (Id.)  
 “I remember telling Officer Driesal [sic] that when Tif [and] I first heard mom 
screaming I could hear her yelling for Tif. At that time I was still in the bath tub. It 
was just a few second later when we heard the gunshots.” (Id. at 124-25.) 
 “When I had gotten dressed Tif grabbed my new .22 rifle that mom [and] Jamie 
[sic] had just given to me that morning. Tiffi gave me one of mom’s .22 pistols 
[and] then she took me outside . . . .” (Id. at 125.) 
 From behind the sheep wagon, “We could see mom in the alleyway by the feed 
corrals . . . . I remember I heard Tif shoot the rifle while we were behind the 
sheep wagon. I remember this because it startled me so much that I accidentally 
fired mom’s pistol . . . .” (Id.) 
 “I asked Tif what was going on. That’s when she told me mom had taken 
Calamity Jane with her when she went outside to help Jamie [sic] with the 
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horses. Calamity Jane is what we call one of mom’s .22 rifles. When I told this to 
[O]fficer Driesal [sic] that day he told me he would make a note of it but he told 
me it wasn’t necessary to state every little thing in my statement.” (Id. at 125-26.) 
 A few days later, Deputy Larry Webb “said I had forgotten to write down some 
important things in my statement. Officer Webb told me that I had forgotten to put 
down the part about hearing more shots that day after Tiffie [and] I had went 
back into the house. Officer Webb told me to write out another statement saying I 
had heard 6 or 8 more shots . . . . I remember I had to sign another statement 
when Officer Webb told me to write that down even though I know it was not 
true.” (Id. at 126.) 
 “Mr. Haws has told us that we need to get rid of mom’s Calamity Jane rifle. . . . 
[G]randpa [and] me [and] [U]ncle Jimmy we all went out to the el rancho property 
last week [and] we buried mom’s rifle out there behind the potato cellar . . . .” (Id. 
at 126-27.) 
 Uncle Jimmy “had thrown some of mom’s other things in the crawl space at the 
back of the potato cellar a few weeks after the day my mom died. That’s the stuff 
we told Dwane Brown [and] [O]fficer Orvil17 about back then. Everybody told me 
not to say anything about Uncle Jimmy throwing those things away in the crawl 
space.” (Id. at 127.) 
 “Can you please call or write to my grandpa [and] talk to him about this stuff? . . . 
[H]e is a good man [and] if he is doing anything bad or wrong it’s only because 
                                            
17 It appears Tira was referring to Duane Brown, the owner of El Rancho 93, the 
property on which the Arbaugh family was living on July 1, 1984, and Officer Orville 
Balzer, the officer who responded to the Arbaugh family’s report that they found 
evidence in the potato cellar on July 11, 1984. 
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he is so mad at Jamie [sic] . . . . My Aunt Margene, mom’s sister, can also tell 
you about this stuff because she was also there when Mr. Haws told Uncle 
Jimmy [and] grandpa [and] all of us to get rid of mom’s rifle.” (Id. at 127-28.)  
In a post-script, Tira explained she was sending her letter from Bruneau, Idaho, 
where she was attending a street dance at which a family friend, Frederick 
“Pinto” Bennett, and his band were performing. (Id. at 128.) She said she decided 
to send her letter after having discussed the matter with Mr. Bennett. (Id.) 
The Gold Affidavit expands on the allegations Sheriff Gold had made in the Gold 
Letter, and ties those allegations to the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.109-
10.) It states, in relevant part, as follows: 
4.  That as stated in my June 3rd 2001 letter to Mr. Charboneau, I am 
aware of certain improprieties committed by the Jerome County 
prosecutor[’]s office and the special prosecutor from the Idaho Attorney 
General’s office (Marc Haws) in preparing various cases for trial, 
specifically Mr. Charboneau’s case. 
. . .  
6.  That it is my belief that facts and evidence in the Charboneau case 
were purposely manipulated and altered to arrange for a verdict of guilty. 
A specific example of this came to my knowledge when in the fall of 1989, 
my chief deputy Mito Alanzo [sic18] confided in me his concern about the 
fact that the District Court clerk Cheryl Watts was in possession of a letter 
which had been delivered to the Jerome County Courthouse via the 
United States Postal Service. Chief Deputy Alanzo [sic] informed me that 
the letter at issue had been addressed to district court Judge Philip Becker 
and had been sent by Tira Arbaugh, the daughter of Marilyn Arbaugh. 
Chief Deputy Alzanzo [sic] told me that the subject matter of this letter had 
significant relevance concerning the Charboneau case. Chief Deputy 
Alanzo [sic] stated that his concern was that the District Court Clerk Cheryl 
Watts had requested that he help her to destroy the letter. 
(Id. at 109-110.)  
                                            
18 Sheriff Gold misspelled Chief Deputy Alonzo’s last name throughout his affidavit. 
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Finally, the Shedd Note provides an explanation of why the Tira Arbaugh Letter, 
sent in 1989, and the Gold Affidavit, drafted in 2001, had never seen the light of day. 
The body of the note states as follows: 
Per Tim McNeese from the AG’s office / Instructed to monitor all of inmate 
Charboneau’s personal/legal mail. All incoming and outgoing legal mail. If 
a letter arrives at ICI-O for Charboneau from Larry Gold, a former sheriff of 
Jerome County, seize it without notifying Charboneau. Look for any 
documents depicting the name Tira Arbaugh, confiscate any such 
documents and notify McNeese immediately. If McNeese is not available 
then contact another attorney Mark [sic] Haws at the federal court building 
in Boise. His phone number and address is in the directory on my desk. 
Notified Lt. Unger and he agreed to help monitor Charboneau’s mail.  
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) It is signed by Mr. Shedd, the ICIO paralegal, and dated June 27, 
2003. 
Less than 90 days after receiving the Hiskett Packet, Mr. Charboneau filed 
another petition for post-conviction relief, thereby initiating this case. (See R. Vol. 1, 
pp.20-23; see also id. at 25-28 (supporting affidavit), 35-77 (supporting exhibits).) He 
alleged a Brady claim.19  After counsel was appointed, Mr. Charboneau filed an 
amended petition clarifying his claim somewhat.20  (See id. at 134-40; see also id. at 
142-93 (supporting exhibits).) 
Early in the case, the State filed two separate motions for summary dismissal 
(see R. Vol. 1, pp.330, 721-22) and a motion to reconsider the denial of the second 
such motion (see R. Vol. 2, pp.936-40.) All three motions were denied by the district 
court. (See R. Vol. 1, p.418; R. Vol. 2, pp.755-56.) 
                                            
19 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).  
20 The amended petition incorporated by reference the allegations and verifications set 
forth in his original petition. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.134.) 
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Ultimately, the district court decided to bifurcate the proceedings. It decided to 
hold an initial evidentiary hearing to address two limited questions:  (1) whether the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter is true and genuine, and (2) whether that letter was concealed by the 
State or its agents. (See R. Vol. 1, p.688.) Reserved for another day would be the 
question of whether Mr. Charboneau was entitled to relief under Brady, which the court 
recognized might involve an inquiry into the admissibility and materiality of the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter. (R. Vol. 1, p.688.)  
Prior to the initial evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter and the accompanying envelope were, in fact, written by Tira, although the State 
reserved its right to challenge the veracity of any of the statements contained therein. 
(See R. Vol. 2, pp.957, 971-72, 975.) Based on this stipulation, the district court entered 
an order stating, “Pursuant to the state’s admission and stipulation in open court, the 
Court does hereby find that the handwriting appearing on the copy of the letter and 
envelope . . . is the handwriting of Tira Arbaugh. This letter is authentic in the sense that 
it is not a forgery.” (R. Vol. 2, p.975.) 
In October 2013, a two-day evidentiary hearing was held. (See generally Evid. 
Tr., p.15, L.1 – p.624, L.13.) Per the prior bifurcation order, and in light of the parties’ 
stipulation concerning Tira’s authorship of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, that hearing was 
limited to the question of whether the letter was concealed by the State. (See id., p.1, 
Ls.12-18.) 
Following that evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order making 
fairly extensive findings of fact. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.109-43.) These findings included, but 
were not limited to, the following: 
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 Tira wrote the Tira Arabaugh Letter, and she mailed it from Bruneau, Idaho on 
September 7, 1989. (Id. at 115, 134.) It was sent to Judge Becker at the Jerome 
County Courthouse. (Id. at 115, 134.)  
 It is unknown whether the Tira Arabaugh Letter ever reached Judge Becker. (Id. 
at 134.) 
 “There is no evidence as to who had possession of the Tira Arbaugh letter from 
1989 to December 2002. Wherever the letter was between 1989 and 2003, it was 
originally taken or concealed by someone who had the state’s purposes in mind, 
and who acted on behalf of the state, rather than” Mr. Charboneau. (Id. at 134.) 
 “Someone sent or delivered a copy of the letter to Charboneau, who was in 
IDOC’s custody, sometime between December 2002 and September 2003.” (Id.) 
 “[S]omeone at ICIO was opening and reading Charboneau’s legal mail in 2003 
before it got to him.” (Id. at 131.) 
 Mr. Shedd wrote the Shedd Note or, at a minimum, signed it knowing it to be 
true, thereby ratifying and adopting its contents. (Id. at 125, 129.)  
  “[T]he Tira Arbaugh letter arrived at ICIO between June of 2003 and September 
of 2003. . . . It was intentionally intercepted by Shedd at the direction of others 
and concealed . . . .” (Id. at 135.) “Shedd did not and could not have acted 
alone.” (Id.) “The inferences and conclusions the Court draws from the evidence 
is that McNeese or someone in a similar capacity directed Shedd to do what he 
did. . . . [S]tate agents deliberately and consciously intercepted and withheld 
evidence of extraordinary value to Charboneau . . . and that it would have been 
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concealed from Charboneau forever but for the fortuitous intervention of Michael 
Hiskett.” (Id. at 136.)21 
 The Tira Arabaugh Letter was delivered to Mr. Charboneau as part of the Hiskett 
Packet on March 18, 2011. (Id. at 116-17.) 
 The Tira Arabaugh Letter had remained hidden from Mr. Charboneau “from 1989 
until it was delivered to Charboneau by Michael Hiskett at ICIO on March 18, 
2011, a period of 21½ years.” (Id. at 134; accord id. at 135.) 
As anticipated, the court made it clear that it would leave for another day questions as 
to whether the Tira Arabaugh Letter was “material” within the meaning of Brady, and 
whether it would be admissible evidence, and also what, if any, remedy might be 
appropriate. (Id. at 142-43.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Charboneau moved for summary disposition. (R. Vol. 3, pp.219-
20; see also R. Vol. 3, pp.223-51, 252-505, pp.973-85; R. Vol. 4, pp.10-58, 439-46, 454-
67.) A hearing was held on Mr. Charboneau’s motion in September 2014. (See 
generally 9/14/14 Tr., pp.639-757.) At the hearing, the State suggested there were 
outstanding questions of fact warranting a second evidentiary hearing; however, the 
district court questioned the value of such a hearing, given that it did not appear either 
party had additional evidence to present that could in any way help resolve the 
unanswered factual questions in the case. (See 9/14/13 Tr., p.676, L.18 – p.687, L.18.) 
In the end, the court invited the parties to submit post-hearing briefing and evidence. 
(See 9/14/13 Tr., p.723, L.5 – p.732, L.2.)  
                                            
21 The district court specifically declined to determine whether Mr. Haws, Mr. McNeese, 
or Lieutenant Unger were involved in the conspiracy. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38.) 
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Following the summary disposition hearing, the district court entered a written 
order reiterating its invitation for further briefing and additional evidence, and 
acknowledging a second evidentiary hearing might become necessary should there be 
disputed material issues of fact. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.62-67.) Thereafter, it entered a 
second order discussing various procedural matters, including briefing deadlines. 
(See id. at 494-97.) In that second order, the court invited the parties to request a 
hearing if they deemed one necessary, and it indicated a failure to request an 
evidentiary hearing would be a concession that “the parties see no disputed issues of 
material fact.” (Id. at 496.) Neither party ever requested another hearing of any kind; as 
promised, the district court took this as a concession that there were no disputed issues 
of material fact that could be resolved through an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 554.) 
Thereafter, in early 2015, the district court entered a lengthy order granting 
summary disposition in favor of Mr. Charboneau. (See id. at 523-81.) In doing so, the 
district court recognized it was free to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. (Id. at 
550, 554, 559.) Among its more notable rulings were the following: 
 The Tira Arbaugh Letter is admissible evidence. (Id. at 531-47.) 
 The Gold Affidavit is admissible for the limited purpose of showing that former 
Chief Deputy Mito Alonzo had detailed knowledge of the contents of the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter in the fall of 1989. (Id. at 547-49.) 
 Based on Chief Deputy Alonzo’s knowledge of the letter in 1989, as well as the 
Shedd Note, it can be inferred the Tira Arbaugh Letter was in the hands of 
unidentified prosecutorial and/or law enforcement officials soon after its delivery 
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to the Jerome County Courthouse in 1989 (although the precise date of its 
seizure cannot be determined). (Id. at 550-52.)  
 “[L]aw enforcement, by and through unknown (or identified) persons, acted in 
concert with IDOC to suppress and conceal” the letter from Mr. Charboneau. (Id. 
at 556.) 
 The Tira Arbaugh Letter is both impeaching and exculpatory. (Id.) 
 Had the letter been disclosed to Mr. Charboneau in 1989, there is a reasonable 
probability the result of his case would have been different. (Id. at 556-80.) At a 
minimum, since the letter was written prior to Mr. Charboneau’s re-sentencing in 
1991, “it most certainly would have provoked a different [sentencing] outcome . . . 
.” (Id. at 556, 577.) Further, since Mr. Charboneau was still within his time to file a 
motion for a new trial, there is a reasonable probability he would have been 
granted a new trial and, on re-trial, been convicted of a lesser offense.22  (Id. at 
557-80.) 
 Mr. Charboneau is entitled to a new trial. (Id. at 580-81.) 
                                            
22 The district court analyzed only whether there is a reasonable probability that 
Mr. Charboneau would have been convicted of some crime less than first degree 
murder. It did not even entertain the possibility that Mr. Charboneau could be 
completely innocent, commenting, “no one, not Tira Arbaugh, nor even Charboneau’s 
present attorneys, contend that Charboneau is innocent. They do not even seriously 
contend that he is not guilty of murder . . . .” (R. Vol. 4, p.558.)  However, that is not 
true. Below, counsel specifically argued that if the evidence is as stated in the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter, “this could have been second degree murder, this could have been 
manslaughter, this could have been self-defense.” (9/19/14 Tr., p.755. Accord R. Vol. 4, 
p.466.)  And there is a view of the evidence to support this theory. For example, if the 
jury found Ms. Arbaugh had fired first and Mr. Charboneau responded by wresting 
Calamity Jane from her grip and fired some non-fatal shots in the process, and that 
Tiffnie fired a fatal volley with the nylon Remington, there is a good chance a jury would 
have acquitted Mr. Charboneau. 
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Shortly after the district court granted summary disposition in his favor, 
Mr. Charboneau filed a motion seeking to bar the State from re-trying him. (See id. at 
599-600; see also id. at 630-33 (reply memorandum in support of motion).) He argued 
the egregiousness of the State’s actions, and the prejudice attendant to the loss of 
evidence over the past 30+ years, called for an extraordinary remedy. (Id. at 630-33.) 
The district court, however, denied that motion. (See 4/10/15 Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.18.) 
The district court formally entered judgment in Mr. Charboneau’s favor on 
April 14, 2015. (R. Vol. 4, pp.659-61.) In the meantime, the State had filed a premature 
notice of appeal on April 6, 2015. (Id. at 626-29.) It then filed an amended notice of 
appeal immediately after judgment was entered. (Id. at 663-66.) The State’s appeal is 
timely from the judgment. See I.A.R. 14(a) & 17(e)(2). Mr. Charboneau then filed a 
notice of cross-appeal on May 6, 2015. (R. Vol. 4, pp.670-74.) That notice was also 
timely from the district court’s judgment. See I.A.R. 15. 
On appeal, the State argues: (1) the district court erred in failing to dismiss 
Mr. Charboneau’s petition as barred by the applicable statute of limitation (App. 
Br., pp.26-32); (2) the district court erred in finding the Tira Arbaugh Letter, the Gold 
Affidavit, and the Shedd Note to be admissible (App. Br., pp.33-48); (3) the district court 
erred in finding a Brady violation (App. Br., pp.48-72); (4) the district court erred in 
considering evidence it had ruled inadmissible (relating to the prior bad acts of 
Mr. Haws) (App. Br., pp.72-74); (5) the district court erred in considering evidence of 
prior bad acts by Mr. McNeese (App. Br., pp.75-77); and (6) assuming this Court rules 
in the State’s favor, it should order Mr. Charboneau remanded into custody (App. 
Br., pp.77-78).  
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In this brief, Mr. Charboneau explains in detail why none of the arguments 
proffered by the State have merit and, in fact, the district court correctly granted 
summary disposition in his favor. He also presents a single issue on cross-appeal—
whether, after granting his petition for post-conviction relief and vacating his conviction, 
the district court should have also entered an order barring his retrial. He argues the 
unique circumstances of this case warrant such an extraordinary remedy. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association 
(“IPAA”), essentially acting as counsel for Marc Haws, has filed a brief as amicus curiae. 
The IPAA:  (1) asks this Court to “affirm” the fact that the district court did not make any 
finding that Mr. Haws was involved in a conspiracy to seize and conceal evidence 
favorable to Mr. Charboneau (Amicus Br., pp.8-10, 14); (2) joins in the State’s fourth 
claim of error (alleging the district court erroneously considered evidence of Mr. Haws’ 
prior bad acts which it had previously ruled inadmissible) (Amicus Br., p.10); (3) argues 
that the district court did not find the prior bad act evidence concerning Mr. Haws 
admissible, but if it did, it erred under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) (Amicus Br., pp.10-
12, 14); and (4) because Mr. Haws has a due process right to not be accused of 
misconduct, requests this Court affirm the non-finding of the district court “with a more 
definitive statement,” i.e., make a definitive factual finding that Mr. Haws did nothing 
wrong (Amicus Br., pp.12-13). To the extent the IPAA’s arguments are relevant to the 
issues on appeal such that any response is necessary, Mr. Charboneau’s comments 
are interwoven with his arguments in response to the State’s fourth claim of error. 
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ISSUES 
II. Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Charboneau’s claims were not 
barred by the applicable statute of limitation? 
III. Did the district court err in finding the Tira Arbaugh Letter, the Gold Affidavit, 
and/or the Shedd Note to be admissible? 
IV. Did the district court err in finding a violation of Mr. Charboneau’s due process 
rights under Brady v. Maryland? 
V. Did the district court err in referencing Marc Haws’ Brady Violation from a prior 
capital case? 
VI. Was any error by the district court in referencing Tim McNeese’s prior bad acts 
harmless? 
VII. In the event this Court rules in the State’s favor, should it revoke 
Mr. Charboneau’s bond, and at what point would such a revocation be 
appropriate? 
VIII. Did the district court err in declining to bar further prosecution (i.e., retrial) of 
Mr. Charboneau?  Alternatively, should this Court bar further prosecution under 
its supervisory authority? 
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ARGUMENT 
I.  
The District Court Correctly Determined Mr. Charboneau’s Claims Are Not Barred By 
The Statute Of Limitation 
A. Introduction 
The State seeks to have this Court reward it for successfully concealing critical 
evidence—the Tira Arbaugh Letter—from Mr. Charboneau for nearly 22 years. It argues 
that, although the district court found the State knowingly withheld that evidence the 
whole time, Mr. Charboneau is somehow to blame for not bringing his Brady claim 
before he even knew of the evidence in question. As the district court said, the State’s 
argument is “beyond ironic.” (R. Vol. 4, p.526 n.3.)  
Notwithstanding that Mr. Charboneau filed his post-conviction petition in this case 
less than 90 days after his receipt of the Hiskett Packet containing the Brady evidence 
at issue, i.e., the Tira Arbaugh Letter, the State’s primary, and oft-repeated, argument 
below was that Mr. Charboneau’s current Brady claim is barred by the UPCPA’s statute 
of limitation.23 And that is now the State’s first argument on appeal. (See App. 
Br., pp.26-32.) For the reasons detailed below, this argument is without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Legal conclusions of the district court are reviewed de novo. Whether [a] post-
conviction action is barred by the statute of limitations is an issue of law and is therefore 
subject to free review.” Green v. State, 156 Idaho 722, 724 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations 
omitted). Accord Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91 (2001). 
                                            
23 Below, the State raised its statute of limitation argument four separate times. (See 
R. Vol. 1, pp.332-60, 731-33; R. Vol. 2, pp.445-47, 936-40; R. Vol. 3, pp.552-53.)  The 
district court rejected these arguments each and every time. (R. Vol. 1, p.418; R. Vol. 2, 
pp.755-56; 5/24/13 Tr., p.60, Ls.20-21; R. Vol. 2, pp.798-99; R. Vol. 4, p.526 n.3.) 
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C. Properly Characterized, It Is Clear Mr. Charboneau’s Brady Claim Accrued On 
March 18, 2011 
The State’s argument on appeal is that Mr. Charboneau’s Brady claim is 
essentially duplicative of a claim he untimely raised in his 2002 post-conviction petition, 
and so the new claim is necessarily untimely as well. (See App. Br., pp.26-32.) Under 
the State’s argument, the statute of limitation for Mr. Charboneau’s current Brady claim 
would have begun to run whenever Mr. Charboneau had notice of the claim he raised in 
his 2002 petition—obviously sometime before May 23, 2002, the date that petition was 
filed. (See App. Br., pp.27-28, 29-32.)24  The basic premise of this argument is that 
Mr. Charboneau’s current Brady claim is the same as that which was presented in 2002. 
That premise, however, is faulty. 
In his 2002 post-conviction petition, Mr. Charboneau pled certain Brady violations 
based on newly discovered evidence. Among the Brady claims arguably alleged,25 was 
                                            
24 Below, the State advanced an alternative argument—that even if the statute of 
limitation began to run upon Mr. Charboneau’s notice of the existence of the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter, i.e., on the date the Hiskett Packet containing the letter was delivered to 
Mr. Charboneau, his petition was still untimely because 90 days is not a “reasonable 
time” for Mr. Charboneau to have taken to file the current petition. (See R. Vol. 2, 
pp.446-47, 939-40.)  However, the State has abandoned this argument (see App. 
Br., pp.26-33), and thereby waived it on appeal. See State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 
758, 763 (1993). 
25 Mr. Charboneau uses the term “arguably” because the allegations concerning Tira 
were not contained within his 2002 verified petition or his original affidavit in support of 
that petition. (See 29042 R., pp.5-14, 31-32.)  They appeared only his memorandum of 
law in support of his petition (29042 R., p.24), an affidavit from his mother (29042 
R., p.53), and, later, in his own supplemental affidavit (29042 R., p.77). Thus, they were 
probably never actually properly before the district court. See Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 
517, 523-24 (2010) (holding that a claim raised in an un-notarized brief in support of a 
petition for post-conviction relief, but not the petition or a supporting affidavit, was not 
properly pled and, therefore, could not be considered). Nevertheless, the district court 
treated these allegations as a distinct Brady claim. (See 32120 R., pp.43, 111-12.)  
Ultimately though, Mr. Charboneau concedes that whether the allegations concerning 
Tira were properly considered an independent claim in his 2002 petition is of no 
consequence to the current analysis because the critical question for statute of limitation 
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that prosecutors and police had withheld from him the fact that they instructed Tira to 
remain quiet about certain physical evidence found at El Rancho 93, and the additional 
fact that they told her what to say regarding the events of July 1, 1984. (29042 
R., pp.24, 53, 77.) Specifically, Mr. Charboneau alleged as follows:  “Tira informed her 
mother-in-law[26] about the fact that she had been instructed to remain silent about her 
knowledge of certain objects which had been found at the scene on July 1st, 1984 and 
identified by Jerome County Prosecutor ‘Dan Adamson’ and other law enforcement 
officers at the scene.” (29042 R., p.24.) This allegation was based on the affidavit of 
Betsy Charboneau, which stated as follows: 
7)  That Tira Arbaugh Griggs did personally confess to me information 
about her feelings towards my son Jaimi Charboneau, her former step 
father. Tira told me that she was sorry for what Jaimi was going through. 
Tira told me that the tragedy which took the life of her mother on July 1st, 
1984 did not happen the way it was played out in court. And; 
8)  That Tira also told me that Dan Adamson the first prosecutor to 
handle the case[,] and[ ] Mark [sic] Haws[,] the trial prosecutor[,] and 
Jerome [C]ounty’s sheriff’s deputy Larry Webb, did instruct her on what 
they wanted her to say regarding the events which took place on July 1st, 
1984 in regards to the shooting incident at the El Rancho 93 outside of 
Jerome, which involved my son Jaimi Charboneau, his recent ex-wife and 
the biological mother to Tira, Marilyn Arbaugh. And; 
9)  That Tira did inform me that Mark [sic] Haws and an investigator 
named Gary [C]arr who was working with law enforcement during the 
investigation regarding the death of Marilyn Arbaugh, had instructed her 
not to reveal certain facts about things which were found at the scene of 
the shooting on July 1st, 1984. Tira told me about two things which she 
said she was instructed to remain silent about[.]  [T]hey were her mother’s 
holster and[ ] her mother’s guns. Tira told me that she had been instructed 
                                                                                                                                  
purposes is when Mr. Charboneau knew of the factual basis for the current claim, not 
whether he previously litigated that claim. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905 (holding 
that the statute of limitation for a successive petition based on newly discovered 
evidence begins to run when the petitioner receives “notice” of the basis for his claim, 
not when he “assembles a complete cache of evidence” to support that claim). 
26 As noted, Betsy Charboneau was both Mr. Charboneau’s mother and Tira’s mother-
in-law. (See note 11, supra.) 
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to say that the only gun that she could remember seeing that day was the 
rifle. . . .  
(29042 R., p.53 (bold emphasis in original; underlined emphases omitted).)27  In a 
subsequent affidavit, Mr. Charboneau also alleged his half-brother, Jimmy Griggs, had 
informed him that Tira had said “things which sharply conflict with testimony presented 
at petitioner’s trial. Information which was until now not known to petitioner”; however, 
Mr. Charboneau did not specify what Tira had told Mr. Griggs. (29042 R., p.76.) Clearly, 
the evidence at the heart of the 2002 claim (i.e., the evidence which Mr. Charboneau 
contended was wrongfully suppressed by the State) was the knowledge of the State’s 
own agents (Mr. Adamson, Mr. Haws, Mr. Carr, and Deputy Webb) concerning their 
statements to Tira. Obviously, the claim was not that the evidence suppressed was the 
knowledge of Tira or Mr. Griggs, as neither of them was an agent of the State and, 
therefore, their knowledge was not in any way in the control of the State. Nor was it that 
the evidence suppressed was any particular document (such as Tira’s letter), as 
Mr. Charboneau never referenced any such document (and, in hindsight, we know he 
had no knowledge of any such document).  
In contrast to the 2002 post-conviction case, the Brady evidence at issue in this 
case consists of physical items—Tira’s seven-page letter to Judge Becker and the 
                                            
27 Later, in a separate affidavit, Mr. Charboneau made similar allegations:  
9) My mother, Betsy Charboneau Crabtree, has also recently submitted 
sworn statements and affidavits regarding information which she learned about 
personally from Tira several years after petitioner’s arrest and subsequent trial 
and appeals process. Betsy Charboneau Crabtree will testify that she was 
approached by Tira on more than one occasion regarding information concerning 
the fact that Tira had been instructed by both “Dannis Adamson,” and “Mar[c] 
Haws,” to “keep [quiet]” about certain evidence which had been found at the 
scene belonging to Marilyn, i.e. Marilyn’s pistols, holsters, and her brownish 
colored back-pack.  
(29042 R., p.77.) 
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envelope in which it was mailed. Because the Brady evidence is different, the Brady 
claim is different. The fact that this claim is related to a prior Brady claim, or that it tends 
to prove facts Mr. Charboneau already suspected, is wholly inconsequential. Because 
the State was required to disclose all material evidence favorable to Mr. Charboneau, 
every piece of material, favorable evidence suppressed gives rise to a separate Brady 
claim. 
The State would have this Court hold that, despite the fact the Brady evidence is 
different, because the 2002 Brady claim and the present Brady claim relate to the same 
general subject—the State’s manipulation of the physical evidence and its suborning of 
Tira’s perjury—the current Brady claim is somehow the same as the 2002 claim. 
However, this contention is neither supported, nor supportable.  
The State’s argument is not supported because the State cites no authority for 
the notion that a defendant cannot bring multiple Brady claims as he discovers 
additional evidence wrongfully suppressed by the government. (See App. Br., pp.26-
32.) And, in fact, precedent suggests otherwise. In one of Mr. Charboneau’s prior 
appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court identified the standard for when the statute of 
limitation begins to run for a successive post-conviction petition based on newly-
discovered evidence. It held it begins to run “once [the] claims are known.” Charboneau, 
144 Idaho at 905. It went on explain “known” means “notice” of the claim, not the point 
where the petitioner “assembles a complete cache of evidence” to assert his claim. Id. 
Applying that standard to the present case, it is apparent the statute of limitation began 
to run when the Hiskett Packet was delivered to Mr. Charboneau on March 18, 2011. 
That was the first time Mr. Charboneau had any notice that the Tira Arbaugh Letter 
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existed and had been suppressed by the State for 22 years. In other words, March 18, 
2011 was the first date on which Mr. Charboneau knew of a Brady claim for suppression 
of the Tira Arbaugh Letter. 
And the State’s argument is not supportable because, on its face, it is absurd. 
Under the State’s argument, if, after the government wrongfully suppressed a large 
cache of evidence favorable to a criminal defendant, a small, relatively inconsequential 
piece of evidence found its way into the defendant’s hands and he asserted a Brady 
claim based on that evidence, but was unsuccessful, he would be foreclosed from 
asserting a second Brady claim when the rest of the evidence came to light. The 
ridiculousness of such a scenario is apparent when one considers an extreme example. 
Let us assume the large cache of evidence hidden by the government included the 
following: 
 a firearm and spent shell casings (consistent with ammunition used by that 
firearm), found in the home of a potential alternate perpetrator; 
 an opinion from an expert firearms examiner that a slug recovered from the body 
of a murder victim matched the firearm, and an opinion that the shell casings also 
matched the firearm; 
 latent fingerprint impressions lifted from both the firearm and some of the 
casings; and 
 an opinion from an expert fingerprint examiner that all of the fingerprints matched 
a known print of the alternate perpetrator. 
Let us also assume that, years after the defendant was tried and wrongfully convicted of 
murder, a single piece of evidence—a single shell casing with no discernible finger 
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prints—finds its way into the defendant’s hands. The defendant could seek post-
conviction relief under Brady, arguing a casing matching the caliber of gun used in the 
murder, and found in the residence of a known potential alternate perpetrator, 
warranted relief. But he could very well be unsuccessful—likely because without 
fingerprints or a match to the murder weapon, the lone shell casing was insufficient for a 
reviewing court to say there was a reasonable probability that its admission would have 
led to a different result in the case. Now let us assume that five years after losing on his 
shell casing-related Brady claim, the defendant learned of the existence of the rest of 
the suppressed evidence—evidence likely establishing his innocence. Under the State’s 
argument in this case, he could not bring a second Brady claim. Under the State’s 
reasoning, because the defendant knew, some five years earlier, that there was firearm-
related evidence suppressed by the government, that knowledge was sufficient to start 
the statute of limitation for a successive post-conviction claim related to all of the 
wrongfully suppressed evidence, even that which was still being actively concealed by 
the government and, therefore, was still unknown.  
While the foregoing example presents an extreme case where the equities 
should be clear, in principle, it is no different from the facts of this case. Here, the State 
wants this Court to hold Mr. Charboneau should have raised a Brady claim alleging the 
wrongful suppression of the Tira Arbaugh Letter more than ten years before he knew (or 
could have known) of the existence of that letter. However, because he did not know the 
letter existed, he did not know a potential claim existed. 
Alternatively, even if Mr. Charboneau’s current claim is somehow deemed part of 
the same claim as was raised in 2002, the State’s argument still fails, as it is directly 
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contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641 (2000). 
In Sivak, the State had relied on “snitch” testimony at trial. Sivak, 134 Idaho at 644. As it 
turns out, that snitch, Jimmy Leytham, had been handsomely rewarded for his testimony 
against Mr. Sivak. See id. at 645. However, on the witness stand he significantly 
downplayed that reward, suggesting to the jury he was testifying against Mr. Sivak out 
of the goodness of his heart, and the reason he was then out of State custody had 
nothing to do with the fact that he was testifying for the State. Id. at 644. Mr. Sivak 
knew, or at least suspected, this was not true and, in his original post-conviction 
petition, alleged the State had failed to disclose the substance of the agreements 
between the State and Mr. Leytham. Id. at 644-45. Ultimately the prosecutor testified, 
claiming Mr. Leytham had not, in fact, received any benefits in exchange for his 
favorable testimony against Mr. Sivak. Id. at 645. Based on that testimony from the 
prosecutor, Mr. Sivak’s claim was denied and the Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Id. 
That was in 1990. Id. at 643. In 1996, Mr. Sivak discovered the State had suppressed 
four letters showing the extent of the benefits Mr. Leytham had received from the 
prosecution. Id. at 643, 645. Based on those four letters, Mr. Sivak filed another post-
conviction petition, apparently asserting Brady and Napue28 violations. See id. at 643-
44. In response, the State argued this claim was waived because it had been asserted 
in Mr. Sivak’s original post-conviction petition years earlier. Id. at 646. However, the 
Supreme Court rejected that argument: 
We reject the State's theory that Sivak has waived this claim for 
relief merely because he raised the issue in his first post-conviction 
petition. As Sivak concedes, this petition presents not a new claim but new 
                                            
28 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (holding it is a due process violation for a 
prosecutor failure to fail to correct testimony the prosecutor knows to be false). 
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evidence supporting an old claim. Applying this rule as the State requests 
would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual 
innocence in successive post-conviction petitions, even where the 
evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed by prosecutorial 
misconduct. We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will 
work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency. 
Id. at 647 (emphasis added). The Sivak Court was absolutely correct—to say a claim is 
presently barred, and it was required to have been fully litigated when the evidence 
underlying that claim was being actively concealed by the government, would be 
improper, as it would exalt judicial “efficiency” over justice.  
Unable to attack the reasoning of Sivak, the State attempts to argue its holding 
does not apply to this case. Its arguments are unpersuasive though. Initially, the State 
points out Sivak was a capital case and so the statute governing the post-conviction 
proceedings in that case (I.C. § 19-2719) is different from the statute governing the 
proceedings in this non-capital case (I.C. §§ 19-4901 & -4908), and the State argues 
the Idaho Supreme Court has previously distinguished “Sivak on the basis that the court 
has never applied its rationale to I.C. § 19-4902.” (App. Br., p.31.) This argument fails 
for at least three reasons. First, while Sivak was indeed a capital case subject to section 
19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously drawn from cases interpreting that 
provision in determining when the statute of limitation begins to run for successive 
petitions based on newly-discovered Brady evidence in non-capital cases. See 
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-05 (recognizing that, just as in capital cases, the 
discovery of new Brady evidence in non-capital cases is a basis for the filing of a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief, and adopting the “reasonable time” 
standard from section 19-2719 for filing successive petitions in non-capital cases). 
Second, any attempt to argue the successive petition provision of the death penalty 
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post-conviction statute (section 19-2719) should be interpreted as being less restrictive 
than the successive petition provision of the UPCPA section 19-4908) is baseless, as 
the waiver language in the former statute is actually far more restrictive on its face than 
that of the latter statute. Compare I.C. § 19-2719(5) (creating a waiver as a matter of 
law) with I.C. § 19-4908 (requiring a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver). Indeed, 
the fact that section 19-2719 is actually more restrictive than section 19-4908 was 
acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court in McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 703 
(1999). Third, the State’s claim that Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009), 
distinguished “Sivak on the basis that the court has never applied its rationale to 
I.C. § 19-4902,” is misleading at best. In Rhoades, the Supreme Court was talking about 
free-standing actual innocence claims, not Brady claims, when it considered whether 
Sivak was controlling. Further, the Rhoades Court simply did not say the rationale of 
Sivak “has never been applied  . . . to I.C. § 19-4902.” What the Rhoades Court actually 
said was the following: 
Rhoades argues that Sivak v. State supports his argument that a 
claim of actual innocence provides a basis for equitable tolling. 134 Idaho 
641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000). However, Sivak, unlike Rhoades, was making a 
claim of actual innocence to support overriding a time-bar and reach the 
merits of an otherwise-barred constitutional claim. Id. at 644, 8 P.3d at 639 
(“[Sivak] asserted that the state denied his due process rights by 
withholding evidence of an agreement between Leytham and the 
prosecution.”). We need not and do not decide today whether due process 
requires a free-standing actual innocence exception to the application of 
I.C. § 19–4902. 
Even if actual innocence provides a basis for equitable tolling, the 
facts alleged by Rhoades do not establish a prima facie case of actual 
innocence. 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 252-53 (emphases added). The foregoing language 
demonstrates the Rhoades Court was distinguishing between claims that are well-
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established as being constitutionally-based (such as Brady claims) and claims for which 
the constitutional basis was still an open question. This strongly suggests the Sivak 
analysis does apply to Brady cases brought under the UPCPA. 
Because the present Brady claim is distinct from that which was arguably 
asserted in 2002, and Mr. Charboneau did not know of the existence of the new Brady 
claim until he received the Hiskett Packet with the enclosed Tira Arbaugh Letter on 
March 18, 2011, the statute of limitation did not begin to run until that day. Alternatively, 
even if the new Brady claim is considered to be the same as that which was presented 
in 2002, under Sivak, because Mr. Charboneau received new evidence in support of his 
claim on March 18, 2011, the statute of limitation began to run that day.  
D. Mr. Charboneau’s Brady Claim Was Filed Within A “Reasonable Time” 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, under the UPCPA, a successive petition 
for post-conviction relief based on a newly-discovered Brady violation must be filed 
within a “reasonable time” of the time that the Brady claim is “known” by the petitioner.29  
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905 (2007). It has held this “reasonable time” 
standard will be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
Here, Mr. Charboneau first knew of his claim related to the Tira Arbaugh Letter 
on March 18, 2011, when it was finally disclosed to him as part of the Hiskett Packet. 
(See R. Vol. 3, p.132 (finding Mr. Charboneau did not know of the letter until it was 
delivered to him in 2011).) He filed the present post-conviction on or before June 15, 
                                            
29 Although the UPCPA clearly contemplates the filing of successive petitions, it does 
not actually contain a limitation period for successive petitions as it does for initial 
petitions. Compare I.C. § 19-4902(a) (providing for a one-year limitation period for initial 
petitions) and I.C. § 19-4902(b) (providing that petitions based on new DNA testing 
technology may be brought at “any time”) with I.C. § 19-4908 (discussing the situations 
under which a successive petition may be filed, but identifying no limitation period).  
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2011 (see R. Vol. 1, p.20),30 less than 90 days later. He also filed affidavits explaining 
exactly why it took him nearly 90 days to file his petition. (See R. Vol. 2, pp.807-09 
(affidavit of Mr. Charboneau), pp.814-16 (affidavit of attorney Greg Silvey).) Under these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the district court erred in ruling that the present 
petition was timely filed. 
Further, it cannot even be argued that it was not timely filed. As is discussed 
above, the State has abandoned its argument that Mr. Charboneau’s petition was not 
filed in a reasonable time, and so that argument is waived on appeal. (See note 24, 
supra.) Thus, if this Court finds Mr. Charboneau first knew of the present Brady claim 
when the Tira Abaugh Letter was disclosed to him on March 18, 2011, it must conclude 
the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Charboneau’s petition was timely filed. 
II.  
The State Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s 
Admissibility Determinations For Any Exhibits 
A. Introduction 
Between both its written findings of fact entered following the evidentiary hearing, 
and its subsequent summary disposition order, the district court addressed the 
admissibility of three critical documents from the Hiskett Packet—the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter, the Shedd Note, and the Gold Affidavit. Those admissibility determinations were 
unique to each document given the stage of the proceeding and the purpose for which 
the document was to be used.  
                                            
30 Mr. Charboneau’s pro se petition was probably actually “filed” a few days earlier—
likely on June 2, 2011 (the date it was signed and notarized, and the date it was served 
upon the State (see R. Vol. 1, pp.23-24))—because under the “prison mailbox rule,” it is 
deemed to have been filed when it was delivered to prison officials for mailing. Hayes v. 
State, 143 Idaho 88, 91 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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While the Shedd Note was unconditionally admitted at the evidentiary hearing, 
the Tira Arbaugh Letter and the Gold Affidavit were admitted at that hearing only for the 
limited purpose of showing those documents were in the Hiskett Packet. In the district 
court’s summary disposition order though, both the Tira Arbaugh Letter and the Gold 
Affidavit were ruled admissible to varying degrees and for different purposes. The 
district court ruled that the Tira Arbaugh Letter would be admissible at a new sentencing 
hearing should Mr. Charboneau get one, and most of its contents would also be 
admissible at a new trial should that be his relief. And it ruled the Gold Affidavit was 
admissible to a limited extent for purposes of determining whether Mr. Charboneau was 
entitled to post-conviction relief. 
On appeal, the State argues all of the district court’s rulings were erroneous, and 
the contents of each of the three documents are inadmissible hearsay. For the reasons 
stated below though, the State’s arguments are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Generally, the decision whether to admit a given piece of evidence is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 590 (2013). 
C. The State Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s 
Decision To Admit Exhibit 14 (The “Tira Arbaugh Letter”) 
As noted, the Tira Arbaugh Letter is the crux of this case. In that letter, which the 
State has conceded Tira wrote (see R. Vol. 2, pp.957, 971-72, 974; Evid. Tr., p.337, 
Ls.2-9, p.407, Ls.17-24),31 Tira made shocking and deeply disturbing disclosures about 
the destruction of physical evidence as requested by the prosecutor, the planting of 
                                            
31 The State has also conceded the envelope accompanying the letter was addressed 
by Tira (R. Vol. 2, pp.971, 975; Evid. Tr., p.337, Ls.2-9, p.409, Ls.15-21), and the 
postmark on that envelope is genuine (Evid. Tr., p.409, Ls.2-14). 
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physical evidence by the victim’s family, and the solicitation of false statements and 
testimony by law enforcement. (See generally R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-28.) If the 
statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter are true, the State’s whole theory of the case 
against Mr. Charboneau was a hoax. For example, the State argued Mr. Charboneau 
lay in wait for Ms. Arbaugh for days before shooting her. However, Tira’s letter suggests 
this is not true at all, as Ms. Arbaugh and the girls not only knew Mr. Charboneau was 
there, but they were interacting with him in a very normal way. The State also presented 
evidence indicating Ms. Arbaugh was unarmed, thus undermining any self-defense 
claim Mr. Charboneau may have made. However, Tira’s letter suggests this was not 
true either, as Ms. Arbaugh was carrying her .22 rifle, known as “Calamity Jane.” The 
State also placed in Mr. Charboneau’s hands the .22 nylon Remington rifle responsible 
for the fatal shots. However, Tira’s letter suggests her sister, Tiffnie, was the one firing 
the nylon Remington. Finally, at trial, the State used the alleged second round of six to 
eight shots to argue Mr. Charboneau intentionally and premeditatedly executed 
Ms. Arbaugh. However, Tira’s letter suggests there was no second round of shots when 
Mr. Charboneau was alone with Ms. Arbaugh.  
Throughout this case, the State has argued the Tira Arbaugh Letter consists of 
inadmissible hearsay. It first raised this argument in support of its second motion for 
summary dismissal. The State argued that because the letter consists of inadmissible 
hearsay, Mr. Charboneau’s Brady claim was not supported by admissible evidence and 
should be dismissed. (R. Vol. 1, p.742; R. Vol. 2, pp.454-60.) In denying the State’s 
motion for summary dismissal, the district court declined to decide whether the letter 
would be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence at a new trial; instead, it ruled 
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that because the contents of the letter were impeachment evidence, would likely have 
been admissible at Mr. Charboneau’s sentencing hearing, and certainly would have led 
to the discovery of admissible evidence—Tira’s live testimony (because she was still 
alive when the letter was intercepted and suppressed)—there were questions of fact 
which precluded a grant of summary dismissal.32  (See 5/24/13 Tr., p.52, L.3 – p.61, 
L.10.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the State raised its “hearsay” argument once more. 
When Mr. Charboneau was asked to identify the Tira Arbaugh Letter (Exhibit 14), the 
State objected on hearsay grounds. (Evid. Tr., p.65, Ls.6-23.) In response to that 
objection, the Tira Arbaugh Letter was initially admitted only for the limited purpose of 
showing that that document was among the documents provided to Mr. Charboneau in 
the Hiskett Packet. (Evid. Tr., p.66, Ls.14-21.) Later, the question of the admissibility of 
the Tira Arbaugh Letter (and its accompanying envelope, Exhibit 5a) came up again, 
and again the State voiced a hearsay objection. (See Evid. Tr., p.407, Ls.8-15, p.410, 
L.17 – p.421, L.10.) In response, the court noted the question of whether the statements 
in the letter were inadmissible hearsay was not critical because even if the entire letter 
                                            
32 The State misrepresents the district court’s ruling at the summary dismissal hearing. 
The State claims the district court ruled “Exhibit 14 was admissible as a statement 
against penal interest.” (App. Br., p.33 (citing 5/24/13 Tr., p.52, L.3 – p.60, L.19).)  
However, while the district court discussed at some length the question of whether the 
statements in the letter would be admissible as statements against interest (see 5/24/13 
Tr., p.52, L.23 – p.55, L.16), it noted there may be a difference between whether those 
statements would be admissible at a new trial versus whether they would have been 
admissible at Mr. Charboneau’s re-sentencing (see 5/24/13 Tr., p.55, L.17 – p.56, L.13), 
and it declined to decide whether they would be admissible at a new trial (see 5/24/13 
Tr., p.56, L.14 – p.61, L.10). Ultimately, the court ruled that, regardless of whether the 
letter would be admissible at a new trial, it would have been admissible at 
Mr. Charboneau’s re-sentencing and, therefore, Mr. Charboneau’s Brady claim was 
supported by admissible evidence and was not ripe for summary dismissal. (5/24/13 
Tr., p.59, Ls.14-25, p.60, L.20 – p.61, L.10.) 
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was hearsay, it would still be Brady evidence, at a minimum, for purposes of sentencing 
(because hearsay is admissible at sentencing). (Evid. Tr., p.415, L.11 – p.416, L.14.) 
Thus, the district court made it clear that, at least for the time being, it was not admitting 
the letter for the truth of the matters asserted therein; rather, it simply considered the 
date (September 6, 1989), Tira’s statement that she wrote the letter while in Bruneau, 
and the addressee (Judge Becker) on the letter for the fact that they were consistent 
with the date and location on the postmark (September 7, 1989 and Bruneau, 
respectively) and the addressee (Judge Becker) on the envelope, and it used that 
corroboration to authenticate both documents.33  (Evid. Tr., p.418, L.4 – p.421, L.10.)  
In its initial findings of fact and conclusions of law following the evidentiary 
hearing, the district court specifically declined to address the truth of the statements 
made in the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.112, 141.) The court reasoned that, 
since the purpose of the evidentiary hearing was limited to the question of whether 
IDOC had concealed the letter, “The content of the Tira Arbaugh letter, and whether it is 
actually true or false, is really not the issue at this point.” (R. Vol. 3, p.141.) The court 
also indicated it would, on another day, determine whether the letter was “material” for 
purposes of Brady, and “whether and to what extent the Tira Arbaugh letter would be or 
is inadmissible hearsay, or the extent to which it may be considered, what remedy, if 
any, Charboneau is entitled to . . . .” (R. Vol. 3, pp.142-43.) 
                                            
33 To the extent the district court considered the statements as to the date, Tira’s 
location, and the addressee for their truth in determining the letter was authentic, the 
district court acted properly. See I.R.E. 101(e)(1) (“These rules, other than those with 
respect to privileges, do not apply in the following situations: . . . Preliminary questions 
of fact. The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence . . 
. .”). 
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Thereafter, Mr. Charboneau filed a motion for summary disposition. This motion 
squarely raised the question of the admissibility of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, under the 
theory that the manner in which the letter could be used going forward bears upon the 
“materiality” analysis under Brady.34  (See R. Vol. 3, pp.227-28, 237-48, 249.) 
Specifically, Mr. Charboneau argued the statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter are 
independently admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against interest 
(I.R.E. 804(b)(3)), the exception for statements of the declarant’s then-existing state of 
mind (I.R.E. 803(3)), and under the residual (“catch-all”) hearsay exception (I.R.E. 
804(b)(6)). (See R. Vol. 3, pp.237-48, 249, 979-81; R. Vol. 4, pp.425-34, 455-60; 
9/19/14 Tr., p.655, L.3 – p.665, L.4.) In response, the State argued the letter consists of 
hearsay which is not admissible for any purpose—even impeachment. (R. Vol. 3, 
pp.546-52; R. Vol. 4, pp.70-74, 447-50; Tr., p.671, L.17 – p.679, L.24.) 
Ultimately, the district court ruled the Tira Arbaugh Letter would be independently 
admissible for the truth of the matters asserted therein—either under the “statement 
against interest” hearsay exception, or under the residual hearsay exception (9/19/14 
Tr., p.736, L.14 – p.739, L.6; R. Vol. 4, pp.531-45, 546-47), and it would be likewise 
admissible for impeachment purposes (9/19/14 Tr., p.740, Ls.9-24). 
                                            
34 Mr. Charboneau argued that evidence is “material” under Brady if it is independently 
admissible, could have been used for impeachment purposes, or could have led to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. (R. Vol. 3, p.227; R. Vol. 4, pp.424-25; 9/19/14 
Tr., p.645, Ls.16-24; see also R. Vol. 3, pp.976-78 (reply memorandum explaining how 
the Tira Arbaugh Letter likely would have led to the discovery of admissible evidence 
(Tira’s live testimony)).) With regard to impeachment, Mr. Charboneau pointed out that 
because numerous statements in the letter were inconsistent with Tira’s trial testimony, 
that letter could have been used extensively to impeach her testimony, as well as that of 
her sister, Tiffnie. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.236-37, 978-79; R. Vol. 4, p.425.)  He also argued 
the letter could have been used to impeach the testimony of Officers Diesel and Webb 
because it demonstrated their bias and dishonesty. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.236-37.) 
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1. The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Tira Arbugh Letter Would Be 
Admissible For The Truth Of The Matters Asserted Therein Because It 
Primarily Consists Of Statements Which Are Admissible Under The 
“Statements Against Interest” Hearsay Exception (I.R.E. 804(b)(3)) 
As a general proposition, out-of-court statements offered for their truth are 
considered hearsay and are not admissible. I.R.E 801(c) & 802. However, the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence contain many exceptions to this general rule. See I.R.E. 802 
(“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules . . . .”). See, 
e.g., I.R.E. 803 (identifying 24 exceptions for which the available of the declarant is 
irrelevant); I.R.E. 804(b) (identifying six additional exceptions, all of which apply where 
the declarant is unavailable). See also I.R.E. 801(d) (providing certain out-of-court 
statements, although they may be offered for their truth, are non-hearsay). 
In light of the hearsay exceptions set forth in the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
Mr. Charboneau submits the district court correctly ruled the Tira Arbaugh Letter 
admissible. Specifically, because the vast majority of the statements were very much 
against Tira’s interests when she wrote the letter, those statements were properly 
admitted under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)—the hearsay exception for 
statements against interest. Further, virtually all of the rest of the statements in the letter 
were admissible under Rules 803(1) and (3)—the hearsay exceptions for present sense 
impressions and statements of then-existing state of mind, respectively.  
The “statement against interest” exception provides that where a hearsay 
declarant is unavailable to testify, her out-of-court statements may nonetheless be 
admitted if they fit the following criteria: 
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject 
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
declarant against another, that a reasonable man in declarant’s position 
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would not have made the statement unless declarant believed it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
I.R.E. 804(b)(3). Thus, under this exception, there are three applicable requirements:  
(1) unavailability of the declarant; (2) a statement which is so far contrary to the 
declarant’s interests that a reasonable person would not have made it unless it was 
true; and (3) corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the 
statement. Because it is undisputed that Tira has been deceased since 1998 (R. Ex. 
Vol. 1, p.973), the first requirement is satisfied here. The remaining two requirements 
are discussed in Parts II.C.1(a) & (b), infra.  
Additionally, as the State correctly notes (see App. Br., pp.36-37), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has held that when it comes to the admission of statements against 
interest contained within a larger narrative, the entire narrative is not necessarily 
admissible; each statement must be analyzed to determine whether it is independently 
admissible as a statement against interest or pursuant to another hearsay exception. 
State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 890 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Williamson v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 594, 6001-01 (1994) (holding similarly with regard to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(3)). Here, Mr. Charboneau submits that whatever statements in the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter are not admissible as statements against interest under Rule 
804(b)(3) are admissible as present sense impressions and/or statements of Tira’s 
then-existing state of mind under Rules 803(1) and (3). That issue is discussed in Part 
II.C.1(c), infra. 
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a) The Bulk Of The Statements In The Tira Arbaugh Letter, At The 
Time Of Their Making So Far Tended To Subject Her To Civil Or 
Criminal Liability, That a Reasonable Person In Her Position Would 
Not Have Made Those Statements Unless They Were True 
Because it is undisputed that Tira is now permanently “unavailable” within the 
meaning of Rule 804, the first relevant inquiry is whether her statements in the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter so far tended to subject her to civil or criminal liability that a reasonable 
person in her position would not have made them if they were not true. Mr. Charboneau 
submits that, clearly, a reasonable person in Tira’s shoes would not have written that 
letter unless the information contained therein was, in fact, true. 
The district court ruled the bulk of the statements in the letter were, in fact, 
statements so far against Tira’s interests that a reasonable person in her situation would 
not have made such statements unless they were true. (9/19/14 Tr., p.736, L.14 – 
p.737, L.10; R. Vol. 4, pp.532-34.)  
Initially, the State misconstrues the district court’s ruling, asserting the district 
court erred in failing to analyze each statement in the Tira Arbaugh Letter individually, 
as is required by Averett. The State claims the district court: 
[I]dentified only two discrete parts of the letter that could have subjected 
Tira to a perjury charge because they were contrary to her trial testimony: 
specifically, the statement that she did not hear a second episode of shots 
fired and the statement she had a pistol and Tiffnie had a rifle when they 
first left the house. . . . Under the district court’s own reasoning, therefore, 
only these two declarations could fall within the ambit of the statement 
against penal interest exception—the rest of Exhibit 14 would not. 
(App. Br., p.37 (citing R. Vol. 4, pp.532-33).) This is not correct. As the cited portion of 
the district court’s order makes clear, the two discrete parts of the Tira Arabaugh Letter 
discussed by the district court were cited as examples of how Tira’s letter tended to 
subject her to a perjury charge. (See R. Vol. 4, p.532 (using the phrase “for example” 
 45 
before discussing Tira’s conflicting statements concerning the alleged second round of 
shots), p.533 (using “for example” once more before discussing Tira’s conflicting 
statements concerning which girl had which gun behind the sheep wagon).) The fact is 
the overwhelming majority of the statements in the seven-page letter were statements 
against Tira’s penal interest. Starting with the second full paragraph on the second page 
of the letter (“When I wrote out my statement on the day it happened . . . .”) and 
continuing through the end of the last full paragraph on the sixth page of the letter (“I 
know that this is not right [and] I hope that I am doing the right thing by telling you these 
things”), practically every statement she made tended to reveal a falsity in her prior 
testimony, explain a falsity in her prior testimony, and/or demonstrate her involvement in 
a conspiracy to manipulate evidence and present false testimony.35  Thus, the district 
court did not err in failing to reproduce each individual statement in the seven-page 
letter; under these circumstances, it was sufficient for the district court to have pointed 
out that the bulk of the statements in the letter were statements against Tira’s interest.36 
                                            
35 The discussion of the Tira Arbaugh Letter has primarily revolved around the crime of 
perjury, as Tira obviously confessed to having given false testimony. However, insofar 
as Tira implicated herself in a conspiracy to produce false evidence and/or destroy 
existing evidence, those actions were criminal as well. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 18-1701 
(criminal conspiracy), 18-2602 (preparing false evidence), 18-2603 (destroying or 
concealing evidence). 
36 A close reading of the Tira Arbaugh Letter reveals that it contains six categories of 
statements that were against Tira’s penal interest when they were made: 
 Statements revealing Mr. Charboneau was a known guest at the Arbaugh home on 
the morning of July 1, 1984, and he and Ms. Arbaugh gave the .22 nylon Remington 
rifle to Tira as a gift that day; 
 Statements indicating there was a second .22 rifle—“Calamity Jane”—involved in the 
events of July 1, 1984; 
 Statements placing Calamity Jane in the hands of Ms. Arbaugh, the nylon 
Remington in the hands of Tiffnie, and the .22 Ruger pistol in the hands of Tira; 
 Statements admitting there was no second round of shots while Tiffnie and Tira were 
inside the Arbaugh residence; 
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Further, the State’s entire argument is a red herring. The Tira Arbaugh Letter was 
not admitted for its truth at the evidentiary hearing, so this Court is not being asked to 
determine whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting that document in 
open court and considering its contents without limitation. Rather, the district court 
simply ruled the letter would be admissible at some future date upon Mr. Charboneau’s 
retrial and, therefore, it is “material” under Brady and its suppression by the State was 
prejudicial to Mr. Charboneau. For purposes of this ruling, it makes no difference 
whether 100 percent of the statements in the letter are admissible or only 90 percent. 
What is important is that the statements contradicting Tira’s sworn testimony and 
evidencing a conspiracy to manipulate the evidence are admissible and, thus, the letter 
itself was material under Brady and its suppression was prejudicial. 
The State next challenges the district court’s ruling on its merits. It offers two 
arguments why, in its view, the statements in her letter did not tend to subject Tira to 
criminal liability, and two reasons why, in its view, a reasonable person would not have 
perceived a sufficient risk of criminal liability that she would not have made the 
statements unless they were true. Those arguments are as follows:  (1) the State could 
not successfully prosecute Tira for perjury because the applicable statute of limitation 
had run; (2) because Tira was only fourteen years old when she testified falsely, she 
could not have been charged criminally, only adjudicated as a juvenile; (3) Tira (or any 
                                                                                                                                  
 Statements disclosing the Calamity Jane rifle was hidden/destroyed at the request of 
the prosecution; and 
 Statements indicating the Arbaugh family had planted evidence in the potato cellar. 
(See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-28.)  The first four categories of statements tended to subject 
Tira to criminal liability for having testified falsely, and the last two categories tended to 
subject her to criminal liability for her involvement in the manipulation of the physical 
evidence. 
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reasonable person) would know the State would never charge one of its own witnesses 
with perjury for testifying falsely on behalf of the State; and (4) because it did not find 
the statements were actually true, the district court erred in ruling them admissible. (See 
App. Br., pp.37-41.) 
The State fundamentally misconstrues the standard at issue. At their core, each 
of the foregoing arguments rest on the premise that statements do not meet the 
standard for admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3) unless the declarant knows to a near 
certainty she would actually be prosecuted, and convicted, of the crime of perjury. Rule 
804(b)(3) is not so demanding though. It speaks in terms of the statement at issue 
“tend[ing] to subject declarant to civil or criminal liability,” such that a reasonable person 
would not make it unless it was true. Because it is couched in terms of a tendency, the 
Rule does not require certain, or even near-certain, liability. And because it is based on 
a reasonable person standard, the Rule does not require the declarant to be a skilled 
attorney, capable of knowing whether she would have viable defenses to a perjury 
charge. All the Rule requires is awareness of a danger of civil or criminal liability such 
that a reasonable person in the declarant’s shoes would not risk making the statement 
unless it was true. As the Court of Appeals has explained, 
The rationale of this exception is that “a man will not make a damaging 
statement against himself unless it is true.” Report of Idaho State Bar 
Evidence Committee, C 804, at 21 (Supp. Dec. 31, 1984) (hereinafter 
Evidence Committee Report). “Under the theory that people do not lightly 
make statements that are damaging to their interests, [this] requirement 
provides the safeguard of special trustworthiness justifying most of the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 316, at 335, 336 (4th ed. 1992). 
Rule 804(b)(3) requires that the statement be so decidedly against 
the declarant’s interest “that a reasonable man in declarant’s position 
would not have made the statement unless declarant believed it to be 
true.” Even if the statement seems to be against the declarant’s interest in 
 48 
some respect, if it appears that the declarant had some motive of self-
interest when the statement was made which was likely to lead to 
misrepresentation of the facts, the statement should be excluded. Id., 
§ 319 at 348. As the Evidence Committee Report explains, 
Another aspect of the “reasonable man” test is whether the 
declarant believed the statement was against his interest. If 
not, the rationale for the exception fails. Weinstein points out 
‘it is not the fact that the declaration is against interest but 
the awareness of the fact by the declarant which gives the 
statement significance.’... 
Evidence Committee Report, supra, citing 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 804(b)(3)[02], at 97 (Supp.1983).  
Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 168 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis 
added). 
With this clarification in mind, the weaknesses of the State’s arguments are 
readily apparent.  
(i) The Fact That The Statute Of Limitation May Have Run On 
A Perjury Charge Is Irrelevant To The Question Of Whether 
Tira Would Have Perceived A Threat Of Civil Or Criminal 
Liability Such That She Reasonably Would Not Have Written 
Her Letter Had The Statements Contained Therein Not Been 
True 
The State claims the statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter were not statements 
against Tira’s penal interests because the statute of limitation for perjury had run by the 
time she made the statement in 1989. (App. Br., pp.37-38.) It reasons that when Tira 
testified in April 1985, the statute of limitation for perjury was only three years, but she 
did not write the Tira Arbaugh Letter until September 1989—more than four years 
later—so when she wrote the statement she was not at any risk of a criminal 
prosecution. (App. Br., pp.37-38.) Thus, the State’s argument presumes Tira knew (or a 
reasonable person in Tira’s situation would have known) the statute of limitation for 
perjury in Idaho required charges to be filed within three years.  
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The State’s argument is not one that is in any way supported by Rule 804(b)(3). 
Indeed, the Alaska Court of Appeals explicitly rejected just such an argument under a 
virtually identical rule of evidence. See Linton v. State, 880 P.2d 123, 127 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1994). The Linton Court rejected the notion that the question of whether a 
statement was against the declarant’s penal interests is decided based on a technical 
determination of whether he could still be charged with a crime in light of the applicable 
statute of limitation. See id. Instead, it looked to the declarant’s knowledge and 
considered what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances. See id. 
Specifically, it observed there was nothing in the record in that case to suggest the 
declarant “was aware of or influenced by the possible expiration of the statute of 
limitations,” and, given the nature of the statement, a reasonable person in the 
declarant’s situation would not have felt free to make the statement at issue—
regardless of whether he was aware the statute of limitation may have expired—unless 
it was true. Id.  
Likewise, in this case, there is no reason to believe Tira knew the statute of 
limitation had expired, or that this fact in any way motivated her decision to write the 
letter. When Tira testified at Mr. Charboneau’s preliminary hearing, she was only 
fourteen years old. At that age, she undoubtedly understood on some level that it was 
important to tell the truth in court. (See R. Vol. 3, p.874 (Tira explaining her oath meant 
she was “not supposed to lie”).) Nevertheless, to impress upon Tira the seriousness of 
the matter, Judge (now Justice) Burdick told Tira if she lied she “could be held 
accountable for perjury which is a criminal case,” and she could be held accountable to 
God. (R. Vol. 3, p.874.) A few years later, when Tira wrote the letter recanting much of 
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her prior testimony, she was nineteen years old. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.128.) At that age, 
even if she did not specifically remember Judge Burdick’s admonishment, she was old 
enough that she should have known lying under oath is perjury, a crime. Indeed, as an 
adult, she is presumed to know as much. See Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
By the same token though, even if she was sophisticated enough to understand 
there is a statute of limitation for bringing charges for most crimes, there is no evidence 
she was particularly knowledgeable in the law so as to know the statute of limitation for 
perjury in Idaho was, at that time, three years. Likewise, there is no evidence she was in 
any way motivated to write her letter by the fact the statute of limitation had recently 
expired. In fact, the letter itself demonstrates just the opposite. In her letter, Tira 
explained she was motivated to write the letter in order to right her prior wrong, 
suggesting she felt guilty for having lied under oath. She wrote, in part, as follows: 
I believe you should know the truth about some of the things that 
happened the day my mom died [and] the truth about some of the things 
that I was told to say [and] told not to say. I believe my mom would want 
me to tell the truth about these things. None of this is easy for me . . . . 
It’s just that I keep having bad dreams about all of this [and] I can’t talk to 
anyone about this, even my sister. . . . Everybody . . . tell[s] me I should 
only do [and] say what the prosecutor [and] Mr. Carr tell me to do. But I 
believe you should know that some of the things in my statements to the 
police were not all true. 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-23.)  
One other thing that bothers me sir is something Marc Haws the new 
prosecutor from Boise had told us to do. Mr. Haws has told us that we 
need to get rid of mom’s Calamity Jane rifle. I don’t understand why he 
would want us to do that . . . . 
(R. Ex., Vol. 1, pp.126-27.) 
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Everybody told me not to say anything about Uncle Jimmy throwing those 
things away in the crawl space. But [Judge] Becker I know that this is not 
right [and] I hope that I am doing the right thing by telling you these things. 
Can you please call or write to my grandpa [and] talk to him about 
this stuff?  Because I know he is a good man [and] if he is doing anything 
bad or wrong it’s only because he is so mad at Jamie [sic] for what 
happened to my mom. 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.127-28.) 
[Judge] Becker, I am 19 years old now [and] I need to tell you the truth 
about the things in this letter. 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.128.) So, regardless of whether Tira technically could have been 
convicted of perjury based on the admissions she made in her letter in 1989, she 
certainly knew she was admitting to serious misconduct—misconduct which 
Judge Burdick had already warned her was a crime.  
(ii) The Fact That Tira Was A Minor When She Perjured Herself 
Is Irrelevant To The Question Of Whether She Would Have 
Perceived A Threat Of Civil Or Criminal Liability Such That 
She Reasonably Would Not Have Written Her Letter Had 
The Statements Contained Therein Not Been True 
The State also claims the statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter were not 
statements against Tira’s penal interests because, when she gave her perjured 
testimony in 1984 (preliminary hearing) and 1985 (trial) she was not an adult and, 
therefore, could not have been charged as such; she only could have been adjudicated 
as a juvenile. (App. Br., p.38.) This argument also fails. Initially, it fails because it suffers 
from the same flaw as the State’s argument concerning the statute of limitation—it 
incorrectly assumes the relevant inquiry is whether Tira actually would have been 
convicted of a crime. As noted, what matters is whether Tira (or a reasonable person in 
her shoes) would have believed she was subject to criminal liability, such that she would 
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not have made the statements in the letter unless they were true. Thus, the State’s 
argument is misplaced from the outset. It also fails as a matter of law. 
Initially, the State’s argument assumes Tira could only have been adjudicated as 
a juvenile. That is not true though.  Tira was fourteen years old when she committed 
perjury (see 16339 Trial Tr., p.1234, Ls.5-6) in Mr. Charboneau’s case, so she could 
have been tried as an adult.  See I.C. § 16-1806(a) (1984). But even if we assume Tira 
would not have been tried as an adult, and instead would have been adjudicated as a 
juvenile, the State’s argument still fails because a juvenile adjudication still tends to 
subject people to “civil or criminal liability” within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(3). 
While Idaho still characterizes juvenile proceedings as civil cases,37 the “civil” 
label should not be relevant to the question of whether a given statement is admissible 
under the hearsay exception for statements against interest. Clearly, the underlying 
premise of that hearsay exception is that statements that are likely to lead to the 
declarant’s punishment are not typically made unless they are true. And, while juvenile 
adjudications may not be labeled “criminal” cases, they often lead to the exact same 
type of punishment—a loss of liberty. See State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 912-13 (1972) 
(in the context of evaluating whether double jeopardy protections exist with respect to 
juvenile adjudications, discussing the question of whether juvenile proceedings are 
criminal or noncriminal in nature and, although declining to answer that question, 
holding that where there is a potential for a loss of liberty, jeopardy attaches). See also 
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussing the history and theoretical 
underpinnings of having juvenile justice systems distinct from adult criminal justice 
                                            
37 See Beale v. Department of Labor, 139 Idaho 356, 359 n.3 (2003); Hewlett v. Probate 
Court of Clearwater County, 66 Idaho 690, 695 (1946). 
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systems; explaining the reality that, despite good intentions underlying a juvenile system 
without the formality of the adult criminal system, juvenile cases in many respects differ 
from adult criminal cases only insofar as juveniles are deprived of basic procedural 
safeguards before suffering similarly harsh punishments; and holding juveniles are 
entitled to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, in Gault, the United 
States Supreme Court explicitly observed that attaching the “civil” label to juvenile cases 
is, in many ways, little more than semantics:  
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all 
statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to “criminal” 
involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine 
“delinquency,” which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must 
be regarded as “criminal” for purposes of the privilege against self-
incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because 
of the feeble enticement of the “civil” label-of-convenience which has been 
attached to juvenile proceedings. . . . For this purpose, at least, 
commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one’s will, 
whether it is called “criminal” or “civil.” 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50. Thus, despite the “civil” label attached to the proceedings that 
could have been brought against Tira for her perjured testimony, Mr. Charboneau 
submits those proceedings fell within the “criminal liability” language of Rule 804(b)(3). 
See, e.g., In the Matter of King, 2002 WL 982418, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 9, 2002) 
(unpublished) (finding no error in trial court’s decision to admit a hearsay statement of a 
juvenile under the “statement against interest” hearsay exception where, although he 
faced only a juvenile adjudication, the declarant knew he was under investigation by the 
police for what was essentially a criminal offense). 
But even if the “civil” label attached to juvenile proceedings brought Tira’s 
potential sanctions outside the realm of the “criminal liability” language of Rule 
804(b)(3), Tira’s statements were still statements against interest within the meaning of 
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the Rule. That is because Rule 804(b)(3) is not exclusively couched in terms of criminal 
liability; it speaks in terms of “civil or criminal liability.” Thus, even if this Court accepts 
the State’s argument, the district court still correctly ruled Tira’s statements admissible. 
If a juvenile matter was brought against Tira, she still would have faced liability within 
the meaning of Rule 804(b)(3) regardless of whether that liability would be considered 
civil or criminal. See Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 369-70 (Wyo. 2000) (finding no 
error in trial court’s decision to admit a hearsay statement of a juvenile under the 
“statement against interest” hearsay exception where the juvenile would have known 
the information contained in the statement could have led to delinquency proceedings 
being brought against her). 
(iii) The Proponent Of Hearsay Evidence Offered Under Rule 
803(b)(3) Need Not Prove That The Declarant Actually 
Would Have Been Charged With, Or Convicted Of, A Crime 
Next, the State argues that even if Tira faced the possibility of criminal liability for 
her perjured testimony38 a reasonable person in her shoes would not actually believe 
she would be prosecuted for said perjury. (App. Br., pp.39, 41.) This argument is based 
on two premises—first, the State would never charge a witness with perjury unless it 
could prove its case and obtain a conviction39; second, the State would never abandon 
                                            
38 The State does not address the prospect of civil liability; however, presumably, the 
State’s argument would be the same if this Court determined Tira would have faced 
“civil” juvenile liability. 
39 It is misleading for the State to suggest a prosecutor would only bring a charge 
against Tira if it was clear there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Given that some charges are dismissed following preliminary 
hearings and that some defendants are acquitted following trial, such cannot possibly 
be the standard. Indeed, the current Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct require only 
that a prosecutor believe a charge is supported by probable cause before bringing that 
charge. I.R.P.C. 3.8(a). 
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its theory of Mr. Charboneau’s guilt and charge one of its own witnesses with perjury 
(see App. Br., pp.39, 41)—both of which are flawed. 
First, there is nothing about Rule 804(b)(3) which requires the proponent of the 
hearsay statements to first prove the truth of those statements in order to show the 
declarant would actually be charged and convicted based on the making of those 
statements.40  Rather, as noted, the question is whether the statements “tended to 
subject declarant to civil or criminal liability.” I.R.E. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added). And 
certainly an admission of perjury has such a tendency. Further, and as has also already 
been noted, the question is not whether the declarant actually could or would have been 
convicted, but whether she would have believed there was such a risk of liability such 
that she would not have made the statements if they were not true. 
Second, the notion that Tira should have known the State would never have 
charged her with perjury because she was a government witness and to undermine her 
testimony would be to undermine its case against Mr. Charboneau is to impute to Tira a 
level of cynicism akin to that of a jaded criminal defense attorney (which Tira certainly 
was not). A prosecutor holds a special position in the criminal justice system. He is “a 
public officer, acting in a quasi judicial capacity. It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, 
reasonable, and lawful means to secure the conviction of the guilty who are or may be 
                                            
40 As the State correctly notes (see App. Br., p.39), the district court declined to decide 
whether the allegations in the Tira Arbaugh Letter were true (see R. Vol. 4, pp.533, 545, 
578 n.28). It opined that that was a job for a jury. (R. Vol. 4, p.578 n.28.)  This approach 
was absolutely correct under State v. Meister, where the Idaho Supreme Court, in 
discussing the standards of Rule 804(b)(3), observed it is the court’s job to weigh the 
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement at issue, not its truth: “This test is desirable 
because it prevents the trial judge from substituting himself or herself as the ultimate 
fact-finder. If the statements clearly establish trustworthiness through corroborating 
evidence it is within the province of the jury to weigh the testimony and determine where 
the truth lies.” 148 Idaho 236, 243 (2009). 
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indicted in the courts of his judicial circuit.” State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _, 71 P. 608, 610 
(1903) (quoting Holder v. State, 25 S.W. 279, 281 (1894)). In other words, a prosecuting 
attorney is expected to be more than a zealous advocate who seeks (or seeks to 
protect) convictions at all cost; he should seek justice through fair and honorable 
means. Cf. Irwin, 71 P. at 610 (discussing prosecutorial misconduct and making it clear 
prosecutors may not adopt a win-at-all-costs mentality). Indeed, the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct impose upon prosecutors an obligation to attempt to remedy 
convictions for which there is clear and convincing evidence of innocence. I.R.P.C. 
3.8(h). Although the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct were not in effect in 1989 
(and most likely would not have been known to Tira even if they were), surely Tira 
would have recognized the powerful, privileged, prestigious position occupied by the 
local prosecutor, and would have believed—as most people would—that the prosecutor 
would have been concerned about justice, not just shielding Mr. Charboneau’s 
conviction from challenge. Thus, a reasonable person in Tira’s shoes would have 
expected to suffer consequences for admitting to having committed perjury in 
Mr. Charboneau’s case and, thus, she would not have written her letter had its contents 
not been true. 
(iv) The District Court Correctly Evaluated The Statements At 
Issue In Light Of The Facts Of This Case 
Finally, expanding on its claim that Tira’s admissions of perjury were not 
statements that tended to subject her to civil or criminal liability because 
Mr. Charboneau did not prove Tira was guilty of the crime of perjury, the State argues 
“[t]he district court[ ] determin[ed] that any statement recanting prior testimony is 
sufficient to meet this reasonable man standard” and its “determination” “is contrary to 
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the analysis of every court that has reviewed the reliability of such statements.” (App. 
Br., p.39; see also App. Br., pp.40-41 (claiming the district court “reason[ed] that the 
declaration is trustworthy because it is inconsistent with prior sworn testimony” and 
arguing such a conclusion is “illogical and contrary to applicable legal standards”).) 
Supposedly in support of this argument, the State then string-cites a series of cases 
which support the notion that court’s have traditionally been skeptical of witness 
recantations.   
There are a host of errors in this short argument from the State. First, and most 
fundamentally, the State misrepresents the district court’s ruling. In rejecting the State’s 
argument that it had to find Tira actually committed the crime of perjury in order to find 
the statements in her letter tended to subject her to civil or criminal liability, the district 
court relied upon the language of Rule 804(b)(3) and concluded that, under the facts of 
this case (i.e., Tira had specifically been told by Judge Burdick that lying under oath 
would subject her to criminal liability), when Tira called into question her own 
statements under oath, she was making statements that “so far tended to subject her to 
criminal liability that a reasonable person in her position would not have made the 
statements in the letter unless she believed them to be true.” (R. Vol. 4, p.533.) This 
was the correct analysis under the second prong of the Rule 804(b)(3) standard. At this 
point in its analysis, the district court simply did not make a determination as to the 
“reliability” of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, as the State now claims. Indeed, evaluating the 
overall reliability of the Tira Arbaugh Letter was the point of the entire analysis under 
Rule 804(b)(3) and it undoubtedly encompassed the third prong of the Rule 804(b)(3) 
standard (whether the “corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness 
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of the statement”) as well. Thus, after concluding the letter contained statements that 
“tended to subject declarant to civil or criminal liability” under the second prong of the 
standard (see R. Vol. 4, pp.533-34), the district court immediately went on to analyze 
the third prong in depth (see R. Vol. 4, pp.534-45). It was only after that analysis was 
completed that the district court could be said to have implicitly concluded the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter was “reliable”:  
Overall, one would be hard pressed to find a more worthy example of an 
exhibit carrying more circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness than the 
Tira Arbaugh letter. Now is not the time to decide whether the assertions 
in the letter are true or not. The Court’s conclusion is that the Arbaugh 
letter meets all of the requirements for admissibility pursuant to IRE 
804(b)(3). 
(R. Vol. 4, p.545.) 
Second, the State uses its misrepresentation of the district court’s ruling in 
furtherance of a straw-man argument. Having falsely claimed the district court made a 
sweeping statement about how any statement recanting prior testimony is automatically 
“reliable” or “trustworthy” (and therefore admissible, presumably), the State proceeds to 
try to knock down its straw-man by arguing such a sweeping statement is contrary to 
“the analysis of every court” that has reviewed the issue. (See App. Br., pp.39-41.) 
Since this entire argument is based upon a false premise, it fails. 
Third, the State’s argument misapplies the precedent cited. In support of its claim 
that the district court erred in finding statements recanting prior testimony automatically 
reliable, it cites a host of cases recognizing that courts have traditionally been skeptical 
of witness recantations. (See App. Br., pp.39-41.) However, this is a fundamentally 
different issue than whether a statement essentially confessing to perjury is a statement 
“tend[ing] to subject declarant to civil or criminal liability.” It is undisputed that courts 
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have traditionally viewed recantations with skepticism. Likewise, Mr. Charboneau 
readily concedes courts have traditionally viewed third-party confessions with 
skepticism. But Rule 804(b)(3) already assumes recantations and third-party 
confessions are unreliable, as it includes a “corroboration” requirement for “statement[s] 
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused 
. . . .” As the Meister Court explained (see note 40, supra), the aim of this corroboration 
requirement is to ensure that those statements which are typically viewed with 
skepticism actually are reliable or trustworthy. Thus, the fact that, in a vacuum, the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter would be viewed skeptically, has nothing whatsoever to do with whether 
it contained statements tending to expose Tira to civil or criminal liability. And, as is 
mentioned above (and discussed in greater detail below), the district court went on to 
evaluate the corroborating circumstances and find they clearly indicated the 
trustworthiness of the statements in the letter. 
b) Corroborating Circumstances Clearly Indicate The Trustworthiness 
Of The Statements Made In The Tira Arbaugh Letter 
The next step in the analysis under Rule 804(b)(3) requires a determination of 
whether “corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement.” This district court did this, identifying ten41 circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness and discussing them in detail: 
 Tira’s mental state, as disclosed by the letter itself, suggests she was motivated 
to come forward with the truth because she felt guilty over her part in framing 
Mr. Charboneau. Further, nothing in the letter suggests she was seeking the 
                                            
41 In summarizing the district court’s analysis, Mr. Charboneau has grouped the district 
court’s circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness slightly differently than the district 
court did; however, the information is the same. 
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limelight; to the contrary, her own statements suggest she was a reluctant 
whistleblower. 
 Tira was an adolescent who had no discernible motive to lie for Mr. Charboneau; 
if anything, she had a personal stake in doing what she could to keep 
Mr. Charboneau in prison (especially if she felt he murdered Ms. Arabaugh) 
because she was still grieving over the loss of her mother.  
 Tira’s statements were not offered in exchange for, or given with the expectation 
of receiving, anything in return.  
 Tira’s statements were not over-the-top in their exculpatory effect, as one would 
expect if Tira had concocted a story aimed at winning Mr. Charboneau’s release 
from prison.  
 Some of Tira’s statements are corroborated. For example, in her letter, she 
alleged Officer Larry Webb spoke to her a few days after Ms. Arbaugh died, 
asking that she add to her statement the false claim that she heard a second 
round of shots. This is consistent with the statement itself, which clearly shows 
the statement about a second round of shots was added after-the-fact. Also, she 
alleged that when she and Tiffnie were behind the sheep wagon, Tiffnie had a 
rifle (as opposed to the pistol Tiffnie testified she had). This is consistent with the 
original police reports, which the prosecution had tried to claim were in error. 
 Tira’s “letter appears to be the product of a rational mind,” in that it is neat and 
logical, it flows, it makes sense, and it reflects a good memory of relevant events. 
 The allegations in Tira’s letter are consistent with those in other statements 
attributed to Tira over the years.  
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 Tira’s letter explicitly invited further inquiry into her claims—for example, by 
specifically identifying those involved in manipulating the evidence, by explaining 
precisely where the missing rifle was buried, and by asking Judge Becker to call 
her grandfather—which is not typically what one would do if fabricating evidence. 
 Tira’s letter implicated Marc Haws, but little could Tira have known when she 
wrote that letter in 1989 that Mr. Haws had a history of the same type of 
misconduct.42 
 State actors went to great lengths to intercept and conceal the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter. Further, the Shedd Note suggests Mr. Haws was in on the conspiracy to 
hide the Tira Arbaugh Letter from Mr. Charboneau. The fact that State actors 
were so intent upon hiding this evidence suggests they feared the consequences 
of it coming to light, which thereby suggests it is true. 
(R. Vol. 4, pp.535-43.) 
On appeal, it is the State’s contention that there are no corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statements in the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter. (App. Br., pp.41-43.) The State points out (App. Br., p.41) that in 
Meister the Idaho Supreme Court held that in determining whether “the corroboration 
requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) has been satisfied, [the court] should be limited to asking 
whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant's 
statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be 
true.” 148 Idaho at 242 (quoting State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 570 (1987)) (emphasis 
in Meister). And the State acknowledges the Meister Court adopted from LaGrand a 
                                            
42 The district court’s references to Mr. Haws’ misconduct in Donald Paradis’ case is 
discussed in much greater detail in Part IV, infra.  
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seven-factor test for evaluating the trustworthiness of the statement(s) in question. 
(App. Br., p.41.) However, at no point does the State attempt to apply the seven-
factored Meister standard.43  (See App. Br., pp.41-43). Instead, the State argues that 
because Tira’s statements in her letter conflict with her trial testimony, as well as certain 
other evidence, all of which the State characterizes as “overwhelming” evidence of 
guilt,44 the statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter cannot reasonably be believed to be 
true. (App. Br., p.42.) It also argues the district court’s “trustworthiness” evaluation was 
completely off-base because it focused on the credibility of Tira’s statements, not 
whether those statements were consistent with the evidence. (App. Br., pp.42-43.) 
The State has misapplied Meister. While the State repeatedly quotes the 
Meister/LaGrand language regarding “evidence in the record corroborating and 
                                            
43 Because the State has failed to apply the seven-factored Meister test to the facts at 
issue in this case, it has waived any argument that the statements in the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter were not sufficiently corroborated to be deemed “trustworthy” under Rule 
804(b)(3). Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that an appellant’s brief contain “the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons 
therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon.” Because the State’s brief failed to comply with this requirement, the State 
has waived the issue cited on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996); see 
also Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 745 (2000) (explaining that 
although appellants and respondents face the same briefing requirements under Idaho 
Appellate Rules 35(a) and (b), respectively, only the appellant is deemed to waive an 
issue inadequately briefed because it is the appellant’s burden to establish the lower 
court erred). 
44 The State does not discuss this supposedly-overwhelming evidence. Rather, it simply 
parenthetically asserts such evidence was “set forth above.” (App. Br., p.42.)  As it is 
neither Mr. Charboneau nor this Court’s burden to guess what evidence the State is 
referring to, or to make an argument on the State’s behalf, the State has failed to 
support its contention with sufficient argument and, therefore, has waived its 
“overwhelming evidence” argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. This is of little 
importance though because, for the reasons set forth below, the Meister test does not 
call for an inquiry of whether a court believes a defendant is overwhelmingly guilty; 
rather, it delves into the circumstances tending to show whether the statement is 
reliable, including the circumstances surrounding its making. 
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contradicting the declarant's statement,” because, on its face, that language would 
appear to support the argument the State wishes to make (i.e., because the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter is inconsistent with the State’s evidence it is not trustworthy and, 
therefore, inadmissible), the State utterly ignores the seven-factor test which gives the 
quoted language meaning. See Meister, 148 Idaho at 242 (“This Court adopts Arizona’s 
standard and seven factor test for the corroboration requirement pursuant to I.R.E. 
804(b)(3).”). When one considers the seven-factored test, it becomes readily apparent 
that the above-quoted language repeatedly invoked by the State does not call for an 
examination of whether the statement(s) in question are consistent with the State’s 
evidence, so much as an examination of the circumstances under which the 
statement(s) in question was/were made. Id. at 242 & n.7.  
The seven factors adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Meister are as follows:  
(1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) whether the statement is 
against the declarant's interest; (3) whether corroborating circumstances 
exist which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the exculpatory 
statement, taking into account contradictory evidence, the relationship 
between the declarant and the listener, and the relationship between the 
declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the declarant has issued the 
statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant amount of time has 
passed between the incident and the statement; (6) whether the declarant 
will benefit from making the statement; and (7) whether the psychological 
and physical surroundings could affect the statement.  
Meister, 148 Idaho 242 n.7. Applying these factors to the Tira Arabaugh Letter, it is 
readily apparent that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the 
statements in that letter to be sufficiently trustworthy as to be admissible. Below, each 
factor is discussed in turn.45   
                                            
45 Since the first two factors—the unavailability of the declarant and fact that the 
statement was against the declarant’s interest—were discussed above, they are not 
elaborated upon herein. Thus, Mr. Charboneau’s analysis begins with the third factor, 
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(i) Corroborating And Contradictory Evidence  
The only one of the seven trustworthiness factors the State addresses in its 
Appellant’s Brief is the first one—the degree to which the statement is corroborated or 
contradicted by the other evidence. (See App. Br., p.42.) And on this point, the State’s 
argument is of no value; it simply asserts as follows: 
First, contradictory evidence is legion. Claims in Exhibit 14 that 
Tiffnie had a second rifle and that there was not a second round of shots 
are directly contrary to Tira’s preliminary hearing testimony, Tira’s trial 
testimony, Tiffnie’s preliminary hearing testimony, Tiffnie’s trial testimony, 
the physical evidence of a single gun as the murder weapon, and even 
Charboneau’s testimony (all as set forth above). No reasonable person 
could believe the recitation of events in Exhibit 14 is true in the face of 
nearly universal and overwhelming evidence. 
(App. Br., p.42.) The State fails to support this vague, conclusory argument with any 
citations to the record or any explanation of what “set forth above” means. (See App. 
Br., p.42.) 
Assuming the State’s argument is sufficient for this Court to even consider (see 
notes 43 & 44, supra), it is not sufficient to show an abuse of discretion. While the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter is quite lengthy (seven pages) and contains a myriad of statements 
against interest, as noted (see note 36, supra), those statements tend to fall into six 
categories: 
 Statements revealing Mr. Charboneau was a known guest at the Arbaugh home, 
and he and Ms. Arbaugh gave the nylon Remington to Tira; 
 Statements indicating the involvement of a second rifle—“Calamity Jane”; 
 Statements placing Calamity Jane in Ms. Arbaugh’s hands, the nylon Remington 
in Tiffnie’s hand, and the Ruger pistol in Tira’s hands; 
                                                                                                                                  
which actually has three parts which Mr. Charboneau has broken out for the ease of the 
Court. 
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 Statements admitting there was no second round of shots; 
 Statements disclosing that Calamity Jane was hidden/destroyed at the 
prosecutor’s request; and 
 Statements indicating the Arbaugh family planted evidence. 
(See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-28.) Each of these categories of statements is supported by 
at least some corroborating evidence, and in many cases the corroborating evidence is 
quite compelling.  
Tira’s statements concerning Mr. Charboneau’s being at the Arbaugh home on 
the morning of July 1, 1984, and presenting Tira with a .22 rifle as a graduation gift, are 
corroborated by evidence showing that rifle was purchased with the intent that it be 
given to Tira as a gift. Although the evidence on this point is not totally consistent, the 
common thread is that Mr. Charboneau (perhaps accompanied by Ms. Arbaugh) bought 
the nylon Remington at a hardware store in Hagerman a few days earlier with the intent 
of giving that gun to Tira as a gift. At Mr. Charboneau’s trial, the jury heard from the 
proprietors of the hardware store in Hagerman, Richard and Rosela Myers. (See R. Vol. 
3, pp.483-88 (Rosela Myers), pp.489-99 (Richard Myers).) Ms. Myers testified that on 
June 28, 1984, Mr. Charboneau purchased a gun from their store, and he also had a 
second package and some wrapping paper with him that day. (R. Vol. 3, p.484; Trial 
Tr., p.535, L.2 – p.538, L.4, p.546, L.11 – p.548, L.24, p.549, L.7 – p.550, L.21.) Her 
husband confirmed that information, but also added that he thought Mr. Charboneau 
mentioned he might give the Remington to his daughter as a gift. (See R. Vol. 3, p.493-
94; Trial Tr., p.554, L.12 – p.555, L.15, p.560, L.7 – p.562, L.15, p.563, Ls.16-20, p.571, 
Ls.8-20, p.573, L.16 – p.574, L.6, p.574, L.13 – p.575, L.8.) Since Mr. Charboneau’s 
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trial, additional evidence has surfaced further corroborating Tira’s statement that 
Mr. Charboneau and Ms. Arbaugh presented her with a .22 rifle as a gift on the morning 
of July 1, 1984. Elizabeth Miles, a friend of Ms. Arbaugh, prepared an affidavit in 2009 
indicating that during the week prior to Ms. Arbaugh’s death, she had run into 
Mr. Charboneau and Ms. Arbaugh in a bar in Hagerman. (R. Vol. 1, pp.177-78.) 
According to Ms. Miles: 
We all played a few games of pool and drank a few beers. Then 
Marilyn told me that she was looking for a .22 rifle to buy for a gift for her 
youngest daughter Tira. I suggest[ed] that they try the local hardware 
store there in Hagerman. Later that same day we all went to the hardware 
store together, Marilyn, Jaime [sic], Sandy and myself. 
I was with Marilyn when she asked the store [proprietor] if he had 
any .22 rifles that would be suitable for a teenage girl to learn to shoot 
with. 
I remember Marilyn handling a rifle that the man had given to her 
and I also remember Marilyn asking the man if he had any gift wrapping 
paper. 
I also remember that Marilyn got money from Jaime [sic]. While we 
were in the store, I saw give [sic] money to the man. 
I did not see Jaime [sic] handle a rifle or even speak to the man in 
the hardware store. 
(R. Vol. 1, p.177.) Although this affidavit is inconsistent with the trial testimony of 
Mr. and Mrs. Myers insofar as it placed Ms. Arbaugh at the hardware store for the 
purchase of the gun,46 it is consistent to the extent it asserts the nylon Remington was 
intended as a gift for Tira. 
                                            
46 Ms. Miles’ statement about Ms. Arbaugh being present for the gun purchase is not 
implausible. In 1984, one of the State’s witnesses, Kathy Stewart, testified she picked 
Mr. Charboneau up near the rim of the Bruneau Canyon and gave him a ride to a bar in 
Hagerman, where Mr. Charboneau indicated he would call Ms. Arbaugh and ask her to 
pick him up. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.805-07, 811.) 
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Tira’s statements concerning the presence of a second .22 rifle known as 
“Calamity Jane,” are also corroborated. A month after Ms. Arbaugh was shot, in 
August 1984, Mr. Charboneau wrote his counsel inquiring about Ms. Arbaugh’s .22 rifle 
with “Calamity Jane” inscribed on the stock. (See R. Vol. 1, p.189; see also 16339 Sent. 
Tr., p.123, Ls.5-10 (Mr. Charboneau testifying at his original sentencing that 
Ms. Arbaugh owned a rifle).) Likewise, in a 2006 letter to his counsel, Mr. Charboneau 
again referenced the Calamity Jane rifle, asserting that rifle was the one he used 
against Ms. Arbaugh back on July 1, 1984. (R. Vol. 1, pp.69-71.) And the fact that 
Ms. Arbaugh owned the Calamity Jane rifle was corroborated by multiple statements of 
Pinto Bennett (R. Vol. 4, pp.215, 216 (deposition testimony), p.229 (2011 affidavit)) and 
Betsy Charboneau (R. Vol. 4, pp.279, 290, 297.)47 
Tira’s statements concerning who had which guns are corroborated as well. The 
Tira Arbaugh Letter asserts Ms. Arbaugh had taken the Calamity Jane rifle with her to 
the barn, and that after Tiffnie heard shots she ran outside with the new nylon 
Remington, and handed the Ruger pistol to Tira. (R. Ex., pp.125-26.) This account is 
consistent with Mr. Charboneau’s 2006 letter to his counsel, in which he asserted he 
wrestled the Calamity Jane rifle from Ms. Arbaugh’s hands while the two of them were 
in the barn. (R. Vol. 1, pp.69-71.) It is also consistent with the original probable cause 
affidavit from 1984, which indicated Tiffnie told police that after hearing shots, she ran 
                                            
47 A police report from an unrelated incident on February 1984 (nearly five months prior 
to Ms. Arbaugh’s death) references the fact that Ms. Arbaugh owned a rifle, but it was at 
that time in the possession of a neighbor. (16339 R., p.277.) 
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outside with “her mother’s 22 rifle” (R. Vol. 3, p.392), as opposed to a “pistol,” which 
was what she later testified to (see, e.g., R. Vol. 3, p.682).48 
Tira’s statements concerning a lack of a second round of shots is corroborated 
by three things. First, Tira’s initial written statement was clearly and indisputably altered 
after the fact to note the alleged second round of shots. (See R. Vol. 1, pp.170-72.) That 
statement initially ended approximately two-thirds of the way down the second page, as 
evidenced by the fact that the text terminated and Tira crossed out (with a large “X”) the 
blank space following the text; however, this second page was then followed by a third 
page containing a single sentence:  “While we were dressing we heard about 8 more 
shots.” (See R. Vol. 1, p.171.) That sentence was then followed by a second, much 
larger “X” out. (See R. Vol. 1, p.171.) In his deposition, former Chief Deputy Larry Webb 
explained he had witnesses “X” out blank spaces in their statements so “nobody else 
can add anything in the statements.” (R. Vol. 3, p.264.) Thus, Chief Deputy Webb 
opined Tira’s statement had been completed on the second page, and she added the 
sentence about the supposed second round of shots after the fact. (R. Vol. 3, p.264.) 
This is wholly consistent with Tira’s contention in her letter to Judge Becker that Chief 
Deputy Webb had her write a new statement claiming she had heard “6 or 8 more 
shots,” even though that was not true. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.126.)  
Second, Tira had previously told Betsy Charboneau the prosecution had asked 
her to give false testimony. (See, e.g., 29042 R., p.53 (Betsy Charboneau’s 2002 
affidavit asserting Tira told her that her statements/testimony had been coached by the 
                                            
48 At Mr. Charboneau’s trial, Tiffnie admitted she may have told the police she was 
carrying a .22 rifle; however, she insisted that if she had said that, it was a mistake. 
(R. Vol. 2, pp.123-24.) 
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original prosecutor (Dannis Adamson), the special prosecutor (Mr. Haws), and a 
sheriff’s deputy (Larry Webb).) 
Third, Tiffnie and Tira could not get their stories straight on the supposed second 
round of shots. Tiffnie testified as follows:  she heard a round of shots and her mother’s 
scream; she grabbed her mother’s Ruger pistol and ran outside to find her mother 
injured but alive and conscious; she went back inside to get Tira and get dressed; while 
the girls were inside the house Tiffnie heard a second round of shots; she and Tira went 
back outside behind the sheep wagon where Tiffnie accidentally discharged the Ruger 
pistol; she returned to the house to put the Ruger away; and finally she went back 
outside and into the barn to find her mother unconscious and likely dead. (R. Vol. 1, 
pp.759-73 (preliminary hearing), pp.909-17 (trial).) Whereas Tiffnie claimed the girls 
heard the second round of shots after Tiffnie returned from her first trip outside, Tira 
testified the girls heard the second round of shots after Tiffnie’s return from her second 
trip outside. Specifically, Tira testified as follows: she heard her mother scream 
(although she did not hear any gunshots at that time) and Tiffnie run out of the house; 
Tiffnie came back into house and told her their mother had been shot by 
Mr. Charboneau; the girls got dressed and went out to the sheep wagon for a short 
time; the girls then returned to the house to change clothes, during which time they 
heard a second round of shots; they returned to the sheep wagon a second time, then 
proceeded into the barn where they found their mother unconscious.49  (R. Vol. 1, 
                                            
49 Tira’s testimony was also internally inconsistent concerning the question of when 
Tiffnie supposedly discharged the Ruger. At the preliminary hearing, Tira testified Tiffnie 
fired the Ruger during Tiffnie’s third trip outside (see R. Vol. 1, p.825, L.9 – p.829, L.3); 
however, at trial, she testified Tiffnie fired the Ruger during Tiffnie’s second trip outside 
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p.823, L.7 – p.829, L.3, p.852, L.16 – p.853, L.19 (preliminary hearing); R. Vol. 2, p.79, 
L.17 – p.86, L.17 (trial).) 
Tira’s statements concerning the prosecutor’s request to “get rid of mom’s 
Calamity Jane rifle” is also corroborated. On its most basic level, it is corroborated by 
the fact that Pinto Bennett specifically recalled Ms. Arbaugh possessing such a rifle. 
(R. Vol. 4, pp.215, 216, 229.) But it is also corroborated by Tira’s own prior statements 
to Betsy Charboneau indicating Mr. Haws had asked the Arbaugh family to get rid of 
Calamity Jane. (R. Vol. 4, pp.248, 281, 285-86, 290, 293-94, 298; see also 29042 
R., p.53 (“Tira told me that she had been instructed to say that the only gun that she 
could remember seeing that day was the rifle.”).) 
Finally, Tira’s statements concerning the Arbaugh family planting evidence in the 
crawl space at the back of the potato cellar are corroborated as well. On July 11, 1984, 
ten days after Ms. Arbaugh died, police received a call from the Arbaugh family 
indicating they had certain property of Ms. Arbaugh which they claimed they found in 
the tack room of the barn and stashed in the potato cellar. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.406-09; 
Trial Tr., p.980, L.12 – p.987, L.3, p.1012, L.11 – p.1013, L.18.) After that property was 
turned over to the responding officer, Bart Chisham (Tiffnie’s boyfriend) told the officer 
he had “a hunch” about a vent area of the potato cellar; Mr. Chisham offered to search 
that vent area; and he quickly came back to report he found a knapsack in the vent 
area.  (Trial Tr., p.991, L.8 – p.998, L.7.) Among other things, that knapsack contained 
Ms. Arbaugh’s identification and a good number of .22 shells. (Trial Tr., p.995, Ls.9-10, 
p.996, Ls.10-11.) The timing and manner of the discovery of this evidence is highly 
                                                                                                                                  
(see R. Vol. 2, p.80, L.22 – p.82, L.12). The latter story was consistent with Tiffnie’s 
version of events; the former version was not. 
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suggestive of its having been planted by the victim’s family, just as Tira alleged in her 
letter to Judge Becker. First, the evidence was turned over to police ten days after 
Ms. Arbaugh died. Presumably, the police had already fully searched the premises, 
especially the “tack room,” which was simply an alcove in the same barn in which 
Ms. Arbaugh was killed. (See R. Vol. 1, pp.929-30.) The fact that the evidence was not 
sooner discovered suggests it was not there when the police searched the barn. 
Second, the circumstances under which the evidence was found were highly suspect. 
The family was at the Arbaugh residence to pack Ms. Arbaugh and the girls’ things. 
(See 16339 R., pp.252, 254, 256.) If so, it seems highly unlikely that James Arbaugh 
and Bart Chisham were using that time to play detective and sleuth around the potato 
cellar. Further, Mr. Chisham’s unsupported “hunch” that there would be evidence 
stashed in a vent in the potato cellar (which turned out to be spot-on), his anxiousness 
to search that vent, and his personally volunteering to start that search (rather than 
leaving it up to the professional, Deputy Balzer), all suggested he knew there was 
evidence stashed in the vent, and the only way he could have known that was if he 
stashed it there or watched someone else (perhaps James Arbaugh) stash it there. 
In sum, Tira’s statements in her letter are well-corroborated by other evidence. 
And, while they are certainly contradicted by much of the trial evidence, that is to be 
expected where the statements at issue recant sworn testimony and expose the 
misconduct in the manipulation of testimony, production of false evidence, and 
destruction of exculpatory evidence. So, on the whole, the first Meister factor weighs in 
favor of finding the Tira Arbaugh Letter sufficiently trustworthy to warrant its admission. 
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(ii) Relationship Between The Declarant And The Listener  
In LaGrand, the Arizona Supreme Court noted the relationship between the 
declarant and the listener might provide clues as to the reliability of the statement. 
LaGrand, 734 P.2d at 569. It explained a statement made to law enforcement “may be 
made in an attempt to curry favor and obtain a reduced sentence,” or it may “be a 
product of coercion or force,” and a statement made to a friend or family member may 
be more reliable. Id.  
In this case, the statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter were not directed at Tira’s 
friends or family; they were directed at the judge who presided over Mr. Charboneau’s 
trial—Judge Becker. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-28.) However, that does not make them 
any less reliable. This is not the normal “statement against interest” scenario where the 
declarant is a co-defendant or an alternative perpetrator. Here, as the district court 
pointed out (R. Vol. 4, pp.535-36), Tira had absolutely nothing to gain by sending her 
letter to Judge Becker. As the letter itself points out, Tira was afraid that by writing the 
judge directly, she may have been doing something improper. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, 
p.122.) Further, Tira must have known her letter would “earn her ridicule and contempt 
from law enforcement” (R. Vol. 4, p.536)—the same people who were tasked with 
finding justice for the Arbaugh family. Finally, Tira seemed to recognize her letter “would 
earn her the scorn of her family, with no apparent benefit to her except to declare the 
truth and lift a great burden from her own conscience.” (R. Vol. 4, p.536; see also R. Ex. 
Vol. 1, pp.122-23 (Tira explaining she could not talk to Tiffnie about the contents of her 
letter, and stating her family told her to only say and do what the prosecutor told her).) 
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Thus, there is no chance she penned that letter in an effort to curry favor with the court, 
anyone in law enforcement, or anyone else.  
Further, there is no reason to believe Tira’s letter was a product of pressure or 
coercion from Judge Becker. First, there is no evidence Judge Becker ever knew of the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter—either before it was written or after (see R. Vol. 3, p.134)—and it 
defies belief that Judge Becker would have had ex parte contact with a witness in order 
to influence her testimony shortly before the case came back to him for re-sentencing. 
Second, the letter itself reveals Tira wrote to Judge Becker while “in Bruneau, Idaho for 
a cowboy benefit [and] street dance,” and after having discussed the matter with a long-
time family friend, Pinto Bennett. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.128.) Such circumstances are in no 
way coercive. 
Although Tira’s letter was directed to a government official, as opposed to a close 
friend or family member, the unique circumstances of this case demonstrate that this 
consideration weighs in favor of the district court’s conclusion that the statements in the 
letter were reliable.  
(iii) Relationship Between The Declarant And The Defendant  
The LaGrand Court explained the relationship between the declarant and the 
defendant can be an important factor in the reliability analysis because “[a] strong 
emotional or family bond between the declarant and defendant may render the 
declarant’s statement less trustworthy because such a bond may motivate the declarant 
to fabricate his story.” LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 569-70. 
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Here, while Mr. Charboneau was Tira’s former stepfather (see R. Vol. 1, pp.747, 
883; R. Vol. 2, pp.51-52), and she liked Mr. Charboneau somewhat,50 Mr. Charboneau 
had not raised her.51  Much more importantly though, Tira’s mother—someone whom 
Tira loved deeply and missed terribly—was the victim. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.122 (“None of 
this is easy for me because I loved my mom. She was my best friend [and] I feel lost 
[and] alone without her.”).) And Mr. Charboneau undeniably had some kind of role in her 
death. Thus, by the time of trial, when asked how she felt about Mr. Charboneau, Tira 
responded, “What am I supposed to think? . . . He—I—I don’t know. He—he killed my 
mom. What am I supposed to think?”  (R. Vol. 2, p.90.) In light of this, the district court 
correctly noted as follows:  
She [Tira] is, presumably, writing to clear up the truth about someone who 
killed the dearest person on earth to her. This is another huge 
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. It would seem extraordinarily 
unlikely that anyone in Tira’s position would write a letter such as this 
unless it was true. She did not suddenly come to hate her mother, or 
develop some affinity for Charboneau. . . . What possible motive could she 
have to help him?  None is apparent. 
(R. Vol. 4, pp.535-36 (emphasis in original).)  
Because any emotional bond that Tira may have had with Mr. Charboneau was 
greatly overshadowed by the love that she had for her mother and the loss she felt as a 
result of her mother’s death, and because Mr. Charboneau undeniably played some role 
                                            
50 Tira testified in 1984 and 1985 that she liked Mr. Charboneau and got along with him 
“most of the time,” but Tiffnie did not. (R. Vol. 1, p.837; see also R. Vol. 1, pp.843-44 
(Tira testifying she “didn’t hate Jaimi” and would not have minded if he and her mother 
had gotten back together with him, but Tiffinie “was kinda upset about” that possibility); 
R. Vol. 2, p.96 (Tira testifying she got along with Mr. Charboneau and he was pretty 
good to her).)  Tiffnie’s testimony was consistent with Tira’s. (See R. Vol. 1, pp.794-95, 
942.) 
51 Mr. Charboneau and Ms. Arbaugh were married for a very short time—just about a 
year. (See R. Vol. 1, pp.938, 941; R. Vol. 2, p.26; 16339 Sent. Tr., p.113, L.18 – p.119, 
L.3.)  Tira testified she had only even known Mr. Charboneau for “about, two and a half 
years.” (R. Vol. 2, p.51.) 
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in her mother’s death, the district court correctly concluded that, viewing the relevant 
interpersonal relationships in context, the Tira Arbaugh Letter is reliable.  
(iv) Number Of Times The Statement Was Made  
In LaGrand, the Arizona Supreme Court observed that “[t]he number of times the 
statement is made and the consistency of multiple statements may assist in determining 
trustworthiness.” LaGrand, 734 P.2d at 570. Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized that multiple statements may corroborate each other. Meister, 148 Idaho at 
242. 
As the district court noted (R. Vol. 4, p.540), there is evidence to suggest that 
before she died Tira disclosed to others some of the prosecutorial improprieties at issue 
in this case. For example, Mr. Charboneau’s mother, Betsy Charboneau, contends that 
Tira came to her “on several occasions” to disclose that Marc Haws had told her what to 
say and how to say it on the witness stand, and that Mr. Haws had asked the Arbaugh 
family to dispose of a .22 rifle. (R. Vol. 4, pp.248-49, 250, 281; accord R. Vol. 4, pp.286, 
290, 294, 298; 29042 R., p.53.)  Additionally, there is evidence that Tira shared her 
allegations with Pinto Bennett around the time that she drafted her letter to Judge 
Becker. Specifically, Tira herself indicated she had discussed the contents of her letter 
with Mr. Bennett (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.128) and Mr. Bennett corroborated that statement 
(R. Vol. 4, pp.211-14, 217-18, 229, 238).52 
                                            
52 Mr. Bennett provided inconsistent accounts of his conversation with Tira during the 
late summer of 1989. In two affidavits he signed in 2011, Mr. Bennett said he saw the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter before Tira mailed it to Judge Becker. (See R. Vol. 4, p.238.)  
However, when he was deposed approximately three years later, he said did not recall 
having actually seen the letter; he said Tira did not disclose the specifics of the 
prosecutorial misconduct at issue; and he suggested his prior affidavits may not have 
been accurate. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.211-14, 217-18.)  At a minimum though, Mr. Bennett 
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Given that at various times, and to various listeners, Tira made statements 
consistent with those in her letter to Judge Becker, that letter is well-corroborated. 
(v) Passage Of Time  
The LaGrand Court explained the “[t]he amount of time which has passed 
between the event at issue and when the statements are made also should be 
considered” because “[t]he degree of trustworthiness may relate inversely to the amount 
of time which passes . . . .” LaGrand, 734 P.2d 570.  
Tira wrote her letter to Judge Becker in 1989—approximately four years after she 
testified falsely at Mr. Charboneau’s trial. While this may seem like a long time, given 
the unique facts and circumstances of this case it is not. When Tira testified falsely, she 
was still a child (fifteen years old); when she recanted her testimony, she was just 
barely an adult. During the intervening years, Tira had undoubtedly grown and matured, 
refining her value system and developing the courage to ultimately write a letter to the 
judge. In fact, in her letter, she said she decided to come forward because she 
recognized that Mr. Charboneau’s trial was not on the up and up, and she suggested 
she felt guilty for her role in that miscarriage of justice. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-23, 
127-28.) This was a supremely courageous act on her part, and one that requires a 
strength of character one would not expect a child to possess. Thus, it is not at all 
surprising that Tira came forward with the truth in 1989 as a young adult, but not in 1984 
or 1985 as a child.  
                                                                                                                                  
confirmed Tira approached him and told him she had information that would be helpful to 
Mr. Charboneau, and that he encouraged Tira tell somebody what she knew. (R. Vol. 4, 
pp.211-12, 214, 217, 218.)  
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Additionally, as noted, Mr. Charboneau’s case had recently been remanded to 
the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Presumably, Tira knew this. Obviously, if 
Tira knew Mr. Charboneau’s case was coming back to Judge Becker, she would have 
seen an opening to reveal the truth to him. Thus, the timing of Tira’s letter, far from 
being suspicious, actually tends to show that the statements made in that letter are 
reliable. 
(vi) Benefit To The Declarant 
“A statement made by a declarant who will benefit therefrom is probably less 
reliable than a statement which does not benefit the declarant.” LaGrand, 734 P.2d at 
570.  
Whether Tira had anything to gain by penning her letter to Judge Becker is a 
question the district court considered. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.535-37.) As the district court 
pointed out (and as is discussed in Parts II.C.1(b)(ii) & (iii), supra), Tira had absolutely 
nothing to gain and much to lose. She had no improper motive to write the letter—she 
was not trying to curry favor with the police or the court, and her personal relationship 
with Mr. Charboneau was not particularly strong under the circumstances. And she had 
much to lose. In addition to inviting a perjury charge, Tira was concerned that her letter 
to Judge Becker was improper. At the same time, she must have known that her letter 
would get her crosswise with both law enforcement and her own family. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, anything that she did that helped Mr. Charboneau risked 
impeding her ability to obtain “closure” over the untimely death of her beloved mother. 
As the district court found, the fact that Tira had nothing to gain from her letter to 
Judge Becker and much to lose suggests her letter is trustworthy. 
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(vii) Psychological And Physical Surroundings 
Neither the LaGrand Court, nor the Meister Court, has explained precisely how 
the psychological and physical environment surrounding the making of a statement may 
contribute to the reliability of that statement. See LaGrand, 734 P.2d at 570; Meister, 
148 Idaho at 242 & n.7. However, the district court in this case has offered a compelling 
analysis in this regard. The district court focused first on Tira’s mental state, noting that 
Tira admitted she had struggled with what happened in Mr. Charboneau’s case, and 
had even had nightmares about it; the district court pointed out that Tira said her mother 
would have wanted her to come forward with the truth. (R. Vol. 4, p.535.) The district 
court next discussed how difficult the situation was for young Tira—partly because of 
the pain attendant to losing her mother, and partly because coming forward with the 
truth was against the wishes of the rest of her family. (R. Vol. 4, pp.535-36.) Thereafter, 
the district court referenced the fact that Tira gave it some thought, and even talked to 
an old friend of the family—Pinto Bennett—before deciding to send her letter. (R. Vol. 4, 
p.4, p.537.) Finally, the district court noted that the letter is clear, consistent and 
logical—obviously the product of a sound mind having engaged in thoughtful 
deliberation. (R. Vol. 4, pp.540-41.) 
What the district court did not get into is that the physical environment in which 
Tira appears to have written her letter. According to the letter itself, she wrote it in 
Bruneau while attending “a cowboy benefit and street dance,” where Pinto Bennett and 
his band were providing the music.53  (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.128.) Thus, she was in a festive 
                                            
53 In a footnote, the State asserts “there is overwhelming evidence that Exhibit 14 was 
not created under the circumstances set forth within it,” i.e., after a discussion with Pinto 
Bennett at a street dance in Bruneau on or about September 6, 1989.  (App. Br., p.42 
n.14.)  This contention by the State is discussed (and rebutted) in Part III.E, infra. 
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environment—not the type of environment where one would be pressured into making a 
false confession to perjury. 
(viii) Other Considerations 
While not necessarily part of the Meister standard for evaluating the 
trustworthiness of a statement, it is worth noting that the district court found other 
compelling circumstantial guarantees that the statements in the Tira Arbaugh Letter are 
trustworthy. First, the district court noted Tira’s version of events was not over-the-top in 
its exculpatory effect suggests it was not concocted for Mr. Charboneau’s benefit. (See 
R. Vol. 4, p.536.) Second, the district court found the fact Tira “named names” and 
specifically invited further inquiry into her allegations tends to increase the reliability of 
those allegations because someone concocting a lie would not want to be fact-checked. 
(See R. Vol. 4, pp.541-42.) Third, the district court concluded that, although Tira could 
not possibly have known it when she wrote her letter in 1989, Marc Haws, one of the 
individuals she identified as having committed misconduct in Mr. Charboneau’s case, 
just so happened to have committed similar misconduct in another capital murder case 
a couple years earlier.54  (R. Vol. 4, pp.542-43.) Finally, the district court found very 
significant the fact that various state actors were so intent upon intercepting and 
concealing the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (R. Vol. 4, p.543.) As the district court explained, 
the “inference here . . . is that the Arbaugh letter was concealed precisely because it 
                                            
54 The question of whether the district court was permitted to consider Marc Haws’ 
misconduct in the earlier case is discussed in detail in Part IV, infra. As is discussed 
therein, although the “prior bad act” evidence concerning the prior misconduct would 
have been inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), the Rules of Evidence did 
not apply to the district court’s analysis of whether the Tira Arbaugh Letter was itself 
admissible. See I.R.E. 101(e)(1). Thus, Mr. Haws’ prior misconduct was properly 
considered in conjunction with the limited question of whether the Tira Arbaugh Letter 
was sufficiently trustworthy as to be deemed admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). 
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does have destructive value to those who know the ins and outs and possible 
weaknesses of Charboneau’s murder case.” (R. Vol. 4, p.543.) As the district court 
found, all of these considerations suggest that, in fact, the statements in the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter are trustworthy. 
(ix) Conclusion 
Given all of the above considerations, the State has shown no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the statements against Tira’s interest 
contained with her letter to Judge Becker are trustworthy. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the district court order finding them admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).  
c) Those Statements In The Tira Arbaugh Letter That Are Not 
Statements Against Interest Are Nonetheless Admissible Under 
The Hearsay Exception For Present Sense Impressions (I.R.E. 
803(1)) And/Or Statements Of Then-Existing State Of Mind (I.R.E. 
803(3)) 
Mr. Charboneau freely admits that some of the individual statements in the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter are not statements which tended to subject Tira to civil or criminal 
liability when they were made but, rather, were statements of her then-existing state of 
mind and descriptions of her feelings. For example, virtually the entire first page of her 
letter explains why she wrote her letter and the internal turmoil she felt over writing that 
letter. For example, her letter begins as follows:  
Sir, I am writing this letter to you because I believe you should 
know the truth about some of the things that happened the day my mom 
died [and] the truth about some of the things that I was told to say [and] 
told not to say. I believe my mom would want me to tell the truth about 
these things. None of this is easy for me because I loved my mom. She 
was my best friend [and] I feel lost [and] alone without her. 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.122.) In then continues in a similar vein into the second page, where it 
begins its discussion of Tira’s prior false testimony. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-23.) 
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Thereafter, it contains references to Tira’s state of mind interwoven with one of her 
statements against interest: 
 One other thing that bothers me sir is something Marc Haws the 
new prosecutor from Boise had told us to do. Mr. Haws has told us that we 
need to get rid of mom’s Calamity Jane rifle. I don’t understand why he 
would want us to do that but grandpa [and] me [and] uncle Jimmy we all 
went out to the el-rancho property last week [and] we buried mom’s rifle 
out there behind the potato cellar . . . . 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.126-27.) Finally, the letter concludes with two paragraphs again 
expressing Tira’s feelings:  “[Judge] Becker I know that this is not right [and] I hope that 
I am doing the right thing by telling you these things. Can you please call or write to my 
grandpa [and] talk to him about this stuff?  Because I know he is a good man [and] if he 
is doing anything bad or wrong it’s only because he is so mad at Jamie [sic] . . . .” 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.127-28.) 
All of these types of statements were admissible as statements of Tira’s then-
exiting state of mind and/or as present sense impressions. Under the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, hearsay statements are admissible if they “describ[e] or explain[ ] an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event of condition, or 
immediately thereafter,” I.R.E. 803(1), or if they reveal “the declarant’s then existing 
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, 
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health),” I.R.E. 803(3). In her letter, Tira was 
describing her thoughts and feelings at the time of her writing of that letter. Among other 
things, she explained that she was unsure of whether her letter was proper and 
expressed a concern that her family would not approve of her revealing the truth; she 
discussed her feeling of guilt and confusion over what had happened in 
Mr. Charboneau’s case; she said she believed she had a moral obligation to right her 
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wrongs and the wrongs of police and prosecutor involved; and she expressed her love 
and respect for her grandfather, and her belief that he would ultimately do the right thing 
by telling the truth too. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.122-23, 126-27.) These were all 
statements describing her state of mind and emotions at the time and, therefore, they 
are admissible under Rules 803(1) and/or 803(3). 
2. The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Tira Arbaugh Letter Is 
Admissible For The Truth Of The Matters Asserted Therein Because It 
Consists Of Statements Which Are Admissible Under The Residual 
Hearsay Exception (I.R.E. 804(b)(6)) 
Under the residual (catch-all) hearsay exception, a hearsay statement by an 
unavailable declarant may be admitted if it is: 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
[for unavailable declarants] but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence. 
I.R.E. 804(b)(6). The district court found the Tira Arbaugh Letter would be admissible 
under this hearsay exception. (R. Vol. 4, pp.546-47.) In doing so, the court relied 
primarily upon the ten indicia of trustworthiness it had previously discussed in 
determining the letter was sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy within the meaning 
of the “statement against interest” exception of Rule 804(b)(3). (See R. Vol. 4, p.547; 
see also R. Vol. 4, pp.535-43 (discussing the ten circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness).) 
On appeal, the State challenges this ruling. (App. Br., pp.43-46.) First, it argues 
that the Tira Arbaugh Letter is not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 
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804(b)(6). (App. Br., pp.43-44, 45.) Second, it claims the letter does not evidence a 
material fact, as it merely impeached Tira’s testimony. (App. Br., pp.44, 46.) Third, it 
asserts the letter is not more probative than the other evidence, i.e., Tira’s since-
recanted testimony. (App. Br., pp.44-45, 46.) Fourth, the State says “the purpose of the 
hearsay rules and interests of justice are not served by admission” of the letter. (App. 
Br., p.45.) 
a) The Statements In The Tira Arbaugh Letter Have Circumstantial 
Guarantees Of Trustworthiness Equivalent To Those In Statements 
Subject To The Specifically-Enumerated Hearsay Exceptions 
 The State contends the Tira Arbaugh Letter does not have adequate 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. (App. Br., pp.43-44, 45.) In making this 
argument though, the State misrepresents the applicable standard in the same way that 
it misrepresents the “trustworthiness” standard under Rule 804(b)(3) (see Part II.C.1(b), 
supra)—it falsely suggests the degree to which the statement at issue is contradicted or 
corroborated by the other evidence in the case is the sole question. (See App. Br., p.44 
(arguing an unsworn hearsay statement cannot be trustworthy if it contradicts sworn 
testimony), p.45 (drawing a false distinction between “credible” and “trustworthy” 
statements, and claiming a credibility examination is not the proper inquiry under Rule 
804(b)(6)).) However, under Rule 804(b)(6), just as with Rule 804(b)(3), the degree to 
which the statement at issue is consistent with the other evidence of guilt or innocence 
is only part of the required in analysis. In State v. Giles, the Idaho Supreme Court made 
it clear the critical question is whether the statement is reliable, and that reliability is not 
just judged by the degree to which the statement at issue is consistent with other 
evidence concerning the alleged crime, but also by evidence concerning the 
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circumstances under which the statement was made. See 115 Idaho 984, 987-88 
(1989). Likewise, in State v. Hester, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
admissibility of hearsay pursuant to [the residual hearsay exception] depends upon the 
trustworthiness of the evidence and the necessity for its use,” and it affirmed the trial 
court’s admission of hearsay under that exception, in part, because the hearsay 
appeared reliable. 114 Idaho 688, 696-98 (1988). In determining reliability, the trial court 
had not focused on the degree to which the content of the declarant’s statement was 
consistent with the other evidence in the case; instead, it focused on other, more 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness—that the declarant seemed truthful, 
exhibited a good memory of the relevant events, did not show signs of confusion, and 
appropriately spoke up when he had relevant information to share and quieted down 
when he did not.55  Id. at 698. Thus, for the State to suggest once more that the 
admissibility of the Tira Arbaugh Letter is wholly dependent on the degree to which it is 
consistent (or in conflict) with the other evidence of the alleged crime is wholly incorrect. 
With regard to the substantive question of whether the Tira Arbaugh Letter has 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent of those found in the 
specifically-enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule, no further discussion is required 
here. A closely-related issue was discussed in Part II.C.1(b), above, where 
Mr. Charboneau analyzed the question of whether Tira’s statements against interest 
were sufficiently trustworthy under Rule 804(b)(3). For the same reasons that Tira’s 
                                            
55 In speaking of the residual hearsay exceptions, the Hester Court observed that, as a 
matter of policy, “[H]earsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of 
the evidence of the declarant.” Hester, 114 Idaho at 698. 
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statements are trustworthy for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3), so too are they trustworthy 
for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6). 
Nonetheless, one final point warrants discussion. In finding that the statements in 
the Tira Arbaugh Letter are trustworthy, the district court relied upon the truth of 
statements contained within that letter. (See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, p.535 (finding Tira’s mental 
state, as revealed by statements in the letter itself, to provide a circumstantial guarantee 
of trustworthiness as to other statements in the letter).) Likewise, Mr. Charboneau has 
relied upon the truth of statements contained within the letter to argue that the contents 
of the letter are trustworthy and therefore admissible. (See, e.g., Part II.C.1(b)(vii), supra 
(arguing that Tira’s psychological condition and physical surroundings, as revealed by 
the letter itself, provided circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness).) The State 
seems to think that this approach is incorrect, although it makes no argument as to why 
it would be incorrect. The whole of its argument on this point is as follows: 
[T]he district court relied primarily upon evidence within Exhibit 14 to 
bootstrap a finding of trustworthiness. The judge found statements within 
Exhibit 14—such as the declarant’s statement of motive for writing the 
document, the description of the circumstances of writing the document, 
and the date and the statement the document was intended to go to Judge 
Becker—to be credible in order to find the Exhibit credible. 
(See App. Br., p.45.) The State’s argument is meritless. First, because it offers no 
explanation of how the district court’s approach could have been wrong, it is inadequate 
under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a) and, therefore, it is waived. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 
263. Second, it fails to account for the fact that the statements at issue were either 
independently admissible as present sense impressions or as statements of Tira’s then-
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existing state of mind (see Part II.C.1(c), supra), or were otherwise corroborated.56  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, even assuming the statements relied upon were 
not themselves admissible because they were hearsay, there was nothing improper 
about the district court relying on them to determine the admissibility of the balance of 
the statements in the letter. See I.R.E. 101(e)(1) (providing the Rules of Evidence do 
not apply to the determination of preliminary questions of fact necessary to determine 
whether evidence is admissible). 
In light of all of this, the State has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in 
the district court’s determination that the contents of the Tira Arbaugh Letter have 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those required for other 
hearsay exceptions. 
b) The Statements In The Tira Arbaugh Letter Relate To Material 
Matters  
 The State contends the Tira Arbaugh Letter “is not offered as evidence of a 
material fact,” but only “to contradict Tira’s sworn trial testimony, an impeachment 
purpose.” (App. Br., p.44.) However, the State fails to elaborate on this contention in 
any way; it offers no analysis whatsoever in support of the contention that the letter is 
not “material.” (See App. Br., p.44.) Accordingly, the State’s briefing is inadequate under 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a), and its argument on this issue is waived. See Zichko, 129 
Idaho at 263. 
                                            
56 For example, Tira’s statements about writing her letter in Bruneau, Idaho after 
speaking to Pinto Bennett are corroborated by both the postmark on the letter’s 
envelope (see R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.97) and the statements of Mr. Bennett (see R. Vol. 4, 
pp.211-12, 229). And the date is corroborated by the file stamp on the envelope. (See 
R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.97.)  
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Even if this Court reaches the merit of the State’s argument though, it should 
reject it. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, evidence may at the same time be 
both material and impeaching. See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74 (2011) (holding 
that where a witness’ prior testimony was inconsistent with his testimony at trial, and it 
tended to support the defendant’s claim of innocence, that prior inconsistent testimony 
was both material and impeaching).57  Thus, while the statements in Tira’s letter 
certainly tend to impeach her, they also tend to support Mr. Charboneau’s version of the 
facts—for example, that Mr. Charboneau was interacting with the Arbaugh family on the 
day of the shooting, and thus was not lying in wait for days; that Tiffnie was armed with 
the rifle linked to the fatal shots, and she fired it; and that Mr. Charboneau did not fire a 
second round of shots while the girls were inside and, thus, did not execute 
Ms. Arbaugh. This evidence, at a minimum, undermines the basis for a first-degree, 
premeditated murder conviction and could even support a self-defense theory. Thus, it 
is clearly material. 
c) The Statements In The Tira Arbaugh Letter Are The Most Highly 
Probative Evidence Available On The Point For Which It Will Be 
Offered  
 The State argues that the Tira Arbaugh Letter “is not more probative than other 
evidence”; it contends simply that Tira’s trial testimony was more probative than the 
                                            
57 In Ellington, the Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals’ explanation of the 
difference between material (“substantive”) evidence and impeachment evidence: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of persuading 
the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the determination 
of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to 
discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by 
bringing forth the evidence which explains why the jury should not put faith 
in him or his testimony.  
151 Idaho at 74. 
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statements in her letter because the testimony was sworn. (App. Br., pp.44-45.) In 
support of this argument, the State cites State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396 (Ct. App. 
1998). (See App. Br., pp.44-45.) 
The State’s reliance on Hawkins is misplaced though. That case does not stand 
for the sweeping proposition that sworn testimony is always more probative than an out-
of-court statement recanting that testimony, as the State suggests. Rather, it stands for 
the proposition that, under the unique facts and circumstances of that case, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in precluding admission of a hearsay statement which 
not only controverted the sworn testimony of another witness, but which was also 
ambiguous on its face, had marginal relevance, and bore no circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness. Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 404. Indeed, in State v. Ransom, the Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that testimony is automatically more probative than 
out-of-court statements “simply because of the procedural safeguards in the courtroom, 
including the presence of a jury and the fact that live testimony is subject to an oath and 
cross-examination.” 124 Idaho 703, 708 (1993). It observed that such an argument, 
“[t]aken to its logical conclusion, . . . would preclude admissibility of any hearsay 
statement under [Idaho Rule of Evidence] 803(24),” the residual hearsay exception for 
available witnesses, and it made it clear that under the residual hearsay objections, “the 
trial court’s analysis will generally be confined to a case-by-case basis.” Ransom, 124 
Idaho at 708.  
Under the facts of this case, there is little reason to believe Tira’s testimony is 
more probative than her subsequent letter. As her letter makes clear, that testimony 
was false—the product of manipulation at the hands of the police and the prosecutor. In 
 89 
contrast, the letter is a product of Tira seeking to right her past wrong and clear her 
conscience. And, as is discussed at length above (see Parts II.C.1(b) & II.C.2(a), 
supra), it has significant circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 
d) Admission Of The Statements In The Tira Arbaugh Letter Is 
Necessary To Further The Objectives Of The Idaho Rules Of 
Evidence And Serve The Interests Of Justice 
Finally, the State asserts in wholly conclusory fashion that “the purposes of the 
hearsay rules and interests of justice are not served by admission of Exhibit 14.” (App. 
Br., p.45.) It does not elaborate at all. 
The State’s one-sentence argument is insufficient to comply with the briefing 
requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a) and, therefore, should be deemed waived. 
See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. However, to the extent this Court is willing to consider 
the State’s argument, Mr. Charboneau contends it should be rejected on its merits. 
A ruling that the Tira Arbaugh Letter is inadmissible on hearsay grounds, which 
would effectively mean that the truth could never be considered (since Tira is now 
dead), would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court has noted, “[H]earsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over 
complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.” Hester, 114 Idaho at 698 (quoting M. 
Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, C 804, p.11 (4th 
Supp.1985)). Further, to hold the Tira Arbaugh Letter inadmissible would constitute a 
tragic miscarriage of justice. Not only would it allow a wrongful conviction to stand, but 
such a ruling would tell prosecutors that their constitutional obligations under Brady are 
absolutely meaningless—all they have to do is hide exculpatory evidence long enough 
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for the relevant witnesses to die. Giving prosecutors a roadmap to circumvent 
defendants’ rights and wrongfully incarcerate innocents is not justice.    
e) Conclusion 
For all of the reasons set forth above, the State has failed to demonstrate any 
abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling that the Tira Arbaugh Letter is admissible 
under the residual hearsay exception of Rule 804(b)(6). 
3. Even If The Contents Of The Tira Arbaugh Letter Would Not Be 
Admissible For Their Truth Upon A Retrial, Such A Holding Would Not 
Entitle The State To The Relief It Seeks 
As noted, since the district court did not admit the Tira Arbaugh Letter for its truth 
at Mr. Charboneau’s evidentiary hearing, the State is not challenging its admission and 
use at a contested proceeding. Rather, the State’s claim is that the district court erred in 
ruling that the contents of the letter would be admissible for their truth at a future retrial. 
The State argues this ruling was error because, under the Rules of Evidence, all of the 
contents of the letter are inadmissible hearsay. Thus, the State claims the district court 
erred in denying its motion for summary dismissal and, later, in granting summary 
disposition in favor of Mr. Charboneau. (See App. Br., p.46.)  
Besides the fact that the State’s briefing is insufficient on both of these points,58 
its arguments do not support the relief requested. As discussed above, in denying the 
State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court did not rule the Tira Arbaugh 
                                            
58 The State asserts in conclusory fashion that, “Because Exhibit 14 is inadmissible 
hearsay, the district court erred by not granting the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal for failure to support the petition with admissible evidence. It also erred in 
granting Charboneau summary judgment.” (App. Br., p.46.) However, it cites no 
authority in support of its argument, and it makes no effort to analyze the remaining 
evidence. (See App. Br., p.46.)  Accordingly, the State’s briefing is insufficient under 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a) and its argument is waived. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. 
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Letter admissible for the truth of the matters asserted therein, as the State now claims59; 
rather, the district court simply held that, regardless of whether the contents of the letter 
would be admissible at a new trial now, either the letter itself would have been 
admissible at Mr. Charboneau’s re-sentencing in 1991 or, alternatively, Tira’s live 
testimony would have been available and admissible at that re-sentencing hearing. (See 
5/24/13 Tr., p.59, Ls.14-25, p.60, L.20 – p.61, L.10.) And the district court was correct. 
Tira was still alive in 1991 and so, had Mr. Charboneau known of her letter recanting 
her prior testimony, he could have called her as a witness at his re-sentencing and she 
could have painted a very different picture of the events of July 1, 1984. Alternatively, 
Mr. Charboneau could have simply offered the Tira Arbaugh Letter into evidence at his 
1991 re-sentencing hearing because the Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing 
hearings, I.R.E. 101(e)(3), and, indeed, hearsay is routinely admitted at such hearings, 
see e.g., State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 460-62 (2013) (holding the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation does not apply to testimonial hearsay offered against 
the defendant at his sentencing hearing). In either case, the evidence suggests that 
Mr. Charboneau is far less culpable for Ms. Arbaugh’s death than the State originally 
claimed, as it shows, at a minimum, that he did not lie in wait for her or deliver an 
execution-style second round of shots. Thus, regardless of whether the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter would be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence at a future trial, that letter 
still constituted admissible evidence to support Mr. Charboneau’s Brady claim because 
it was (and still is) material with regard to his sentence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 
419, 433-34 (1995) (quoting Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in United States v. Bagley, 
                                            
59 See note 32, supra (discussing the State’s misrepresentation of the district court’s 
ruling). 
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473 U.S. 667 (1985), for the proposition that “favorable evidence is material, and 
constitutional error results from its suppression by the government ‘if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different’”); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . 
.”). So even if this Court agrees with the State that the Tira Arbaugh Letter consists 
solely of hearsay which would be inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence, that does 
not mean the district court erred in denying the State’s motion for summary dismissal. 
In terms of the district court’s grant of summary disposition in Mr. Charboneau’s 
favor, again, the State’s arguments do not support its ultimate prayer for relief. Even if 
the Tira Arbaugh Letter would constitute inadmissible hearsay at a future trial, it would 
still be admissible at a future sentencing hearing. Under Brady, the question is not 
whether the suppressed evidence would be material to a future proceeding; it is whether 
its suppression rendered the prior proceedings unfair. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434; 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. And here, the letter came into existence (and was promptly 
concealed by the State) in 1989—well before Mr. Charboneau’s 1991 re-sentencing. 
Thus, its suppression impacted not only the sentence Mr. Charboneau received at his 
1991 re-sentencing, but also his ability to file a motion for a new trial.60  Based on the 
new version of events provided by Tira—which she could have testified to at any time 
prior to her death in 1998 (see R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.973)—Mr. Charboneau could reasonably 
                                            
60 Under Idaho Criminal Rule 34 (which has not changed since it first went into effect in 
1980), a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be filed within two years of 
the final judgment.  
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have been retried and acquitted (based on a self-defense theory); he could have been 
retried and convicted of a lesser offense of second degree murder or voluntary 
manslaughter; or he could have been convicted of first degree murder again, but 
received a sentence less than fixed life. Thus, the letter was material to both 
Mr. Charboneau’s conviction and his sentence and, therefore, the district court did not 
err in granting summary disposition in Mr. Charboneau’s favor. 
D. The State Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s 
Decision To Admit Exhibit 4 (The “Shedd Note”) 
Included within the packet of documents delivered to Mr. Charboneau by 
Corporal Hiskett was the “Shedd Note.” As discussed above, the Shedd Note—a one-
page note signed by DeWayne Shedd—is a confession of sorts. It alleges that Deputy 
Attorney General Tim McNeese asked Mr. Shedd to monitor all of Mr. Charboneau’s 
incoming and outgoing mail, including his legal mail, and to surreptitiously confiscate 
any mail from Jerome County Sheriff Larry Gold or bearing Tira’s name. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, 
p.95.) The note further alleges Mr. Shedd was instructed that if he found any such mail, 
he should immediately notify Mr. McNeese or, alternatively, Marc Haws. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, 
p.95.) Ultimately, everyone agreed that Mr. Shedd signed the note, and the district court 
found as a factual matter that Mr. Shedd also wrote it and, even if he did not, he 
certainly ratified the statements contained therein. (R. Vol. 3, p.129.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Charboneau’s counsel twice moved for admission 
of the Shedd Note (Evid. Tr., p.45, Ls.7-8, p.383, L.25 – p.384, L.3) and both times the 
State objected, arguing that the statements in the note were inadmissible hearsay (Evid. 
Tr., p.31, Ls.9-15, p.384, L.20 – p.385, L.3). The first time the issue arose, the district 
court admitted the note for the limited purpose of showing what was in the envelope. 
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(Evid. Tr., p.31, Ls.18-22, p.262, L.6 – p.263, L.6.) Later though, the court admitted the 
note unconditionally. (Evid. Tr., p.390, L.2 – p.391, L.8; see also Evid. Tr., p.414, Ls.9-
11.) In admitting the Shedd Note for all purposes, including the truth of the matters 
asserted therein, the district court never specifically addressed the State’s “hearsay” 
objection. (See Evid. Tr., p.390, L.2 – p.391, L.8.) 
On appeal, the State complains that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the Shedd Note for the truth of the matters asserted therein. (App. Br., pp.34-
35.) Specifically, it argues very simply that because the Shedd Note contains out-of-
court statements which were offered for their truth, it fits the definition of hearsay under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 and, because, no exception to the hearsay rule was cited 
by the district court, it was inadmissible under Rule 802. (App. Br., pp.34-35.) 
The State’s arguments fail. The Shedd Note was properly admitted as non-
hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) (admissions by a party’s agent) or, 
alternatively, under the hearsay exception for present sense impressions (Rule 803(1)) 
and/or statements of then-existing states of mind (Rule 803(3)). Although these were 
apparently not the grounds upon which the Shedd Note was admitted, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has long held that a district court’s order will be affirmed on appeal 
based on the correct theory, regardless of whether that theory formed the basis for the 
ruling below. See, e.g., Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 
440, 460 (2012).  
1. The Shedd Note Was Admissible As Non-Hearsay Under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) (Statement By A Party’s Agent Or Servant) 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, “A statement is not hearsay if . . . The 
statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by a party’s agent or servant 
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concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment of the servant or 
agent, made during the existence of the relationship . . . .” I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). Under 
this Rule, the statements in the Shedd Note are non-hearsay if:  (a) DeWayne Shedd 
was an agent or servant of a party; (b) the statements concerned a matter within the 
scope of Mr. Shedd’s agency or employment; and (c) the statements were made while 
Mr. Shedd was employed by a party. 
a) DeWayne Shedd Was An Agent Or Servant Of A Party, The State 
Of Idaho 
In civil cases,61 government employees are considered agents of the government 
for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(D).62  Thus, out-of-court statements made by 
government employees concerning matters within the scope of their employment, are 
non-hearsay within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Cf., e.g., Lowber v. City of New 
Cordell, Okla., 378 Fed. Appx. 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2010) (in an employment 
discrimination action against a public employer (a city), the mayor’s out-of-court state 
was non-hearsay, as it was a statement by a party’s agent under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)); 
L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 347, 359 
(Fed. Cl. 2010) (in review of an administrative action concerning alleged Air Force 
procurement improprieties, documents prepared by government employees and agents 
                                            
61 “An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure 
Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature.” Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521 (2010). 
62 Some courts have refused to apply Rule 801(d)(2)(D) to government employees in 
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 448 F.3d 294, 298-99 & n.14 (5th Cir. 
2006). Although this Court need not reach that issue in this case, Mr. Charboneau 
submits those cases are wrongly decided, as they are inconsistent with the plain 
language of the Rule and represent an attempt to ascribe to the Rule a common law 
standard that was jettisoned with adoption of the rules of evidence. See generally Anne 
Bowen Poulin, Party Admissions in Criminal Cases: Should the Government Have to 
Eat its Words?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 401 (2002).  
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were non-hearsay under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1262 
(9th Cir. 1982) (in a civil rights action by inmates challenging conditions at a state 
penitentiary, out-of-court statements of employees of state Attorney General’s office 
contained within an investigative report were non-hearsay under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)), 
abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Sanchez v. 
California, 90 F.Supp.3d 1036, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (in an employment discrimination 
action against a public employer (the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation), a co-worker’s out-of-court statement was non-hearsay, as it was a 
statement by a party’s agent under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)); M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 
F.Supp.2d 400, 436 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (in a civil rights action against heads of city 
and state agencies, out-of-court statements of city employees were non-hearsay, as 
they were statements by a the state’s agent under F.R.E. 802(d)(2)(D)); Sadrud-Din v. 
City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (in a civil rights action against the City 
of Chicago and certain police supervisors, out-of-court statements of police officers 
were non-hearsay under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D)).63  
Here DeWayne Shedd was clearly an agent of the State, as he was (and still is) 
an employee of the IDOC. (See Evid. Tr., p.265, L.17 – p.267, L.1.) And, while the State 
may try to claim that the IDOC is not a party to this case because that particular 
department has not been specifically named as a respondent,64 such an argument 
would be meritless here. The two parties to this case are Mr. Charboneau and the State 
                                            
63 Federal Rule of Evidence 801 is substantively identical to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
801. 
64 Below, the State argued it was not obligated to disclose through the discovery 
process documents or information under the control of the IDOC because IDOC is not a 
“party” to this case. (See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, pp.603-06.)  Mr. Charboneau assumes the 
State will try to make a similar argument here. 
 97 
of Idaho (see, e.g., R. Vol. 5, p.675 (Clerk’s Certificate of Appeal)), and the latter 
includes the IDOC. 
While it is certainly possible in civil cases in Idaho for a particular governmental 
agency, department, etc. (as opposed to the State as a whole) to be named as a party 
to the case, see, e.g., I.R.C.P. 3(b) (“[A]ll civil actions by or against a governmental unit 
or agency . . . shall designate such party in its governmental . . . name only . . . .”), that 
common practice in no way precludes the State as a whole from being a party to an 
action. Indeed, every criminal case filed in Idaho bears the caption, “State of Idaho v. 
[Defendant]”; never is such a case brought in the name of the city or county in which the 
case is brought, the local prosecutor’s office, the Attorney General’s Office, or any other 
agency, department, etc. This makes sense, of course, because criminal cases are 
prosecuted by the government for the benefit of all the people of the State of Idaho.  
Likewise, every civil post-conviction action in Idaho is captioned, “[Petitioner] v. 
State of Idaho,” as it is properly filed against the State as a whole. See I.C. § 19-4905 
(“All costs and expenses necessarily incurred by the state in the proceedings shall be 
paid by the county in which the application is filed.”); 19-4906(a) (“Within 30 days after 
the docketing of the application, or within any further time the court may fix, the state 
shall respond by answer or by motion which may be supported by affidavits.”); 19-4909 
(providing that either the petitioner or “the state” may appeal any final judgment, and 
that on any such appeal, “the state shall be represented by the attorney general”) 
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(emphases added). Thus, it is the State as a whole that is the party opposite the 
petitioner in a post-conviction case.65 
With regard to Mr. Charboneau, no particular agency, department, or political 
subdivision was identified as the prosecuting party; rather, the State as a whole 
prosecuted Mr. Charboneau. (See, e.g., 16339 R., pp.80-81 (information).) And, more 
recently, this post-conviction case was filed against the State as a whole. Under these 
circumstances, the “party” opposing Mr. Charboneau is not Jerome County or the Office 
of the Attorney General, but the State of Idaho. As was explained in United States v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., where prosecutorial or enforcement actions are 
undertaken on behalf of a sovereign as a whole for the benefit of all of its people, and 
the “concerns and activities of the government generally are implicated” in the action, 
not just those of the prosecuting or enforcing agency, it “makes no sense to hold that 
the [prosecuting or enforcing agency], which essentially is a law office, alone comprises” 
the party. 498 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D.D.C. 1980) [hereinafter, AT&T]. Thus, the AT&T 
Court went on to hold that, in an antitrust action initiated by the United States against 
AT&T, the plaintiff was the whole of the United States, not just the Department of 
Justice and the Attorney General, such that statements made by all executive branch 
personnel were statements by a party’s agent under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). Id. at 356-
                                            
65 This is not unheard of in the civil context. For example, the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
(I.C. § 6-901 et seq.), makes it clear that not only can Idaho’s agencies, departments, 
etc. and its political subdivisions be sued, but also the State as a whole can be sued. 
See I.C. § 6-902(1) (defining “State” to mean “the state of Idaho or any office, 
department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university or other instrumentality thereof”) (emphases added). 
 99 
58.66  Mr. Charboneau submits that the same principle applies here—because the State 
of Idaho is the party opposing him, all statements made by executive branch personnel 
concerning matters within the scope of their employment were admissions by a party-
opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).  
Insofar as the State attempts to limit the definition of “party” (as it is applied to the 
State of Idaho for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(D)) based on an analogy to the scope of 
the State’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady,67 the State’s 
analogy will be misplaced. To compare the definition of “party” under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) to the scope of the prosecution’s obligation to disclose 
exculpatory evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to 
compare apples and oranges. The former is a rule of evidence, apparently calculated to 
allow judges and juries to hear all of the reliable evidence for and against each party to 
a case before engaging in the fact-finding function, see I.R.E. 102; the latter is a 
constitutional standard of fairness, imposed upon the lawyers for a certain party in a 
particular type of case, see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88. In other words, while the former is 
                                            
66 AT&T was cited with approval in Globe Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 61 
Fed. Cl. 91, 97 (Fed. Cl. 2004). See also United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (leaving open the question of “[w]hether or not the entire federal government 
in all its capacities should be deemed a party-opponent in criminal cases,” but holding 
the Justice Department is “certainly” all one entity such that prosecutors in one part of 
the Department are charged with knowledge of the activities of the rest of the 
Department). 
67 As noted, below, the State attempted to deny Mr. Charboneau discovery of evidence 
in the control of the IDOC based on an argument that the IDOC is not a party to this 
case. (See note 64, supra.)  In making this argument, the State sought to limit the 
definition of itself as a “party” by making an analogy to the scope of its obligations under 
Brady in criminal cases. (R. Vol. 1, pp.603-06.)  The State’s point in making this analogy 
was to say a prosecutor’s Brady obligations extend only to the prosecutor himself and 
“the government agents having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the 
offense.” (R. Vol. 1, p.603 (quoting Queen v. State, 146 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 
2008).)  Mr. Charboneau anticipates the State will make a similar argument here. 
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aimed at simply providing competent evidence to the fact-finder, the latter is geared 
toward preventing the prosecutor from manipulating the proceeding as a whole, see id. 
at 88 (indicating that allowing a prosecutor to withhold exculpatory evidence would 
“cast[ ] the prosecutor in the role of an architect of the proceeding”). Thus, the Brady 
standard would logically extend to those involved in the investigation and prosecution of 
crime, but not necessarily those in other branches of government without knowledge of, 
much less incentive to manipulate the process in, an individual prosecution. So, even 
assuming the State is correct in its characterization of the limited scope of its obligations 
under Brady,68 the scope of those obligations cannot logically be analogized to the 
scope of the meaning of “party” in Rule 801(d)(2). Indeed, the State as a “party” under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) is better analogized to a large corporation with hundreds (or even 
thousands) of employees in multiple divisions and, perhaps, multiple physical sites, see 
Poulin, supra, at 468-69, where an a statement of an employee would certainly be 
considered an admission by a party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). 
                                            
68 Mr. Charboneau does not concede that the State’s characterization of the scope of its 
Brady obligations is correct. While the State correctly quotes Queen, and while Queen 
cites other Idaho precedent, the relevant Brady analysis is more nuanced than the State 
would have this Court believe. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 
that although the FDA is not generally a part of law enforcement, and certainly is not an 
arm of the Department of Justice, where it is charged with administering a certain 
statute, and consulted with the prosecutor, it “is to be considered as part of the 
prosecution in determining what information must be made available to the defendant . . 
. .” United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding evidence in the hands of the 
Bureau of Prisons was in the possession and control of the government for purposes of 
discovery because the prosecutor had knowledge of, and access to, the evidence in 
question). However, because the any analogy between a prosecutor’s disclosure 
obligation under Brady and the definition of “party” under Rule 801(d)(2) is not 
appropriate, this Court need not address the State’s characterization of the scope of its 
Brady obligations here. 
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In short, no matter how the State may try to distance itself from Mr. Shedd and 
his statements concerning the concealment of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, the fact is that 
because he was an employee of the State of Idaho, he was an agent or servant of a 
party.  
Alternatively, even if all IDOC employees are not agents of a party (the State) for 
purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in all post-conviction cases, under the unique facts of this 
case, Mr. Shedd was still an agent of the State. The Shedd Note itself suggests that 
Mr. Shedd conspired with at least three other individuals to hide exculpatory evidence 
from Mr. Charboneau. It says that he received his orders from a Tim McNeese, a deputy 
attorney general; it indicates that Mr. McNeese had identified Marc Haws, the former 
prosecutor on Mr. Charboneau’s case, as another member of the conspiracy; and it 
states that Mr. Shedd brought Lieutenant Unger, a second IDOC employee into the 
fold.69  (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) Further, the district court ultimately found that 
Mr. Shedd was part of a larger conspiracy to intercept and conceal the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter and, although it specifically declined to identify the other participants in the 
conspiracy, it found that Mr. Shedd did not act alone. (R. Vol. 3, pp.134-36, 137-38.) In 
terms of identifying the scope of the conspiracy, the district court found as follows:  
                                            
69 Mr. Shedd’s contention that such a conspiracy existed was corroborated by other 
evidence. For example, the 2001 Gold Letter stated Sheriff Gold’s belief that there was 
a conspiracy afoot. (See R. Vol. 1, pp.151-52.)  As noted above, in that letter, Sheriff 
Gold asserted there “appeared to be a ‘collaboration of minds’” manipulating 
Mr. Charboneau’s criminal case. (R. Vol. 1, p.152.)  And of course the Gold Affidavit, 
written a few months later, suggested Sheriff Gold had discovered the evidence which 
earlier eluded him. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.109-10.)  In his affidavit, Sheriff Gold 
described the “collaboration of minds,” i.e., the conspiracy, in much greater detail. (See 
R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.109-10.)  He described the Tira Arbaugh Letter and asserted it had 
been intercepted at the Jerome County Courthouse. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.109-10.) 
 102 
 The Tira Arbaugh Letter “was originally taken or concealed by someone who had 
the state’s purposes in mind, and who acted on behalf of the state, rather than” 
Mr. Charboneau (id. at 134);  
 The letter “was intentionally intercepted by Shedd at the direction of others” (id. 
at 135); “Shedd did not and could not have acted alone. There is no way that 
Shedd knew of or could have known of the circumstances surrounding the Tira 
Arbaugh letter, or the names of the personnel . . . allegedly involved with the 
discovery of the letter in Jerome unless or until he was provided that information 
by others” (id.);  
 “The inferences and conclusions the Court draws from the evidence is that 
McNeese or someone in a similar capacity directed Shedd to do what he did. 
Shedd personally had no interest in, and nothing to gain from, withholding 
evidence from Charboneau. Others did, and the obvious suspects are those 
involved with the investigation and prosecution of Charboneau. . . . The Court 
concludes that state agents deliberately and consciously interecepted and 
withheld evidence . . . from at least 2003 until 2011” (id. at 136); and 
 “The court need not determine the extent of any conspiracy to seize or confiscate 
Charboneau’s mail. It is sufficient for purposes of this case, at this time, to 
determine only that someone at IDOC did so, and did not act alone” (id. at 137). 
Thus, regardless of whether IDOC staff may always be considered agents of the 
State as a party opponent in post-conviction cases, here, because Mr. Shedd was 
working on behalf of those individuals connected with Mr. Charboneau’s case who were 
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seeking to hide critical exculpatory evidence, he was an agent of the State as a party 
opponent regardless of the agency or department paying his salary. 
b) The Statements In The Shedd Note Concerned A Matter Within 
The Scope Of Mr. Shedd’s Employment 
The district court found Mr. Shedd wrote the Shedd Note or, at a minimum, 
ratified its contents. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.120-21, 124-25, 127-29.) At the time the note 
was written (June 27, 2003 (see R. Vol. 3, p.124)), Mr. Shedd was the “correctional law 
library specialist” at ICIO (Evid. Tr., p.190, Ls.16-21, p.266, Ls.3-170) and 
Mr. Charboneau was an inmate there (Evid. Tr., p.19, Ls.17-25). Thus, it was through 
his employment with IDOC that Mr. Shedd had contact, and was familiar, with 
Mr. Charboneau. (See, e.g., Evid. Tr., p.201, L.25 – p.202, L.2 (Mr. Shedd 
acknowledging that he could have delivered mail to Mr. Charboneau), p.192, Ls.5-15 
(Mr. Shedd testifying he was tasked with reviewing Mr. Charboneau’s mail and looking 
through it in order to confiscate certain receipts), p.326, Ls.1-5 (Mr. Shedd 
acknowledging he kept a file on Mr. Charboneau).) 
Mr. Shedd testified that while at ICIO he had some responsibility for handling 
incoming and outgoing mail, including legal mail. (Evid. Tr., p.191, Ls.15-25.) He also 
acknowledged that on an unrelated occasion he had been stationed in the prison 
mailroom with specific instructions to look for, and intercept, certain other mail expected 
to be delivered for Mr. Charboneau. (Evid. Tr., p.192, Ls.1-15, p.273, Ls.14-24.) With 
regard to the incident at issue in this case (interception of the Tira Arbaugh Letter), the 
Shedd Note itself reflects that Mr. Shedd was instructed by Deputy Attorney General 
Tim McNeese to monitor Mr. Charboneau’s incoming and outgoing inmate mail 
(including his legal mail), surreptitiously seize certain correspondence, and report back 
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to Mr. McNeese or Marc Haws once any seizure was effectuated. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) 
It also reflects he informed another IDOC employee, Lieutenant William Unger, of the 
plan and Lieutenant Unger agreed to assist him. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) Thus, insofar as 
Mr. Shedd was instructed to, and actually did, monitor and intercept Mr. Charboneau’s 
mail, those actions were part of his job with IDOC. 
Finally, the Shedd Note itself was prepared as part of Mr. Shedd’s job. He 
testified that while working at ICIO, he kept a file on Mr. Charboneau. (See Evid. 
Tr., p.313, L.15 – p.314, L.19.) He said he kept files for inmates whom he perceived to 
be litigious. (See Evid. Tr., p.326, Ls.1-5.) The only reasonable inference from this 
testimony is that Mr. Shedd felt these files would aid him in defending against claims by 
inmates or others. And, along these lines, Mr. Shedd acknowledged he signed the 
Shedd Note as a “CYA” (“cover your ass”) measure. (See Evid. Tr., p.308, L.17 – p.309, 
L.12.) 
From all of this (as well as its observations of Mr. Shedd’s demeanor while 
testifying), the district court concluded Mr. “Shedd would do what he was asked to do by 
superiors or others in law enforcement, even if it was not proper, but that he would 
make a record of it.” (R. Vol. 3, p.121 & n.2.) Under these circumstances, it is apparent 
the statements in the Shedd Note “concern[ed] a matter within the scope of the agency 
or employment of the servant or agent [Mr. Shedd] . . . .” I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). 
c) DeWayne Shedd Wrote (Or Ratified) The Shedd Note While 
Employed By The IDOC 
There can be little doubt Mr. Shedd wrote, or at least signed and adopted, the 
Shedd Note while he was employed by IDOC. The note is dated June 27, 2003 (R. Ex. 
Vol. 1, p.95), a time during which Mr. Shedd was working for IDOC at ICIO (Evid. 
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Tr., p.190, Ls.16-21, p.266, Ls.3-170). And the district court found as much: “A. 
DeWayne Shedd, an IDOC employee at ICIO (Idaho Correctional Institution-Orofino) at 
the very least signed Ex.4, and dated it 6/27/03—there is no question about this and 
there is no dispute about this.” (R. Vol. 3, p.124.)  
Further, Mr. Shedd’s own statements suggest that even if he did not write the 
note, he signed it and acknowledged to be true, all while working at ICIO. (R. Vol. 3, 
p.124; see also Evid. Tr., p.223, L.23 – p.224, L.2, p.229, L1 – p.231, L.23, p.308, Ls.5-
11, p.308, L.22 – p.311, L.5.) 
d) Conclusion 
Since the statements in the Shedd Note were made by Mr. Shedd, an IDOC 
employee and, therefore, an agent or servant of the State, and because those 
statements were made concerning a matter within the scope of Mr. Shedd’s 
employment while he was actually an employee, those statements are non-hearsay 
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). 
2. To The Extent The Shedd Note Was “Hearsay,” It Was Admissible Under 
The Hearsay Exceptions For Present Sense Impressions (I.R.E. 803(1)) 
And/Or Then-Existing Mental State (I.R.E. 803(3)) 
Assuming arguendo that the statements in the Shedd Note are determined to be 
“hearsay” within the meaning of Rule 801, Mr. Charboneau contends they were 
admissible nonetheless—as present sense impressions under Rule 803(1) and/or as 
statements of Mr. Shedd’s then-existing state of mind under Rule 803(3). 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide hearsay statements may be admitted if 
they either “describ[e] or explain[ ] an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter,” I.R.E. 803(1), or if they are 
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“statement[s] of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or 
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered 
or believed,”  I.R.E. 803(3). Either, or both, of these exceptions apply to the Shedd 
Note. 
The Shedd Note is dated June 27, 2003. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) The district court 
found Mr. Shedd was the one who signed and dated it (R. Vol. 3, p.124), and the court 
found that date was accurate (see R. Vol. 3, pp.122, 129, 132; see also R. Vol. 3, p.125 
(finding that Mr. Shedd adopted all the statements contained within the Shedd Note)). 
While the record does not definitively reveal when Mr. McNeese instructed Mr. Shedd to 
monitor Mr. Charboneau’s mail and surreptitiously seize the Tira Arbaugh Letter, the 
only reasonable inference is that the instructions were given very shortly before 
Mr. Shedd recorded them in the Shedd Note. This is apparent from the Shedd Note 
itself, which:  (a) is largely written in the present tense and appears to have been 
penned before the Tira Arbaugh Letter was actually intercepted; (b) contains specific 
details that would be unlikely to be remembered long after the conversation with 
Mr. McNeece; and (c) generally reads like a memorandum prepared in order to aid the 
writer in remembering the critical details of a recent conversation. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, 
p.95.) Further, Mr. Shedd explained he wrote the Shedd Note as a “CYA” measure. 
(Evid. Tr., p.308, L.17 – p.309, L.12; see also R. Vol. 1, p.136 (“Shedd did not want to 
be the one left holding the bag in the event things unraveled, and he left a trail to cover 
himself in the form of keeping the letter describing what he was told to look for and 
which documented what he was asked to do.”).) That fact also suggests the note was 
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written immediately after his conversation with Mr. McNeese. After all, in order to 
effectively deflect blame, the Shedd Note would have to have been written before the 
conspiracy was uncovered. In other words, if the note were to fulfill its intended purpose 
of protecting Mr. Shedd, it would have to have been written immediately after the 
conversation with Mr. McNeese. In light of all of this, it is readily apparent that 
Mr. Shedd wrote the Shedd Note immediately after joining the conspiracy to seize and 
conceal the Tira Arbaugh Letter. 
The Shedd Note describes an event (Mr. Shedd’s conversation with 
Mr. McNeece) immediately after he perceived it, and explains a condition (the 
conspiracy to intercept and conceal the Tira Arbaugh Letter) while it was ongoing and 
he was perceiving it. Thus, the statements made in the note are present sense 
impressions within the meaning of Rule 803(1). Cf. United States v. Dolan, 120 F.3d 
856, 869-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming admission of declarant’s figurative statement that 
he “had [defendant] by the balls” as both a present sense impression and a statement 
reflecting the declarant’s then-existing state of mind, because it showed the declarant’s 
“plan, motive, and design concerning his transactions and relationships with” the 
defendant). 
The statements in the Shedd Note are also statements of Mr. Shedd’s then-
existing mental or emotional state within the meaning of Rule 803(3). They outline 
Mr. Shedd’s plan to confiscate and conceal the Tira Arbaugh Letter, as that plan existed 
as of June 27, 2003, while the conspiracy was ongoing. See id.  
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E. The State Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court’s 
Decision To Admit Exhibit 8 (The “Gold Affidavit”) 
Included in the Hiskett Packet was the Gold Affidavit. (Evid. Tr., p.58, L.17 – 
p.59, L.3.) That affidavit repeated some of the vague allegations of misconduct in 
Mr. Charboneau’s case which Sheriff Gold had made in the Gold Letter, which 
Mr. Charboneau used in his 2002 post-conviction petition. (Compare 29042 R., pp.48-
49 (Gold Letter asserting, inter alia, that there was a “collaboration of minds” to 
manipulate Mr. Charboneau’s case) with R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.109-10 (Gold Affidavit 
asserting, inter alia, that Sheriff Gold was aware of “certain improprieties” by the 
prosecutors in Mr. Charboneau’s case, and that “certain court and county officers often 
manipulated or affected the facts and evidence of cases to arrange for a finding of 
guilt”).) But, as discussed above, it also included some very-specific allegations which 
had not been made in the earlier letter:   
[I]t is my belief that facts and evidence in the Charboneau case were 
purposely manipulated and altered to arrange for a verdict of guilty. A 
specific example of this came to my knowledge when in the fall of 1989, 
my chief deputy Mito Alanzo [sic] confided in me his concern about the 
fact that the District Court clerk Cheryl Watts was in possession of a letter 
which had been delivered to the Jerome County Courthouse via the 
United States Postal Service. Chief Deputy Alanzo [sic] informed me that 
the letter at issue had been addressed to district court Judge Philip Becker 
and had been sent by Tira Arbaugh, the daughter of Marilyn Arbaugh. 
Chief Deputy Alzanzo [sic] told me that the subject matter of this letter had 
significant relevance concerning the Charboneau case. Chief Deputy 
Alanzo [sic] stated that his concern was that the District Court Clerk Cheryl 
Watts had requested that he help her to destroy the letter. 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.109-110.) Mr. Charboneau testified he had never seen this affidavit 
before. (Evid. Tr., p.58, Ls.21-23.) 
At Mr. Charboneau’s evidentiary hearing, the Gold Affidavit was admitted for the 
limited purpose of showing what was in the Hiskett Packet. (See Evid. Tr., p.60, Ls.6-
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12.) Although the parties argued about the proper use and value of the affidavit in their 
closing arguments (see Evid. Tr., p.578, L.13 – p.579, L.24, p.612, L.7 – p.615, L.7), the 
district court did not make any factual findings based on the affidavit (see generally 
R. Vol. 3, pp.109-43).  
Later, the Gold Affidavit came up at the hearing on Mr. Charboneau’s motion for 
summary disposition. (See 9/19/14 Tr., p.632, L.10 – p.640, L.7, p.725, L.5 – p.731, 
L.4.) At that hearing, the district court recognized it might not be able to consider the 
affidavit because it arguably consisted of three levels of hearsay. (9/19/14 Tr., p.632, 
L.16 – p.633, L.6, p.635, L.6 – p.636, L.24.)  
In its summary disposition order though, the district court ruled the Gold Affidavit 
admissible. Initially, it discussed the affidavit in its statement of facts, noting that it 
corroborated the existence and mailing of the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (See R. Vol. 4, p.527 
& n.5.) Later, the district court discussed the affidavit again, noting it was concealed 
along with the Tira Arbaugh Letter, examining its admissibility, and discussing its 
significance. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.547-52.) On the final point, the district court 
acknowledged the affidavit “is at least double, if not triple, hearsay.” (R. Vol. 4, p.548.) 
Ultimately though, the court ruled that it was admissible for a limited purpose—to prove 
that Chief Deputy Mito Alonzo told Sheriff Gold about the Tira Arbaugh Letter in the fall 
of 1989 and, in doing so, exhibited knowledge of its contents. (R. Vol. 4, p.549.) The 
district court then used this information to conclude the critical Brady evidence at issue 
in this case—the Tira Arbaugh Letter—was known to law enforcement in 1989, and to 
infer that it was concealed by unknown law enforcement actors at least up until the time 
that it was retained and concealed by IDOC. (R. Vol. 4, pp.550-52.) 
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On appeal, the State challenges this ruling by the district court. (See App. 
Br., pp.46-48.) It argues the Gold Affidavit is inadmissible hearsay,70 and “[t]he district 
court’s conclusion that Exhibit 8 may be admitted for the non-hearsay purpose of 
showing Alonzo’s knowledge of and about” the Tira Arbaugh Letter “does not withstand 
scrutiny.” (App. Br., pp.47-48.) In support of this argument, the State focuses on the first 
layer of hearsay—the fact that the affidavit is an out-of-court statement of Sheriff 
Gold71—and it argues that if Sheriff Gold was lying, the contents of his affidavit are 
irrelevant. (App. Br., p.48.) 
The State’s analysis is flawed on its most basic level, as the hearsay rules within 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not apply to affidavits in post-conviction cases. While 
the Rules of Evidence apply generally to post-conviction cases, there is an exception 
whereby they are “modified by Idaho Code § 19-4907.” I.R.E. 101(d)(4). The 
modification appearing in section 19-4907 is that, “The court may receive proof by 
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence . . . .” I.C. § 19-4907(a) 
(emphasis added). In other words, while affidavits constitute inadmissible hearsay in 
many court proceedings, they are admissible in post-conviction proceedings. So here, 
where the State’s concern is that Sheriff Gold’s statements about Chief Deputy Alonzo 
are out-of-court statements made in an affidavit, the hearsay rules are of no aid to the 
                                            
70 The State argues there are three layers of hearsay:  first, the affidavit itself is an out-
of-court statement of Sheriff Gold; second, it recites out-of-court statements of Mito 
Alonzo to Sheriff Gold; and third, the statements of Chief Deputy Alonzo appear to be 
based on statements of Cheryl Watts. (App. Br., p.47.) 
71 The State cannot get to the second and third layers of hearsay because the district 
court did not consider the affidavit for the truth of the statements attributed to Chief 
Deputy Alonzo or Ms. Watts. 
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State. The fact is the Gold Affidavit was properly admitted and considered pursuant to 
section 19-4907 and Rule 101(d)(4). 
The State also argues about the inference the district court drew based on the 
Gold Affidavit—that, because Chief Deputy Alonzo conveyed very specific information 
about the Tira Arbaugh Letter to Sheriff Gold in the fall of 1989, the letter must have 
been in the hands of prosecutorial or law enforcement agents by that time. (See App. 
Br., p.47 n.15.) Specifically, the State complains that the district court inferred that Marc 
Haws had knowledge of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, and it argues that this inference is 
unreasonable given that there is no evidence that “Marc Haws set foot in the Jerome 
County Courthouse after his last appearance in the underlying criminal case in 1986.” 
(App. Br., p.47 n.15.) However, this argument is based on a false premise. The district 
court never made any finding related to Mr. Haws. Following the evidentiary hearing, the 
district court specifically declined to decide whether Mr. Haws was “involved in this 
case.” (R. Vol. 3, p.137.) And nothing in the subsequent summary disposition order 
changed that. In the latter order, the district court found agents of law enforcement (at a 
minimum, Sheriff Gold and Chief Deputy Alonzo) knew of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, and it 
drew the inference that if law enforcement knew of the letter, then “agents of the 
prosecuting attorney” knew of the letter too. (R. Vol. 4, p.551 (emphasis added).) 
Although it certainly raised the possibility that Mr. Haws was involved, it never drew 
such a conclusion. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.551-52.) In fact, it specifically said it did not know 
who seized the letter:  
The inference from all the evidence is that the Arbaugh letter was known 
about in Jerome County by those in law enforcement commencing soon 
after delivery to the Jerome County Courthouse in 1989, and it was seized 
or confiscated or hidden from Charboneau by unknown persons from that 
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time. The conclusion this leads to is that Shedd was given a mission by 
Mark [sic] Haws or someone in law enforcement with an interest in the 
Charboneau case . . . . It would be a fair inference to conclude the letter 
was concealed by those with a connection to law enforcement after 1989, 
but it is not possible to say when that commenced. 
(R. Vol. 4, pp.551-52 (emphasis added).) Because the State’s argument is based on a 
false premise, it should be rejected. The fact is the court’s inference that someone in 
law enforcement was involved in the interception and concealment of the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter was infinitely reasonable given not only the Gold Affidavit, but also the balance of 
the circumstantial evidence in the case (e.g., the envelope bearing Judge Becker’s 
name and the canceled postmark and the subsequent conspiracy by Mr. Shedd and 
others to conceal the letter). 
 
III.  
The District Court Correctly Found The State Violated Mr. Charboneau’s Fourteenth 
Amendment Right To Due Process Under Brady v. Maryland 
A. Introduction 
Under Brady, the government has an obligation to disclose to the defendant 
favorable evidence which is material to guilt or punishment. Here, Mr. Charboneau 
alleged the State violated Brady by failing to disclose the Tira Arbaugh Letter. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court made extensive findings 
concerning the Tira Arbaugh Letter and the State’s concealment of that letter from at 
least 2003 through 2011.  Later, in granting Mr. Charboneau’s motion for summary 
disposition, the district court inferred from the undisputed evidence that the letter had 
actually been concealed by law enforcement and/or the prosecution since it was first 
sent in September 1989. This timing was important because it coincided with the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s remand of Mr. Charboneau’s case for re-sentencing (which did not 
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occur until 1991). The district court also ruled the Tira Arbaugh Letter would be 
admissible not only at the re-sentencing hearing, but also at a new trial. Thus, the 
district court ruled the letter was material to the question of punishment (because it 
almost surely would have led to a different sentence at Mr. Charboneau’s 1991 re-
sentencing), and to the question of guilt (because in 1991 Mr. Charboneau was still 
within his time to file a motion for a new trial, and there is a reasonable probability that 
such a motion would have been granted and, upon re-trial, he would have been 
convicted of a lesser offense).  Accordingly, the court granted post-conviction relief and 
ordered a new trial. 
On appeal, the State challenges the district court’s grant of relief under Brady. 
(See App. Br., pp.48-72.) It offers three reasons why it believes the district court erred. 
First, it claims its Brady obligations no longer existed while Mr. Charboneau’s case was 
on direct review and pending re-sentencing. (App. Br., pp.49, 50-53.) Second, it 
contends Mr. Charboneau failed to establish all of the elements of a Brady claim. (App. 
Br., pp.49, 53-57.) Third, it asserts the district court’s factual findings were wrong. (App. 
Br., pp.49, 57-72.) 
For the reasons set forth below, the State’s arguments are without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The State’s first argument involves only a question of law, which this Court will 
review de novo. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 706 (1999). The second argument 
primarily involves questions of law, so it too will be reviewed de novo. Id. And the third 
argument primarily involves question of fact, which will be reviewed for clear error. 
State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007). 
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In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court 
determines whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept 
it and rely on it. Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, 
although conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506 (2003) (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Correctly Ruled The State Still Owed Mr. Charboneau A Duty 
Under Brady To Disclose Favorable Evidence While There Was No Final 
Judgment Of Conviction In His Case And, In Fact, His Case Was Still Pending 
Re-Sentencing 
The State’s primary argument about Brady is that, even though there was no final 
judgment of conviction in Mr. Charboneau’s case when the State came into possession 
of the Tira Arbaugh Letter, and even though a re-sentencing had been ordered by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, the State was free to conceal that critical letter. (See App 
Br., pp.50-53.) The State’s reasoning is not entirely clear; however, it appears to get to 
its position in one (or both) of two ways—either by misrepresenting the district court’s 
findings, or by torturing the term “post conviction” and ignoring United States Supreme 
Court precedent holding that its Brady obligations extend, at a minimum, through the 
defendant’s sentencing hearing. In either case, the State’s arguments are meritless. 
Whatever the State’s angle, its argument is based on the United States Supreme 
Court’s Opinion in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 
U.S. 52, 68 (2009). (See App. Br., pp.50-53.) In that case, Osborne had been convicted 
and sentenced for his crime, and his conviction and sentence had been affirmed on 
appeal, when, many years later, he filed a petition for state post-conviction relief 
seeking additional DNA testing which he believed would exonerate him. See Osborne, 
557 U.S. at 55-59. In addressing Osborne’s claim that the government’s refusal to turn 
over the evidence for DNA testing constituted a violation of his due process rights under 
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Brady, the Supreme Court held that Brady does not require the government to disclose 
favorable evidence in post-conviction proceedings:  “Osborne’s right to due process is 
not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has 
already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in post-conviction 
relief. Brady is the wrong framework.” Id. at 68-69.  
The State attempts to argue its suppression of the Tira Arbaugh Letter occurred 
post-conviction and, thus, under Osborne, did not constitute a Brady violation. (See 
App. Br., pp.50-53.) How the State gets there though is somewhat unclear. On the one 
hand, it appears to claim the district court found only that the State suppressed the letter 
from 2003 to 2011. (See App. Br., p.51 (“In this case the district court did not find any 
pre-conviction suppression of evidence by the prosecution, only post-conviction 
suppression [the letter] more than a decade after the criminal case was final.”).) 
However, any such contention is patently false. Although, after the evidentiary hearing, 
the court explicitly found the State suppressed the letter from 2003 through 2011 (see, 
e.g., R. Vol. 3, p.136), and was vague with respect to the 1989-2003 timeframe (finding 
only that, “Wherever the letter was between 1989 and 2003 or 2011, it was taken or 
concealed by someone who had the state’s purposes in mind, and who acted on behalf 
of the state, rather than the defendant” (R. Vol. 3, p.116)), later, in its summary 
disposition order, the district court specifically found “the Arbaugh letter was known 
about in Jerome County by those in law enforcement commencing soon after delivery to 
the Jerome County Courthouse in 1989, and it was seized or confiscated or hidden from 
Charboneau by unknown persons from that time” (R. Vol. 4, pp.551-52)—a finding the 
State ignores. 
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On the other hand, the State also appears to suggest that because the Osborne 
Court used the term “post-conviction” in describing the limits of the State’s Brady 
obligations, those obligations terminate after a defendant is found guilty, and do not 
extend through his appeal and re-sentencing. (See App. Br., p.52 (apparently arguing 
Brady did not apply because the Tira Arbaugh Letter was “written in 1989, at least four 
years after the conclusion of the trial and after the conviction was affirmed on appeal”).) 
Assuming this is the State’s argument, it fails for two reasons. 
First, any such error was invited by the State, as the State conceded below that 
its Brady obligations persist throughout the lifetime of the criminal case. Below, when 
questioned by the district court about whether Brady deals with a trial right only, or 
whether it describes an obligation that extends through sentencing as well, the State 
acknowledged it applies through sentencing. (5/24/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-20.) When the 
court then pointed out that when the Tira Arbaugh Letter was written in 1989, 
Mr. Charboneau had yet to be re-sentenced, the State responded, “And that’s why we 
do not dispute the timing of the Tira Arbaugh letter, if, of course, we accept all of the 
allegations established for purposes of this motion. The letter’s dated 1989, so it was 
while the criminal proceeding was still pending. So that is a Brady claim.” (5/24/13 
Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.11 (emphasis added).) Moments later, counsel for the State 
explained further: 
So where the state has evidence that a witness has recanted during the 
course of the criminal proceedings, the state is required under Brady to 
disclose that evidence. And in fact if the state does not, that would 
constitute a Brady violation. 
If after the judgment is final a witness recants, and an agent of the 
state, meaning the prosecutor or an investigating officer, that sort of thing, 
learns of that recantation, there would still be an ethical duty to turn that 
over, but it wouldn’t have anything to do with Brady. So the ongoing Brady 
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duty is to disclose what should have been disclosed in the criminal 
proceedings themselves. 
(5/24/13 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-17 (emphasis added). See also 9/19/14 Tr., p.694, L.17 – p.697, 
L.19 (arguing the State’s Brady obligation exists only until such time as “everything was 
done, conviction was final, judgment was final”).) Because the State invited the alleged 
error about which it now complains, the State is estopped from pressing that claim of 
error on appeal. See State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 837-38 (1983). “Errors consented 
to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.” Id. at 838. 
Second, the State’s argument fails on its merits, as it relies upon a distortion of 
Osborne’s holding. Not only was Osborne clearly limited to examining the scope of an 
individual’s Brady rights after his criminal case has ended, but the State’s argument flies 
in the face of other precedent clearly holding the State’s Brady obligations exist through 
the defendant’s sentencing. Indeed, in Brady itself the Supreme Court made this clear, 
as it framed the government’s duty to disclose favorable evidence as an obligation to 
disclose evidence which would:  (1) exculpate the accused, or (2) “reduce the penalty.” 
Brady, 373 U.S. 87-88 (emphasis added). In other words, there is a duty of disclosure 
“where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .” Id. at 87 (emphasis 
added). And, indeed, Brady was a case where the evidence improperly suppressed by 
the government was material to punishment, so a due process violation was found and 
the defendant was ultimately entitled to a new sentencing hearing. See id. at 88-91. 
Applying the correct framework, it is clear that the State had an obligation to 
disclose the Tira Arbaugh Letter to Mr. Charboneau. That letter was written, sent, and 
ultimately seized by agents of the State in September 1989. At the time of the letter’s 
seizure, the Idaho Supreme Court had recently issued its opinion in Mr. Charboneau’s 
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original direct/post-conviction appeal, see State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989) 
(opinion issued April 4, 1989; rehearing denied May 25, 1989), and both parties had 
petitions for writs of certiorari pending with the United States Supreme Court, see 
Charboneau v. State, 493 U.S. 922 (1989) (denying Mr. Charboneau’s petition on 
October 16, 1989); Idaho v. Charboneau, 493 U.S. 923 (1989) (denying the State’s 
petition on October 16, 1989). Thus, Mr. Charboneau’s criminal case was still ongoing 
when the State first obtained and initially failed to disclose the letter. See Smith v. 
Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 819-20 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding the State’s obligations under 
Brady continue while a case is on direct review). 
More importantly though, in its April 4, 1989 opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court 
remanded Mr. Charboneau’s case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
See Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 148-54. Mr. Charboneau was not re-sentenced until 
1991. (R. Vol. 4, p.530, n.6.) Thus, from the time the State seized the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter to the time that Mr. Charboneau was re-sentenced, the State was clearly 
obligated to turn it over under Brady because it was, at a minimum, material to the 
question of punishment upon re-sentencing.  
In light of the foregoing, it is clear the district court correctly analyzed this case 
under the Brady framework.72 
                                            
72 After arguing Brady has no application in this case, the State implicitly asserts in a 
footnote that the district court should have employed the standard that applies 
generically to claims of newly-discovered evidence—the four-part test set forth in 
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976). (See App. Br., p.53, n.19.)  It then asserts 
“Charboneau’s claim would have failed” under this test. (App. Br., p.53 n.19.)  However, 
the State offers no argument in support of this contention, and so it is waived. I.A.R 
35(a); Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. 
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D. The District Court Correctly Found The State Violated Mr. Charboneau’s Due 
Process Rights As Outlined By Brady And Its Progeny 
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held the government has a duty 
(under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause) to disclose, upon the 
defendant’s request, favorable evidence that “is material either to guilt or to 
punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. Subsequently, the Court expanded its holding to require 
the disclosure of favorable evidence regardless of whether it was requested by the 
defendant. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). 
In order to make out a claim for relief under Brady, one must show three things: 
(1) the evidence at issue is favorable—either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; 
(2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State (whether willfully or 
inadvertently); and (3) the evidence must be “material,” meaning that the evidence must 
be of such a character that, had it been timely disclosed, there is a “reasonable 
probability” that the outcome of the case would have been different. State v. Dunlap, 
155 Idaho 345, 389 (2013).  
In this appeal, the State argues the district court erred in its application of the 
foregoing Brady standard. (App. Br., pp.53-58.) Specifically, although it concedes the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter is favorable to Mr. Charboneau (App. Br., p.53), it argues the court 
erred in finding it was suppressed by the State (App. Br., pp.53, 54-56), and that it is 
“material” (App. Br., pp.53, 56-58). The State’s arguments, however, are without merit. 
1. The District Court Correctly Found The Tira Arbaugh Letter Was 
Suppressed By The State 
The State argues, “The factual findings of the district court do not include 
possession or control of [the Tira Arbaugh Letter] at any relevant time by ‘the state’ as 
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that term is defined for purposes of Brady.” (App. Br., pp.53, 54-56.) In making this 
argument, the State focuses on the district court’s original set of findings immediately 
following the evidentiary hearing (in which the court explicitly identified Mr. Shedd as 
having concealed the letter from 2003 through 2011), and it largely ignores the fact that 
the district court made additional findings in its subsequent summary disposition order. 
(See App. Br., pp.54-55.) 
In fact, as noted above, in its summary disposition order, the district court found 
the letter was seized and concealed shortly after being sent in 1989: “the Arbaugh letter 
was known about in Jerome County by those in law enforcement commencing soon 
after delivery to the Jerome County Courthouse in 1989, and it was seized or 
confiscated or hidden from Charboneau by unknown persons from that time.” (R. Vol. 4, 
pp.551-52.) It then went on to find Mr. “Shedd was given a mission by Mark [sic] Haws 
or someone in law enforcement with an interest in the Charboneau case sometime after 
that, and Shedd looked for and seized the Arbaugh letter, and kept it from Charboneau.” 
(R. Vol. 4, p.552.)73   
                                            
73 Eventually, the State gets around to acknowledging (at least to a limited degree) the 
relevant findings. (See App. Br., pp.55-56.)  It then complains these findings are actually 
suppositions on the part of the district court, not findings. (App. Br., p.56.)  While it is not 
clear what the State thinks the difference is between a “finding” and a “supposition,” the 
reality is the district court made it clear that its conclusions were “inferences.” (See 
R. Vol. 4, pp.550-52.)  The State has not challenged the district court’s authority to draw 
reasonable inferences at the summary disposition stage (see App. Br., pp.54-56), nor 
can it. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (“When an action is to be tried 
before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor 
of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to 
arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary 
facts.”). Nor has the State challenged these inferences as clearly erroneous factual 
findings. Thus, the State has waived any legal challenge to the inferences. 
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The fact that the district court was unable or unwilling to name the individual 
participants (besides Mr. Shedd) in the conspiracy to seize and conceal the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter is of no consequence. The district court found those individuals, 
whoever they were, were involved with the prosecutor and/or law enforcement, and that 
is all that is necessary under Brady. “[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of 
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the 
case, including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (emphasis 
added).74 
The fact that the State now disagrees with the factual findings and reasonable 
inferences of the district court does not establish the district court erred as a matter of 
law in ruling that the second (“suppression”) prong of the Brady standard was 
established in this case. 
2. The District Court Correctly Found The Tira Arbaugh Letter To Be Material 
The State also argues the Tira Arbaugh Letter is not “material” within the 
meaning of Brady, in that its suppression did not cause Mr. Charboneau any prejudice. 
(App. Br., pp.53, 56-58.) In making this claim, the State offers two different theories: 
                                            
74 The Idaho Supreme Court has characterized the reach of Brady slightly differently 
than did the United States Supreme Court in Kyles. The Idaho Supreme Court has held, 
“The duty of disclosure enunciated in Brady is an obligation of not just the individual 
prosecutor assigned to the case, but of all the government agents having a significant 
role in investigating and prosecuting the offense.” State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781 
(1999) (quoting State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 433 (Ct. App. 1994)). Insofar as the 
Idaho courts’ inclusion of the phrase “significant role in investigating and prosecuting the 
offense” in its definition of the scope of the State’s disclosure obligations under Brady 
causes that scope to be narrower than what was dictated in Kyles, Mr. Charboneau 
submits the Kyles standard controls. However, he submits the Court need not reach this 
issue, as the district court found law enforcement and/or prosecutorial officials were 
involved in the original seizure and concealment of the Tira Arabaugh Letter in this 
case, and they worked in concert with the IDOC in continuing to conceal the letter from 
2003 through 2011. 
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first, “[b]ecause, according to the district court’s findings, the state first suppressed the 
evidence in 2003,” any suppression could not have impacted Mr. Charboneau’s criminal 
case (App. Br., pp.56-57); second, because Mr. Charboneau knew, or should have 
known, that Tira testified falsely as of at least 2002, he cannot claim prejudice owing to 
the State’s failure to disclose Tira’s letter (App. Br., pp.57-58.) Neither theory has merit. 
The State’s first theory—that the district court found that the State first 
suppressed the Tira Arbaugh Letter in 2003—is based on its continued 
misrepresentation of the district court’s rulings. As is discussed repeatedly above, the 
district court did not find that the State first suppressed the Tira Arbaugh Letter in 2003; 
it found the State suppressed the letter shortly after it was sent—in September 1989. 
(See R. Vol. 4, pp.551-52.) And, as is also discussed above, this was while 
Mr. Charboneau’s case was still on direct review and pending a re-sentencing. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly found that, had the letter been disclosed when it 
came into the State’s possession in 1989, “it most certainly would have provoked a 
different outcome of the sentencing proceeding,” (R. Vol. 4, p.556; accord R. Vol. 4, 
pp.530, 577), and that, because Mr. Charboneau could have filed a motion for a new 
trial at that time, which “most likely” would have been granted, there is a reasonable 
possibility that at the end of that new trial he would have been convicted of something 
less than first degree murder (R. Vol. 4, pp.557-59, 577-79).   
The State’s second theory—that Mr. Charboneau knew, or should have known, 
of Tira’s false testimony since at least 2002—is no more compelling than its first theory. 
Preliminarily, it is worth observing that this second theory harkens back to the State’s 
argument that Mr. Charboneau’s petition was untimely filed because the current Brady 
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claim is essentially the same as that which was brought in 2002. (See App. Br., pp.26-
32.) However, as was pointed out in response to that argument, the Brady claim made 
in the present (2011) petition is fundamentally different from that which was made in 
2002 because the present claim is based on evidence of which Mr. Charboneau had no 
knowledge until it was handed to him by Corporal Hiskett on March 18, 2011. (See Part 
I.C, supra.) Likewise, although in 2002 Mr. Charboneau had reason to believe Tira had 
testified falsely, he certainly did not know she had written a letter recanting her 
testimony. Thus, he simply could not have raised the current claim. Further, because 
there is nothing Mr. Charboneau could have done in 2002 to have learned of the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter, it cannot be said he should have known of its existence at any point 
before it was handed to him. 
More importantly though, the State’s second theory fails because it is based on 
what the State claims Mr. Charboneau knew, or should have known, in 2002, and that 
timeframe is irrelevant. The Tira Arbaugh Letter was seized and concealed from 
Mr. Charboneau in 1989, and the district court ruled that he suffered prejudice from that 
suppression at his 1991 re-sentencing (at a minimum). Thus, what the State claims 
Mr. Charboneau knew or should have known in 2002 is wholly irrelevant to the question 
of whether he suffered prejudice in 1991. 
In short, the State has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s 
determination that the Tira Arbaugh Letter is “material,” in that its suppression 
prejudiced Mr. Charboneau. At a minimum, he was prejudiced at his re-sentencing 
hearing. But he was also prejudiced in terms of his ability to obtain a new trial where 
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there is a reasonable probability he would have been acquitted of at least first degree 
murder. 
E. The State Has Failed To Show Clear Error In Any Of The District Court’s Factual 
Findings, Or That It Shifted To The State A Burden Of Disproving 
Mr. Charboneau’s Allegations 
The State’s final argument on the Brady issue is that the district court was wrong 
in finding the facts. (App. Br., pp.58-72.) The State challenges the court’s factual 
findings on two subjects—whether Mr. Shedd was involved in a conspiracy to withhold 
the documents from Mr. Charboneau (see App. Br., pp.59-70), and whether 
Mr. Charboneau’s mail was intercepted while he was incarcerated in 2003 (see App. 
Br., pp.70-71). The State also appears to argue that, insofar as the district court 
reached conclusions which were not factually supportable, it necessarily shifted the 
burden of proof to the State. (See App. Br., pp.59-60, 69-70.) 
Although the State cloaks its arguments in the language of the proper legal 
standard (“clear error”), it is really nothing more than a naked plea for this Court to re-
weigh the evidence and substitute its own factual findings for those of the district court. 
Because that is not an appropriate role of this Court, the State’s arguments should be 
rejected. See, e.g., Sherman Storage, LLC v. Global Signal Acquisitions II, LLC, 159 
Idaho 331, __, 360 P.3d 340, 345 (2015) (“The district court’s factual findings are owed 
deference unless clearly erroneous. It is not this Court’s role to reweigh evidence.”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
In making its clear error/burden shifting argument, the State urges this Court to 
accept its explanations of various individual pieces of evidence. It does so by: 
highlighting evidence it deems favorable and casting that evidence in its most favorable 
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(even if unreasonable) light; completely ignoring unfavorable evidence, and drawing 
inferences contrary to the reasonable inferences drawn by the district court. However, 
this does not demonstrate clear error, as is required under Idaho law. Some of the more 
flagrant deficiencies in the State’s arguments are highlighted below. 
First, in discussing the Tira Arbaugh Letter (Exhibit 14), the State wishes for this 
Court to believe it is, in some unspecified way, a forgery. (See App. Br., pp.60-61, 61-
62.) The State claims it “is a multi-generational copy, meaning it is a copy of a copy of a 
copy, etc.,” and it observes that, because of this, it could have been manipulated. (App. 
Br., pp.60-61.) However, the State cites nothing for its claim that the letter was a 
“multigenerational” copy. (See App. Br., p.61.) And it does not appear there is any 
actual evidence that it was a “multigenerational” copy. It appears that the evidence 
below was simply that it was a photocopy, not that it was a “multigenerational” 
photocopy, as the State claims. (See R. Vol. 2, pp.726-27; Evid. Tr., p.333, L.8 - p.382, 
L.21.) Further, even if the version of the letter before the court was a multigenerational 
copy, the State’s observation that it could have been forged hardly shows clear error in 
the district court’s reliance on that letter. After all, this is just wild speculation on the 
State’s part; it has offered no evidence that the letter actually was altered. And the 
State’s argument attempts to back away from its own stipulation. While, on appeal, the 
State acknowledges only that the letter is “apparently [in] the handwriting of Tira” (App. 
Br., p.60 (emphasis added)), below, the State stipulated that the letter was written in 
Tira’s hand (R., pp.957, 971) and, based on that stipulation, the district court entered an 
order stating:  “Pursuant to the state’s admission and stipulation in open court, the Court 
does hereby find that the handwriting appearing on the copy of the letter and envelope . 
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. . is the handwriting of Tira Arbaugh. This letter is authentic in the sense that it is not a 
forgery.” (R. Vol. 2, p.975 (emphasis added).) Further, the State wholly ignores the fact 
that the authenticity of the Tira Arbaugh Letter is corroborated by additional evidence. 
Given that the State has no evidence the Tira Arbaugh Letter is a forgery, only wild 
speculation that conflicts with its own stipulation below, it has failed to show clear error 
on the district court’s part. 
Second, in further attempting to undermine the legitimacy of the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter, the State argues, “This document could not have come into existence in the 
manner described therein because there was no street dance in Bruneau on the date 
set forth on the letter,” and because a witness testified that Tira was living in Nevada on 
the date in question. (App. Br., p.61; see also App. Br., p.42 n.14 (arguing the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter was not sufficiently corroborated to be deemed admissible hearsay, in 
part, because “there is overwhelming evidence that Exhibit 14 was not created under 
the circumstances set forth within it,” and basing this argument on the contentions that 
there was no street dance on the date in question and a witness said Tira was not 
there).) However, the claim that “there was no street dance” on the date in question is 
the State’s inference, not a statement of fact. The evidence in this case shows only that 
there was apparently no newspaper advertisement of a street dance being held in 
Bruneau on the date in question. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.82-84, 86-92, 444-46.) The absence 
of a newspaper advertisement of a dance is not dispositive of whether a dance actually 
occurred, much less the more important question of whether Tira mailed her letter to 
Judge Becker from Bruneau in September 1989, as she claimed in her letter. 
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Further, the State fails to acknowledge there was conflicting evidence on these 
points. Included with the Tira Arbaugh Letter in the Hiskett Packet was an envelope, 
addressed from Tira to Judge Becker, and bearing a postmark indicating it was mailed 
from Bruneau, Idaho on September 7, 1989. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.97.)75  Despite the lack of 
a newspaper advertisement of a dance in Bruneau on September 6-7, 1989, there is 
evidence that there was, in fact, some sort of street dance in Bruneau around that date. 
Pinto Bennett said:  he and his band performed at such an event; he spoke to Tira 
during a break in the band’s performance; and Tira told him she had information that 
would help Mr. Charboneau and he encouraged her to tell the authorities. (R. Vol. 4, 
pp.211-13.) The State’s failure to mention Mr. Bennett’s deposition testimony on this 
point is telling. Likewise, the State fails to mention that the one witness who testified that 
Tira was living in Nevada at the relevant timeframe and, therefore, could not have sent 
her letter from Bruneau in September 1989, was found by the district court not to be 
credible. (See R. Vol. 3, p.136.) That the State would have this Court find a lack of a 
newspaper advertisement and a bit of non-credible testimony is more convincing than a 
valid postal stamp and the sworn testimony of a credible witness, does not demonstrate 
a clear error in the district court’s factual findings. 
Third, in discussing various documents contained within the Hiskett Packet 
(Exhibit 2 (an offender concern form), Exhibit 3 (a resource center request form), Exhibit 
7A (an offender concern form)), the State argues that, because the original copies found 
in the packet should have been in the possession of Mr. Charboneau, he must have 
been the one to have put them in the packet, thereby proving the whole packet was a 
                                            
75 A postal employee has verified the postmark is legitimate and correct. (R. Vol. 2, 
p.721.) 
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grand fraud perpetrated by Mr. Charboneau. (See App. Br., pp.62-63, 64, 66, 68.) 
However, the fact that these documents should have been provided to Mr. Charboneau 
by IDOC staff does not mean they were provided to him in the first place, or that they 
were not later confiscated.76  Further, the State’s assumption is controverted by 
evidence to the contrary, as Mr. Charboneau specifically denied that two out of the three 
documents the State now assumes were in his possession were actually in his 
possession. (See Evid. Tr., p.35, L.16 – p.37, L.7 (Mr. Charboneau testifying he had 
never received Exhibit 2), p.46, Ls.1-10 (Mr. Charboneau testifying he did not think he 
had received Exhibit 3).)77  An assumption which is contradicted by evidence is not 
indicative of there being any clearly erroneous findings by the district court.  
Fourth, the State suggests that because the Gold Affidavit is dated November 13, 
2001, but Mr. Charboneau was not transferred to ICIO until 2002, that document could 
not have been intercepted by Mr. Shedd. (See App. Br., p.63.) However, this suggestion 
makes little sense. Just because the Gold Affidavit was dated November 13, 2001, that 
does not mean it was sent to ICIO on that date. The affidavit could well have been sent 
to the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI), which is where Mr. Charboneau was 
housed prior to his transfer to ICIO (Evid. Tr., p.53, L.23 – p.54, L.2, p.158, Ls.9-11), 
and it could have been intercepted and held there before following Mr. Charboneau up 
to ICIO in 2002. This theory is supported by a separate item in the Hiskett Packet—an 
                                            
76 Additionally, the State’s characterization of the evidence is once more highly suspect. 
With regard to Exhibit 3, the State argues, “Charboneau admitted that he received this 
original document with the packet.” (App. Br., pp.62-63 (citing Evid. Tr., p.144, L.6 – 
p.145, L.8).)  That is false. In fact, when questioned about Exhibit 3, Mr. Charboneau 
agreed the original should have been returned to him; he never said it actually was 
returned to him. (Evid. Tr., p.144, L.25 – p.145, L.8.) 
77 Mr. Charboneau was not asked this question about Exhibit 7A. 
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envelope with multiple notations on it, including the following:  “Forward to ICIO Legal 
Docs 12-5-02,” and which has Mr. Shedd’s signature on the back, along with an 
indication that he received it on January 6, 2003. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, pp.100-01.) Granted, 
under this theory, Mr. Shedd would have had to have been part of a larger conspiracy to 
intercept and confiscate Mr. Charboneau’s mail. But that is precisely what the evidence 
suggests (see, e.g., R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95 (Shedd Note identifying a conspiracy)) and what 
the district court found (see R. Vol. 3, pp.134-36; R. Vol. 4, pp.550-52). Regardless, the 
district court’s finding that the Gold Affidavit was seized and concealed along with the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter is amply supported by other evidence. For example, Mr. Shedd 
readily admitted in the Shedd Note that he had been instructed by others to seek out 
and confiscate any mail from Sheriff Gold or bearing Tira’s name. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) 
Perhaps the conspirators on the State’s side feared that if Sheriff Gold had tried to send 
his affidavit to Mr. Charboneau at ISCI and learned it never reached him, he would try to 
re-send it to Mr. Charboneau at ICIO. Additionally, Mr. Charboneau testified that the first 
time he ever saw the Gold Affidavit was when he received the Hiskett Packet on 
March 18, 2011. (Evid. Tr., p.58, Ls.17-23.) Indeed, had Mr. Charboneau had the Gold 
Affidavit sooner—for example, before his move to ICIO in 2002—he undoubtedly would 
have used it in conjunction with his 2002 post-conviction petition. (Cf. R. Vol. 3, p.131 
n.8 (district court observing that there is no chance that Mr. Charboneau would have sat 
on the Tira Arbaugh Letter had he had it in his possession when he filed his 2002 post-
conviction petition).78  In light of all of this, there is nothing clearly erroneous about the
                                            
78 Mr. Charboneau did support his 2002 petition with the Gold Letter, which apparently 
did reach him. (See 29042 R., p.48.) 
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district court’s findings.  
Fifth, the State places tremendous emphasis on the fact that the district court 
found that certain documents contained within the Hiskett Packet (Exhibit 5 (a purported 
letter from Deputy Balzer), Exhibit 7C (a purported e-mail from Mr. Shedd), and Exhibit 
7D (another purported e-mail from Mr. Shedd)) are forgeries. (App. Br., pp.65-66.) 
Apparently, the State wants this Court to assume that they were forgeries prepared by 
Mr. Charboneau or someone connected to him. (See App. Br., p.68 (“[S]everal of the 
documents are known forgeries created for the sole purpose of providing evidence of 
Charboneau’s claims as asserted in the third and current petitions for post-conviction 
relief. The only viable suspect for who collected these documents is Charboneau 
himself.”).) However, the State fails to disclose that the district court specifically 
addressed these forgeries and concluded Mr. Charboneau was not responsible for 
them. With regard Exhibit 5, the letter, the district court considered the opinions of the 
parties’ respective handwriting experts, and found the opinion of Mr. Charboneau’s 
expert, Lynn Terry, to be more credible. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.121-22, 125-29.) Mr. Terry 
opined that Mr. Shedd was the author of the forgery attributed to Mr. Balzer and, based 
on that expert opinion, the district court found that Mr. Shedd was, in fact, the author of 
Exhibit 5. (R. Vol. 3, pp.128-29.) The district court also addressed the forged e-mails—
again, with expert assistance (a court appointed forensic computer examiner). (See 
R. Vol. 3, pp.137, 138-40.) Ultimately, the court found that the e-mails were likely 
created by “someone with access to IDOC computers and email.” (R. Vol. 3, pp.139; 
see also R. Vol. 3, p.131 (“Even assuming some of the documents found in the packet 
are fake or forged, no evidence points to Charboneau, or anyone sympathetic to him, as 
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the culprit. He had far less opportunity to fake or forge documents than the state did.”).) 
That conclusion was based on the following facts:  (1) the court’s “forensic examiner 
observed that the emails in question have a lot of formatting that would be difficult to 
fabricate if one did not have real emails to use as a template or reference” (R. Vol. 3, 
p.138); (2) there is no evidence actually linking the e-mails to “anyone friendly with 
Charboneau” (R. Vol. 3, p.139); (3) inmates have “no access to the internet, could not 
send or receive email, and had no access to IDOC email in order to observe what an 
IDOC email would look like” (R. Vol. 3, pp.138-39); (4) Mr. Charboneau’s typewriter 
could not duplicate the font in the e-mails (R. Vol. 3, p.139); and (5) Mr. Charboneau 
had no knowledge of what details to put into the fake e-mails since he had seen neither 
the Shedd Note nor the Tira Arbaugh Letter (R. Vol. 3, p.139). In light of this well-
reasoned, well-supported analysis, it cannot be said that the district court engaged in 
any clearly erroneous fact-finding based on the forged e-mails. 
Sixth, the State asserts baldly that, “The district court’s conclusion that Exhibit 4 
[the Shedd Note] is genuine is contrary to the evidence and thus clearly erroneous.” 
(App. Br., p.66.) However, it offers no argument whatsoever as to how the genuineness 
finding is “contrary to the evidence” and, thus, it has waived this issue on appeal. See 
I.A.R. 35(a); Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. Additionally, whether a finding is “contrary to the 
evidence” is not the standard for clear error. As set forth above, the question is whether 
“the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence,” and “[e]vidence is 
substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it.” Neider, 138 Idaho 
at 506. This standard obviously imposes upon the State a much higher burden than the 
“contrary to the evidence” standard the State now argues. Finally, when one considers 
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the evidence before the district court, it is clear the district court’s finding that the Shedd 
Note is genuine is supported by substantial, competent evidence. Among the many 
facts supporting the district court’s finding were the following:  (1) when shown the note 
by an investigator and attorney from the attorney general’s office, Mr. Shedd admitted 
that the statements in the note were true (see Evid. Tr., p.221, L.12 - p.222, L.1, p.223, 
L.23 – p.224, L.2, p.229, L.1 - p.230, L.14; see also R. Vol. 3, p.120)79; (2) although he 
has given conflicting statements as to whether he wrote the note, Mr. Shedd has 
consistently admitted that he at least signed it, and he has also said that he would not 
have signed it if its contents were not true (see Evid. Tr., p.218, L.19 – p.220, L.9, 
p.230, L.15 – p.231, L.23, p.233, Ls.8-9, p.233, L.14 – p.234, L.8, p.245, L.16 – p.246, 
L.4, p.307, L.17 – p.308, L.9, p.309, L.13 – p.311, L.5; see also R. Vol. 3, pp.124-25, 
128-29, 132-33); (3) Mr. Shedd told investigators that he signed the note as a “CYA” 
(“cover your ass”) measure (see Evid. Tr., p.308, L.17 - p.309, L.12; see also R. Vol. 3, 
pp.120-21); (4) Mr. Charboneau’s handwriting expert (who was deemed to be more 
credible than the State’s handwriting expert) opined that Mr. Shedd not only signed the 
note, but that he also wrote it (see Evid. Tr., p.346, L.9 - p.350, L.17; see also R. Vol. 3, 
pp.126-29). In light of all of this, the State’s claim that the district court clearly erred in 
finding the Shedd Note genuine is meritless. 
Seventh, the State argues “there is no evidence” to support the district court’s 
findings as to when the Tira Arbaugh Letter was sent to Mr. Charboneau at ICIO and 
                                            
79 When questioned under oath about his admission during the Attorney General’s 
investigation, the district court observed Mr. “Shedd appeared surprised” to learn the 
interview had been recorded and disclosed. (See R. Vol. 3, p.121 n.2.)  He suggested in 
his testimony that, had he known he was being recorded he would not have been so 
forthcoming during the interview. (See Evid. Tr., p.308, Ls.5-16; see also R. Vol. 3, 
p.121 & n.2.) 
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was intentionally intercepted by Mr. Shedd (at the direction of others), and “the contrary 
evidence is legion.” (App. Br., p.70.) The contrary evidence relied upon by the State, 
and touted as being substantial, consists of nothing more than testimony as to how 
incoming mail should normally be processed at ICIO. (See App. Br., pp.70-71.) These 
arguments fail.  
As an initial matter, it is not that “there is no evidence” to support the district 
court’s findings; it is that the State ignores the relevant evidence. In terms of the finding 
that Mr. Shedd was involved in conspiracy to intercept Mr. Charboneau’s mail, that 
finding is supported by a wealth of evidence, including:  (1) the Shedd Note, which is 
essentially an admission that Mr. Shedd accepted the task of surreptitiously screening 
Mr. Charboneau’s mail and secretly confiscating anything from Sheriff Gold or 
mentioning Tira’s name; (2) Mr. Shedd’s subsequent statements admitting the Shedd 
Note was true; (3) Mr. Shedd’s admission that he kept a “big file” on Mr. Charboneau 
(see Evid. Tr., p.313, L.15 – p.314, L.19); and (4) the Hiskett Packet, which consisted of 
a group of documents, was consistent with the “big file” kept by Mr. Shedd, in that the 
documents arrived in a large white envelope bearing Mr. Charboneau’s name on one 
side, along with the notation, “Legal Documents,” and Mr. Shedd’s signature, along with 
a date of September 23, 2003, on a piece of tape affixed to the back side  (see R. Ex. 
Vol. 1, pp.91-92). And, in terms of the relevant timeframe, the district court’s conclusion 
that the Tira Arbaugh Letter was intercepted by Mr. Shedd sometime between June and 
September of 2003 is supported by the Shedd Note, which reflects that as of June 27, 
2003, Mr. Shedd was still looking for mail from Sheriff Gold and referencing Tira (see 
R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95), and the envelope holding the Tira Arbaugh Letter, which had 
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Mr. Shedd’s signature, along with the date of September 23, 2003, on a piece of tape 
affixed to its back side, thereby suggesting the letter was sealed into the envelope on 
September 23, 200380 (see R. Ex. Vol. 92). The precise timeframes are not particularly 
relevant anyway though. What is relevant is that the district court found the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter was first seized in September 1989, and it was concealed consistently 
from that time through its disclosure to Mr. Charboneau on March 18, 2011. 
In summary, although the district court’s factual findings are not to the State’s 
liking, its misleading and one-sided representation of the evidence does not 
demonstrate clear error on the part of the district court. Nor does it demonstrate any 
endeavor by the district court to shift the burden of the proof to the State.  
F. Conclusion 
Because the State’s constitutional obligations under Brady extended through 
Mr. Charboneau’s re-sentencing in 1991, the State suppressed favorable evidence to 
Mr. Charboneau’s prejudice, and the district court’s findings withstand scrutiny, the 
State has failed to show any error in the district court’s finding of a Brady violation and 
corresponding grant of post-conviction relief in this case. 
IV.  
The District Court Did Not Err In Referencing The Prosecutor, Marc Haws’, Brady 
Violation In A Prior Capital Case 
A. Introduction 
This is not Marc Haws’ first rodeo. Early in his career, he was involved in the 
capital-murder prosecution of Donald Paradis. Many years after putting Mr. Paradis on 
                                            
80 The district court drew the reasonable inference that the tape had been used to seal 
the envelope at one point and, based on the writing on the tape, the court inferred 
Mr. Shedd had been the one to seal the envelope on September 23, 2003. (R. Vol. 3, 
pp.116-17.) 
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death row, it came out that Mr. Haws had committed a Brady violation in the Paradis 
case. 
In presenting Mr. Charboneau’s Brady claim in this case, Mr. Charboneau’s 
counsel repeatedly pointed out Mr. Haws’ prior misconduct in Paradis, suggesting 
Mr. Haws had engaged in a disturbing pattern of withholding favorable evidence from 
defendants. (See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, p.196; R. Vol. 3, p.163, n.1, p.232; R. Vol. 4, pp.462, 
518-19.) However, when the case went to an evidentiary hearing and Mr. Charboneau’s 
counsel attempted to question Mr. Haws about his misconduct in the Paradis case, the 
district court sustained the State’s objections under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 403, 
and 404(b), and no evidence was heard on that misconduct at the hearing. (Evid. 
Tr., p.436, L.10 – p.438, L.5.)   
Although Mr. Haws’ Brady violation in Paradis was deemed inadmissible for 
purposes of the evidentiary hearing, the district court went on to mention that 
misconduct twice later in the case. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38 & n.10; Tr. Vol. 4, p.542 & 
n.12.) On appeal, the State asserts that those two references to Mr. Haws’ misconduct 
in Paradis were the product of “an extra-judicial investigation” and the district court’s 
consideration of inadmissible evidence, both of which violated the State’s right to due 
process. (App. Br., pp.72-74.)81 
There are a myriad of reasons why the State’s appellate claim fails, not the least 
of which is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer upon the State a right to 
due process. This flaw, along with the rest of the defects with the State’s appellate 
claim, is discussed in detail below. 
                                            
81 The IPAA, as amicus curiae, joins (but does not expand upon) this argument by the 
State. (See Amicus Br., p.10.) 
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B. Relevant Background 
1. Mr. Haws’ Brady Violation In The Paradis Case 
In 1980, while a deputy prosecutor in Kootenai County, Mr. Haws became 
involved in the capital-murder prosecution of Donald Paradis. Idaho Counties Risk 
Management Program Underwriters v. Northland Ins. Cos., 147 Idaho 84, 85 (2009). 
Mr. Paradis had been implicated in the slayings of two people—Scott Currier and 
Kimberly Palmer (Mr. Currier’s fiancée). See State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 119-20 
(1983). A critical issue in the case was whether the victims were killed in Washington or 
Idaho. Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Circ. 2001); Paradis v. Arave, 130 
F.3d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1997); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho at 120. The government’s 
theory was that Mr. Currier was killed in Spokane, Washington, and Ms. Palmer was 
killed just outside Post Falls in Idaho. See Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d at 1172; 
Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d at 392; State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho at 119-20. This theory 
hinged on the forensic pathology evidence, part of which was that Ms. Palmer had water 
in her lungs, which suggested she was still alive when placed in the stream in or near 
Post Falls in which her body was ultimately discovered. Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d at 
392; State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho at 119-20. In support of this theory, the State’s forensic 
pathologist ultimately testified that the condition of Ms. Palmer’s lungs were:  
not consistent with a textbook case of manual strangulation because they 
were heavy and filled with fluid. He then expressed his opinion that the 
lungs would have assumed such an appearance if Palmer had been 
manually strangled and immediately afterwards placed face down in 
water, concluding the immersion played a causal role in Palmer’s death—
that she aspired water once she had been immersed in the creek. 
Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d at 394; accord Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d at 1174. 
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Mr. Paradis was tried for the murder of Mr. Currier in Washington, but was 
acquitted. Id. at 120. Thereafter, Mr. Paradis was tried in Idaho for the murder of 
Ms. Palmer. Id. Marc Haws and another deputy prosecutor for Kootenai County handled 
the prosecution in the Idaho case. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program 
Underwriters, 147 Idaho at 85. Mr. Paradis’ case went to trial in 1981; he was found 
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. See id. at 85; State v. Paradis, 106 
Idaho at 117. On appeal, Mr. Paradis challenged, inter alia, the sufficiency of the 
evidence as to the jurisdictional question of whether Ms. Palmer was killed in Idaho, but 
the Idaho Supreme Court rejected that challenge and affirmed the conviction, 
apparently in light of the forensic evidence and the circumstantial evidence linking 
Mr. Paradis to the murders generally. See State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho at 120-21. 
In 1996, fifteen years after he was convicted and sentenced, Mr. Paradis 
obtained exculpatory evidence which had been withheld by the Kootenai County 
prosecutors since before his trial. See Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d at 392-94. That 
evidence consisted of Mr. Haws’ handwritten notes, taken shortly after Ms. Palmer’s 
autopsy and summarizing the opinions of the State’s forensic pathologist that 
Ms. Palmer did not die in the creek in which her body was later found. Paradis v. Arave, 
240 F.3d at 1173; Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385 at 392, 394. Specifically, the notes 
indicated that Ms. Palmer was strangled and did not drown; she had only a spoonful of 
water in her lungs, which could be attributed to a siphon-effect; there was “nothing 
noteworthy in those lungs”; and she was probably already deceased when her body 
was placed in the creek. Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d at 1174; Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 
at 394. 
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In light of Mr. Haws’ withholding of the critical exculpatory evidence concerning 
the autopsy of Ms. Palmer, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that 
Mr. Paradis had raised a colorable claim that his rights under Brady had been violated. 
Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d at 400. On remand, “[t]he federal district court granted 
Paradis’ habeas petition and ordered the State to initiate a new trial against Paradis or 
release him.[82]  Paradis pled guilty to a lesser charge of accessory to a felony and was 
released” in 2001. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters, 147 Idaho 
at 85-86. 
2. Mr. Haws’ Alleged Brady Violation In This Case 
In this case, Mr. Charboneau alleged that the State committed a Brady violation 
by withholding and concealing the Tira Arbaugh Letter. That letter indicates that Tira 
offered false testimony at Mr. Charboneau’s trial and that Mr. Haws personally solicited 
the destruction of certain physical evidence. (See R. Vol. 1, pp.53-59.) 
3. Procedural History Relevant To The State’s Claim 
In presenting the Brady claim in this case, Mr. Charboneau’s counsel repeatedly 
pointed out Mr. Haws’ prior misconduct in Paradis, suggesting Mr. Haws has engaged 
in a disturbing pattern of behavior. (See, e.g., R. Vol. 1, p.196; R. Vol. 3, p.163, n.1, 
p.232; R. Vol. 4, pp.462, 518-19.) However, when the case went to an evidentiary 
hearing (on the limited question of whether the State had willfully concealed the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter) and Mr. Charboneau’s counsel attempted to question Mr. Haws about 
his misconduct in the Paradis case, the district court sustained the State’s objections 
                                            
82 The State appealed again, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s 
order. See generally Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169. 
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under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b), and no evidence was heard on 
that misconduct at the evidentiary hearing. (Evid. Tr., p.436, L.10 – p.438, L.5.)   
In the district court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law following the 
evidentiary hearing, the district court explicitly declined to make findings as to whether 
the allegations in the Tira Arbaugh Letter were true (R. Vol. 3, pp.112, 141), or whether 
Mr. Haws had a hand in concealing that letter from Mr. Charboneau (R. Vol. 3, pp.137-
38). In declining to make the latter finding, the district court mentioned Mr. Haws’ Brady 
violation in Paradis, as revealed by the Ninth Circuit’s published opinions in Mr. Paradis’ 
federal habeas case. (R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38 & n.10.) Specifically, the court noted the 
open question of whether Mr. Haws could have been involved in the concealment 
conspiracy and mused as to two possible explanations—either Mr. Haws was engaged 
in a pattern of misconduct which covered the cases of both Mr. Paradis and 
Mr. Charboneau, or he was being “smeared” by someone unknown. (R. Vol. 3, pp.137-
38.) But, as noted, the district court did not attempt to answer that question. (R. Vol. 3, 
pp.137-38.)83 
                                            
83 The IPAA, as amicus curiae, repeatedly points out the district court made no finding 
as to whether Mr. Haws was involved in the Brady violation in this case, it argues the 
district court was correct not to have made any such finding, and it asks this Court to 
“affirm” that non-finding. (Amicus Br., pp.8-10, 14.)  However, since there was no factual 
finding made, and neither party has challenged the lack of a finding, there is nothing for 
this Court to affirm. 
 The IPAA also appears to seek to have this Court make an affirmative finding 
that Mr. Haws was not involved in the Brady violation in this case. (See Amicus 
Br., pp.12-13.)  It argues such an affirmative finding is necessary to vindicate Mr. Haws’ 
due process rights. (Amicus Br., pp.12-13.)  However, regardless of whatever rights 
Mr. Haws might have in this case (and Mr. Charboneau submits he clearly has none), it 
is not for an appellate court to decide questions of fact left open by the trial court. See 
Shubert v. Macy’s West, Inc., 158 Idaho 92, 100 (2015); State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 
236, 239 (2009). Accordingly, Mr. Charboneau asks this Court to decline the State’s 
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Nearly a year later, in its order granting summary disposition in Mr. Charboneau’s 
favor, the district court again referenced Mr. Haws’ Brady violation in Paradis. (See 
R. Vol. 4, p.542 & n.12.) This time the district court did more than identify an open 
factual question though; it affirmatively used the Paradis evidence to make a finding 
preliminary to its determination of the admissibility of another piece of evidence (the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter itself). (See R. Vol. 4, p.542.) Specifically, it identified Mr. Haws’ prior 
Brady violation—which was unknown to Tira when she wrote her letter—as one of many 
facts which tended to corroborate the allegations made in the letter. (See R. Vol. 4, 
p.542.) 
On appeal, the State contends the district court erred in “refer[ring] to the facts of 
the Paradis case” in its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the question 
of whether the Tira Arbaugh Letter had been willfully concealed by the State, and, later, 
in its order granting summary disposition in favor of Mr. Charboneau. (See App. 
Br., pp.73, 74.) The State complains that the district court “conduct[ed] an extra-judicial 
investigation into the facts of the Paradis case and consider[ed] on an ex parte basis 
evidence it ruled inadmissible” at the evidentiary hearing. (App. Br., p.73.) The legal 
basis asserted in support of this claim of error is that, by so doing, the district court 
violated the State’s right to due process. (See App. Br., pp.73-74.) 
C. The State’s “Due Process” Argument Is Not Properly Before This Court Because 
It Was Not Preserved, And It Fails On Its Merits Because The Government Is Not 
Entitled To Due Process Of Law 
In complaining about the district court’s alleged “extra-judicial investigation” and 
“ex parte” consideration of inadmissible evidence, the State rests its appellate claim 
                                                                                                                                  
invitation to make an affirmative finding of non-involvement without even reaching the 
IPAA’s claim concerning Mr. Haw’s due process rights.  
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upon a due process theory. (See App. Br., pp.73-74.) Although it never identifies the 
origin of its claimed right to due process, it cites a number of cases interpreting the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See App. Br., pp.73-74 
(citing, inter alia, Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 
(1961), and Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833 (Ct. App. 1989)).)84 
For the reasons detailed below, the State’s arguments are not properly before 
this Court and, even if they were, they fail on their merits because the State is not 
entitled to the due process protections conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1. The State Failed To Preserve Its Due Process Argument Below 
At Mr. Charboneau’s October 16-17, 2013 evidentiary hearing, the State objected 
to Mr. Charboneau’s counsel’s attempted cross-examination of Mr. Haws concerning his 
prior Brady violation in Paradis. (See Evid. Tr., p.,436, L.10 – p.438, L.5.) Those 
objections were based on Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b). (See id., 
p.436, L.10 – p.438, L.5.) Nearly a year later, at the September 19, 2014 hearing on 
Mr. Charboneau’s motion for summary disposition, the State again objected when 
Mr. Charboneau’s counsel started discussing Mr. Haws’ misconduct in Paradis—this 
time just based on Rule 404(b). (See id., p.650, L.11 – p.651, L.14.) Thus, in its 
                                            
84 In Roll, the Court of Appeals did not identify the origin of the due process right at 
issue; however, it quoted Irvin v. Dowd, which was a Fourteenth Amendment case. See 
Roll, 115 Idaho at 837. 
Besides Turner, Irvin, and Roll, the State cites two other cases—Idaho Historic 
Preservation Council v. City Council of the City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651 (2000), and 
Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline, 137 Idaho 596 (2002)—in support of its due 
process argument. Laurino was not based on due process standards at all, but the 
standards set forth Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. See Laurino, 137 Idaho at 
601. And while Idaho Historic Preservation Council spoke in terms of due process 
without explicitly identifying the origin of the due process right at issue, viewed in 
context, the Idaho Historic Preservation Council Court was clearly speaking in terms of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process.  
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objections, the State never presented any argument based upon a purported right to 
due process of law. 
As the State observes, after ruling that evidence of Mr. Haws’ prior Brady 
violation was inadmissible for purposes of Mr. Charboneau’s 2013 evidentiary hearing, 
the district court twice thereafter mentioned Mr. Haws’ prior Brady violation—once in its 
April 14, 2014 findings of fact and conclusions of law (see R. Vol. 3, p.137), and a 
second time in its March 23, 2015 order granting Mr. Charboneau’s motion for summary 
disposition (see R. Vol. 4, p.542). After neither order did the State ever seek 
reconsideration on the basis that the district court’s reference to Mr. Haws’ Brady 
violation in Paradis was error, much less that it violated the State’s due process rights. 
(See R. Vol. 3, pp.147-875; R. Vol. 4, pp.1-686; 9/19/14 Tr., pp.639-772; 4/10/15 
Tr., pp.1-14.)    
In other words, the State’s new “due process” argument was never presented to 
the district court. As such, it was not preserved for appeal. And it is well-established that 
the appellant generally may not raise unpreserved issues for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 129 Idaho 70, 74 (1996) (“This Court has repeatedly held 
that issues which are raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. . . . 
Because these claims were not raised before the district court in the civil post-conviction 
proceedings, we hold that they are not properly before the Court and will not be 
considered.”). Because the State’s new “due process” argument was not presented 
below, it should not be considered on appeal. 
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2. The State’s Argument Fails On Its Merits Because The Government Is Not 
Entitled To The Due Process Protections Of The Fourteenth Amendment 
As noted, although the State fails to explicitly identify the origin of its claimed 
right to due process, it cites a number of cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause. Apparently then, it believes it is entitled to the protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The State is incorrect. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides a right of due process to the people of 
each state vis-à-vis the governments of each such state.85  It provides, in relevant part, 
as follows:  
Nor shall any State make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). Because the State is not a “person,” the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not give it a right of due process as against itself or its 
citizens. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966) (“The word 
‘person’ in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by 
any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the 
Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done by any court.”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Shelby County v. Holder, _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Bain v. 
City of Springfield, 678 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Mass. 1997) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
protects persons against exercises of State power; it has never been applied—and its 
text would hardly permit that it be so applied—to protect the state or its political 
                                            
85 Of course the Fifth Amendment provides such a right of due process vis-à-vis the 
federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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subdivisions against persons. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach . . . .”). Because the 
State has no Fourteenth Amendment rights, its claim in this case necessarily fails.86 
3. To The Extent The State May Rely On A Rule, Statute, Or Constitutional 
Provision Other Than The Fourteenth Amendment For The Proposition 
That The State Was Entitled To Due Process Below, The State Waived 
Any Such Argument On Appeal By Failing To Identify That Authority Or 
Provide Any Argument In Support Of A Claim That The State Had A Right 
To Due Process 
As noted, the State’s Appellant’s Brief is not entirely clear as to the origin of its 
claimed right to due process, although it appears to rely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause (which, as noted, simply does not grant such a right 
to the State). However, to the extent that the State seeks to rely upon another authority 
for its contention that it has a right to due process of law, the State has failed to identify 
that authority or offer any argument as to how it may apply to this case. Accordingly, 
any such arguments have been waived. I.A.R. 35(a); Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. 
D. The District Court’s References To Mr. Haws’ Brady Violation In Paradis Were 
Wholly Proper 
Although this Court need not reach an examination of the propriety of the district 
court’s references to Mr. Haws’ prior misconduct in Paradis (because the State’s claim 
is improperly presented as a due process violation), to the extent that it does, it should 
conclude the district court’s references to Mr. Haw’s misconduct in Paradis were proper. 
Preliminarily, it is important to note that the State’s characterization of the district 
court’s actions is questionable. The State assumes that because the district court 
                                            
86 At a minimum, because the State has failed to present any argument as to how it 
believes it is a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and it has likewise failed to 
offer any authority in support of the proposition that it is a “person” for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes, it has waived any such arguments. See I.A.R. 35(a); Zichko, 129 
Idaho at 263. 
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“refer[red]” to the facts of the Paradis case, it must have engaged in an “extra-judicial 
investigation into the facts of the Paradis case . . . .” (App. Br., pp.73, 74 (emphasis 
added).) While the State’s charge sounds very dramatic, it is actually just misleading. In 
fact, the district court’s brief synopses of Paradis were derived from the facts stated in 
the published Ninth Circuit opinions in Mr. Paradis’ cases: Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 
385 (9th Cir. 1997), and Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001). (R. Vol. 3, 
p.137 & n.10; R. Vol. 4, p.542 & n.12.) The latter of these two cases had already been 
cited to the district court multiple times prior to the evidentiary hearing (see R. Vol. 1, 
pp.196, 491), and the basic circumstances of Paradis were already known by the court 
(see R. Vol. 1, p.382 (court minutes from a hearing early in the case reflecting the 
district court indicated it knew “a little” about Paradis) before it entered its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. In other words, the court was already well-aware of the facts of 
Paradis—based on publicly-available information already highlighted to the court—
without having to engage in any “extra-judicial investigation.” 
More importantly though, the district court’s references to Mr. Haws’ Brady 
violation in Paradis was in no way improper. The State cites two references the district 
court made to Paradis. (See App. Br., pp.73, 74.) The first reference was in the district 
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law following the evidentiary hearing. (See 
App. Br., pp.73, 74 (citing R. Vol. 3, p.137).) In that order, the district court explicitly 
declined to make any finding as to whether Mr. Haws had participated in the conspiracy 
to hide the Tira Arbaugh Letter from Mr. Charboneau. (R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38.) Thus, the 
district court simply pointed out Mr. Haws’ prior misconduct in explaining its reasons for 
not making a finding as to Mr. Haws’ alleged involvement in the conspiracy. (R. Vol. 3, 
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pp.137-38.) Thus, the reference to Paradis the State now complains about was just 
that—a reference. It was not a finding, and it had no impact whatsoever on the ultimate 
conclusions reached in the court’s order. 
The district court’s second reference to Mr. Haws’ misconduct in Paradis was in 
its summary disposition order. The purpose of that order, entered nearly a year after the 
district court made its findings of fact based on the evidence adduced at the evidentiary 
hearing, was not to make additional findings of fact based on the evidence offered at the 
evidentiary hearing. See I.C. § 19-4906(c) (providing that in evaluating a motion for 
summary disposition, the court should consider the entire record in the case, i.e., “the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of 
fact, together with any affidavits submitted”). In fact, the purpose was not to make 
findings of fact at all; it was to decide whether, given that there were no remaining 
genuine issues of material fact, Mr. Charboneau was entitled to relief as a matter of law. 
See id. (“The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the 
application when it appears . . . that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). Thus, it should not be 
surprising that the district court again declined to make any finding as to whether 
Mr. Haws was responsible for the concealment of the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (See 
R. Vol. 4, p.543 (referring to its earlier non-findings regarding Mr. Haws from it’s a year 
earlier), pp.551-52 (inferring that the Tira Arbaugh Letter was concealed by Mr. Shedd 
at the behest of “Marl [sic] Haws or someone in law enforcement with an interest in the 
Charboneau case”).) And the fact that the Paradis evidence had been ruled 
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inadmissible at the evidentiary hearing was patently irrelevant to the ultimate conclusion 
that Mr. Charboneau was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Admittedly though, in the summary disposition order, the district court did use the 
Paradis information to the State’s detriment, and it even used that information to infer 
that Mr. Haws has a propensity to commit misconduct. (See R. Vol. 4, p.542.) However, 
its use of that information was not improper under the circumstances. At that stage of 
the proceeding, the district court was evaluating whether the Tira Arbaugh Letter was 
sufficiently corroborated to be clearly trustworthy, such that it was itself admissible 
evidence. One of the corroborating factors the district court considered was that 
Mr. Haws had committed a Brady violation in Paradis:  “Tira could not have known when 
she wrote that letter [in 1989] that many years later [in 1996], that same type of claim 
would be asserted in another death penalty case against the same attorney. See 
Paradis v. Arave . . . .” (R. Vol. 4, p.542.) Thus, the district court used the Paradis 
evidence to determine a question of fact (whether the Arbaugh letter was sufficiently 
corroborated, such that its trustworthiness was clearly indicated) preliminary to its 
determination of the admissibility of another piece of evidence (Tira Arbaugh’s letter). 
Used in this manner, the admissibility of the Paradis evidence under the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence was quite irrelevant. See I.R.E. 101(e)(1) (providing that the Rules of 
Evidence do not apply to “[t]he determination of questions of fact preliminary to 
admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 
104(a)”).87 
                                            
87 The IPAA, as amicus curiae, argues the district court’s reference to Mr. Haws’ prior 
misconduct did not represent a reversal of its ruling at the evidentiary hearing that such 
prior misconduct was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), but if it was a reversal, such 
 148 
 In short, while the district court mentioned Mr. Haws’ Paradis misconduct in its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and later relied upon Mr. Haws’ Paradis 
misconduct in its summary disposition order, in neither case did the district court do 
anything improper. It did not conduct an “extra-judicial investigation”; it did not violate its 
own prior rulings; and it did not violate the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
E. Any Impropriety In Referencing Mr. Haws’ Brady Violation In Paradis Was 
Harmless  
Even if the district court erred in referencing Mr. Haws’ misconduct in Paradis, 
the State is not entitled to relief because any such error was harmless. The Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure provide as follows: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court 
or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting 
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
I.R.C.P. 61. 
The State’s substantial rights were not impaired by the district court’s mention of 
Paradis in its findings of fact and conclusions of law because, as noted above, the 
district court explicitly declined to decide whether Mr. Haws played a role in concealing 
the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38.) In other words, the district court did not 
                                                                                                                                  
reversal was error. (See Amicus Br., pp.10-12, 14.)  Mr. Charboneau does not disagree. 
By referencing Mr. Haws’ misconduct from Paradis in the summary disposition order, 
the district court was not retroactively changing its ruling from a year earlier. Nor was it 
making a ruling under Rule 404(b) at all. As noted, it was considering a preliminary 
question of fact to which the Rules of Evidence had no applicability.  
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hold Mr. Haws’ misconduct in Paradis against the State in this case because it made no 
finding that Mr. Haws was actually culpable here. 
Likewise, the State’s substantial rights were not impaired by the district court’s 
discussion of Paradis in its summary disposition order. In that order, Mr. Haws’ 
misconduct in Paradis was discussed as one of ten different circumstances which 
tended to corroborate the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (See R. Vol. 4, pp.535-43.) Surely the 
Paradis evidence had no significant impact on the district court’s determination that the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter was well-corroborated and, therefore, was sufficiently trustworthy to 
be deemed admissible where there were so many other significant corroborating facts. 
Indeed, for the reasons discussed in Part II.C.1(b), supra, the Tira Arbaugh Letter was 
exceptionally-well corroborated even independent of the Paradis evidence. Further, as 
is explained in detail Part II.C.3, supra, the district court did not need to find the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter was corroborated, or even that it was admissible, in order to find it was 
“material” within the meaning of Brady. Accordingly, the district court’s use of the 
Paradis evidence for this purpose was not prejudicial at all. 
Because the State has failed to show error, much less prejudicial error, in the 
district court’s references to Mr. Haws’ Brady violation in Paradis, this Court should 
affirm the district court’s judgment. 
V.  
Any Error By The District Court In Referencing Tim McNeese’s Prior Bad Acts Was 
Harmless 
A. Introduction 
At the evidentiary hearing, although the district court refused to admit any 
evidence related to Mr. Haws’ prior misconduct, it did permit Mr. Charboneau’s counsel 
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to elicit testimony concerning the prior misdeeds of another alleged participant in the 
conspiracy to conceal the Tira Arbaugh Letter—Tim McNeese. (See Evid. Tr., p.442, 
L.17 – p.446, L.25.) On appeal, the State argues the district court erred in admitting 
evidence of Mr. McNeese’s prior misbehavior, because such evidence was inadmissible 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (App. Br., pp.75-77.) In response, 
Mr. Charboneau asserts that any error in admitting the evidence in question was 
harmless because it did not factor into the district court’s fact-finding. 
B. Relevant Background 
Mr. McNeese is a former Deputy Attorney General who represented the IDOC for 
many years. (Evid. Tr., p.439, Ls.16-22.) During that time, Mr. McNeese and another 
deputy attorney general supervised by Mr. McNeese (Stephanie Altig), defended “the 
Gomez case,” a class action lawsuit against IDOC regarding “access to courts issues.” 
(See Evid. Tr., p.443, L.24 – p.446, L.12.) During the course of that case, Mr. Shedd 
went to Ms. Altig with a privileged attorney-client letter which had been left in the law 
library by an inmate. (Evid. Tr., p.443, L.24 – p.446, L.12.) Ms. Altig reviewed that letter. 
(Evid. Tr., p.443, L.24 – p.444, L.5.) Thereafter, additional documents, including more 
privileged attorney-client letters, were brought to Ms. Altig by a staff member. (See Evid. 
Tr., p.444, L.23 – p.445, L.9.) Mr. McNeese reviewed at least some of those 
communications. (Evid. Tr., p.445, Ls.10-11.) Ultimately, both Ms. Altig and 
Mr. McNeese were sanctioned by the federal court. (Evid. Tr., p.444, L.11 – p.445, 
L.23.) The record does not disclose whether Mr. Shedd was ever disciplined for his role. 
(See Evid. Tr., p.446, Ls.23-25.) 
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In this case, Mr. McNeese and Mr. Shedd are once more implicated. 
Undoubtedly, the best evidence of their involvement in the conspiracy to conceal the 
Tira Arbaugh Letter is the Shedd Note. As discussed above, the Shedd Note indicates 
Mr. McNeese instructed Mr. Shedd to monitor Mr. Charboneau’s personal and legal 
mail, and to confiscate anything from Larry Gold, or bearing Tira Arbaugh’s name. 
(R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) 
At the evidentiary hearing in this case, Mr. McNeese denied having ever 
instructed Mr. Shedd to intercept or interfere with any of Mr. Charboneau’s incoming 
mail. (Evid. Tr., p.441, L.18 – p.442, L.10.) Thereafter, on cross-examination, 
Mr. Charboneau’s counsel questioned Mr. McNeese regarding his actions and 
subsequent sanctions in Gomez. (See Evid. Tr., p.442, L.17 – p.446, L.25.) The State 
objected to this line of questioning under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b); however, the 
district court overruled the State’s objections and allowed Mr. McNeese to be 
questioned about his actions and sanctions in the Gomez case. (Evid. Tr., p.443, L.19 – 
p.444, L.21.) 
On appeal, the State argues the district court erred in allowing Mr. McNeese to 
be cross-examined about Gomez. (App. Br., pp.75-77.) Specifically, it argues that the 
Gomez evidence was not relevant to any issue other than “propensity,” and that it was 
ultimately referenced by the district court in its discussions of Mr. McNeese and 
Mr. Shedd. (App. Br., pp.76-77.) 
C. Standard Of Review 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), there is a two-tiered analysis for 
determining the admissibility of “prior bad act” evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 
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(2009). The court must first “determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish 
the other crime or wrong as fact” and “whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if 
established, would be relevant . . . to a material and disputed issue concerning the 
crime charged, other than propensity.” Id. If the evidence is insufficient to establish the 
other crime or wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if proven, is not 
relevant to an issue other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry 
ends. See id. However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, 
and that crime or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then “engage in 
a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” Id.  
Even if a court has been found to have erred in admitting evidence under Rule 
404(b), that error does not necessarily mandate reversal. The Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide as follows: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court 
or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting 
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
I.R.C.P. 61. 
D. Because Admission Of The Gomez Evidence Did Not Affect The State’s 
Substantial Rights, It Was Harmless And, Therefore, The State Is Not Entitled To 
Relief 
Assuming the district court erred in admitting the Gomez evidence, that error was 
harmless. Although the State says the Gomez “evidence is cited rather prominently by 
the district court in the evidence related to Shedd and also is mentioned in relation to 
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McNeese as evidence of whether he was involved in suppressing” the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter (App. Br., p.77 (citing R. Vol. 3, pp.120, 137)), the fact is the Gomez evidence 
had little to no importance in the district court’s ultimate conclusions and, therefore, 
could not have affected the State’s substantial rights. 
The State correctly observes that the district court “mentioned” the Gomez 
evidence in discussing Mr. McNeese’s potential involvement in the conspiracy to 
conceal the Tira Arbaugh Letter. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38.) However, just as it did with 
regard to Mr. Haws, the district court explicitly declined to decide whether Mr. McNeese 
played a role in that conspiracy.  (R. Vo. 3, pp.137-38.) Instead, the district court merely 
noted the open question of whether Mr. McNeese could have been involved in the 
conspiracy and indicated that Mr. McNeese’s involvement, if any, was a question for 
another fact-finder on another day. (R. Vol. 3, pp.137-38.) In other words, the Gomez 
evidence was not factored into any findings regarding Mr. McNeese. 
The State also correctly observes that the district court mentioned the Gomez 
evidence in discussing Mr. Shedd’s involvement in the conspiracy. (R. Vol. 3, p.120.) 
And, while the district court ultimately did find Mr. Shedd was involved in that conspiracy 
(see R. Vol. 3, pp.134-36), it is obvious the Gomez evidence had little or no impact on 
that finding because there was other, far-more-probative evidence of Mr. Shedd’s 
involvement in the conspiracy. The most significant piece of evidence connecting 
Mr. Shedd to the conspiracy was the Shedd Note, which indicated he had been 
instructed to monitor Mr. Charboneau’s personal and legal mail, and to confiscate any 
mail from Sheriff Gold or bearing Tira Arbaugh’s name. (See R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.95.) As the 
district court itself said, the Shedd Note has “extraordinary significance.” (R. Vol. 3, 
 154 
p.121 (emphasis in original); see also R. Vol. 3, pp.134-35 (finding the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter was concealed by IDOC from 2003 through 2011, and relying primarily on the 
Shedd Note in support of that finding).) Indeed, elsewhere in its Appellant’s Brief, the 
State concedes the overwhelming importance of the Shedd Note. After quoting the 
“extraordinary significance” label attached to that note by the district court, the State 
goes on to argue that, “the district court based its findings that Shedd intercepted 
Charboneau’s mail, and did so at the behest of others, almost exclusively upon that 
exhibit.” (App. Br., p.34.) 
The district court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the Shedd Note. It considered 
the physical characteristics of the note, the opinions of dueling handwriting experts, 
Mr. Shedd’s own statements about the note and his demeanor on the witness stand,88 
before ultimately finding the note to have been written by, or at least endorsed by, 
Mr. Shedd. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.120-21, 124-25, 127-29.) And of course, as discussed 
above, the note was a direct confession by Mr. Shedd that he had been monitoring all of 
Mr. Charboneau’s mail looking for documents from Larry Gold or bearing Tira Arbaugh’s 
name, with the intent of confiscating those pieces of mail. 
                                            
88 When first questioned about the Shedd Note, Mr. Shedd told an IDOC investigator 
and a deputy attorney general the statements in that note were true, and he specifically 
indicated Mr. McNeese had asked him to monitor Mr. Charboneau’s mail and look for 
something from Larry Gold, although he thought that Mr. Charboneau wrote the body of 
the note and he signed it because it was true. (R. Vol. 3, pp.120, 124.)  By the time he 
testified at the evidentiary hearing in this case, Mr. Shedd’s story evolved. While he 
admitted the Shedd Note was a “CYA” (“cover your ass”) note, and he conceded “he 
may have been overly candid in his interview with IDOC investigators because he did 
not know he was being recorded,” he was only willing to testify that “something like this 
[the events described in the Shedd Note] happened” and, further, he claimed his 
monitoring of Mr. Charboneau’s mail had something to do with an incident involving 
Mr. Charboneau’s boots (not mail from Larry Gold involving Tira Arbaugh). (R. Vol. 3, 
pp.121-22, 124.)  The district court found Mr. Shedd’s new story about the boots 
“unconvincing,” “unlikely,” and “utterly unbelievable.” (R. Vol. 3, pp.124-25 & n.4.)  
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Whether considered by an objective standard or a subjective one, the Shedd 
Note was obviously the critical evidence that informed the district court’s findings 
regarding Mr. Shedd’s involvement in the conspiracy to conceal the Tira Arbaugh Letter. 
Any reasonable observer would recognize that that note was the “smoking gun” which 
connected Mr. Shedd to the conspiracy, and which explained why the Tira Arbaugh 
Letter remained hidden for so long. And on a subjective level, the district court made it 
quite clear that the Shedd Note was the critical evidence actually relied upon in finding 
that Mr. Shedd was involved in the conspiracy. Since the significance of the Gomez 
evidence paled in comparison to that of the Shedd Note, the district court’s findings 
regarding Mr. Shedd could not have been, and indeed were not, affected by the Gomez 
evidence.  
In light of the relative unimportance of the Gomez evidence, it simply cannot be 
said that the district court’s brief mentions of that evidence affected the court’s findings 
and, thus, the State’s substantial rights. Accordingly, any error in admitting the Gomez 
evidence was harmless. 
     VI. 
This Court Should Only Revoke Mr. Charboneau’s Bond If It Vacates The District 
Court’s Judgment And Summary Disposition Order, And Only Then If The Remittitur 
Has Issued And The Court’s Opinion Is Final  
In its Appellant’s Brief, the State requests that “if any reversible is found” on 
appeal, this court revoke Mr. Charboneau’s bond and order that Mr. Charboneau 
immediately (i.e., before the 21-day time period for Mr. Charboneau to seek review or 
rehearing expires) be taken into custody. (App. Br., pp.77-78.) While Mr. Charboneau 
has no objection to being returned to custody in this case if, once the appeal is 
concluded (i.e., a remittitur is issued), the district court’s judgment and its order granting 
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post-conviction relief is vacated. However, he objects to any order returning him to 
custody before the appeal is finally resolved, or where the relief granted the State is 
anything short of a vacation of the judgment and the summary disposition order. 
The State’s sole argument as to why Mr. Charboneau should be taken back into 
custody immediately upon issuance of an opinion granting the State any sort of relief is 
its bald assertion that Mr. Charboneau would become a greater flight risk if he thought 
he was going to lose the benefit of the district court’s grant of post-conviction relief. 
However, this concern of the State touches upon only one of ten factors that should be 
considered as part of the bond calculus pursuant to I.C.R. 46(c). To revoke bond based 
on one consideration alone is to ignore the mandate of Rule 46(c). 
The reality is the district court is in the best position to take a holistic approach in 
evaluating the factors set forth in Rule 46(c). This is what the district court presumably 
did in considering whether to set bond in the first place. (See 4/10/15 Tr., p.47, L.16.) 
And this is what the district court could again do in determining when, if ever, 
Mr. Charboneau should be returned to custody.  
If Mr. Charboneau is at liberty on bond when this appeal concludes, the State 
should be required to file an appropriate motion with the district court and allow that 
court to decide whether, given the totality of the circumstances, his bond status should 
change. Accordingly, unless this Court vacates the district court’s judgment and 
summary disposition order in toto (in which case Mr. Charboneau does not object to 
returning to custody once the appeal becomes final), Mr. Charboneau respectfully 
requests that this Court defer any decision on bond to the district court. 
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    VII. 
The District Court Erred In Declining To Enter An Order Barring Further Prosecution Of 
Mr. Charboneau; Alternatively, This Court, In An Exercise Of Its Supervisory Authority, 
Should Bar Further Prosecution 
A. Introduction 
After the district court entered an order granting Mr. Charboneau post-conviction 
relief and ordering a new trial (see R. Vol. 4, pp.523-81), Mr. Charboneau filed a motion 
seeking an order barring the State from re-trying him. (R. Vol. 4, pp.599-600; see also 
R. Vol. 4, pp.631-33.) Mr. Charboneau argued that the State’s Brady violation in this 
case so prejudiced his ability to defend himself at a new trial—due to the death of 
witnesses and the loss or destruction of the original investigatory files (including 
recorded interviews and polygraph reports)—that any such trial would necessarily be 
unfair and, thus, violate his due process rights. (R. Vol. 4, pp.599-600, 631-32.) He also 
cited precedent suggesting a re-trial would violate his double jeopardy rights. (See 
R. Vol. 4, p.632.)  
The district court orally denied Mr. Charboneau’s motion, questioning whether it 
had the authority to bar further prosecution and opining that the authorities cited by 
Mr. Charboneau did not support such a proposition. (4/10/15 Tr., p.7, L.5 – p.8, L.18.)  
Mr. Charboneau filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on this issue (see R. Vol. 4, 
pp.670-74). On appeal, Mr. Charboneau contends the district court erred in denying his 
motion. Alternatively, he requests that, upon affirming the district court’s judgment, this 
Court exercise its supervisory authority and enter an order barring his re-trial. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Charboneau’s Motion To 
Bar Further Prosecution 
1. The District Court Had Discretion To Enter An Order Barring Further 
Prosecution, i.e., Re-Trial 
Under the UPCPA, “If the court finds in favor of the applicant, it shall enter an 
appropriate order with respect to the conviction or sentence in the former proceedings, 
and any supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, 
correction of sentence, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.” I.C. § 19-
4907(a) (emphasis added). By authorizing trial courts to enter appropriate orders not 
only with respect to the conviction or sentence, but also as to “other matters that may be 
necessary and proper,” the UPCPA clearly grants broad authority to fashion a remedy 
appropriate to the unique facts and circumstances of each case; it clearly does not limit 
the power of the district court to simply order a new trial or a new sentencing hearing. 
See, e.g., State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 837-38 (2986) (holding that where the 
petitioner established his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure 
to file a timely notice of appeal, the district court did not err in ordering that the original 
judgment of conviction be vacated and a new judgment of conviction be entered so that 
the petitioner might then perfect a timely appeal).  
An analogous federal (habeas corpus) statute, which contains similarly 
expansive language, has been interpreted to grant broad authority for federal district 
courts to grant whatever relief is appropriate in a given habeas case. In federal habeas 
cases, “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the 
matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (emphasis added). The United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that this broad language grants broad authority 
for fashioning remedies. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (“[T]he 
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statute does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from 
physical custody. Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted. It 
provides that ‘[t]he court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’  28 
U.S.C. § 2243.”).  This broad authorization even allows federal district courts to 
preclude state prosecutors from re-trying the petitioner. See, e.g., Morales v. Portuondo, 
165 F. Supp. 2d 601, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 as granting 
authority to preclude a state from retrying the petitioner when that is deemed to be the 
appropriate remedy, but making it clear that unconditional release is the exception 
rather than the rule, and that a new trial is the usual remedy for a successful habeas 
petition).89 
Since the relief that may be granted under the UPCPA (enter all orders “that may 
be necessary and proper”) is just as open-ended as the relief that may be granted under 
the federal habeas statute (“dispose of the matter as law and justice require”), section 
19-4907(a) should be given a comparable interpretation to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 
                                            
89 See also Satterlee, 453 F.3d at 370 (noting that, in “extraordinary circumstances” a 
habeas court may preclude re-prosecution of the petitioner); Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 
350, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding “the district court normally should facilitate [a new 
trial] by suspending the writ for a time reasonably calculated to provide the state an 
adequate opportunity to conduct the new trial,” but noting that because section 2243 
vests the district court with the authority to grant the relief “law and justice require[s],” 
and such authority is “necessary to protect the purpose of habeas corpus jurisdiction 
when the error forming the basis for the relief cannot be corrected in further 
proceedings,” “or other exceptional circumstances exist such that the holding of a new 
trial would be unjust,” “the district court ha[s] the power to grant any form of relief 
necessary, including permanent discharge”); Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 727 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (“A district court has authority to preclude a state from retrying a successful 
habeas petitioner when the court deems that remedy appropriate. Nevertheless, this is 
an extraordinary remedy that is suitable only in certain situations, such as when a retrial 
itself would violate the petitioner’s constitutional rights.”); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 
F.2d 1208, 1219-26 (3d Cir. 1987) (ordering unconditional release where no relief short 
of discharge could fully remedy the constitutional violations found).  
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Mr. Charboneau asks this Court to recognize that a trial court deciding a post-conviction 
matter in Idaho has discretion to bar the re-trial of the petitioner. Obviously though, re-
trial should not be barred whenever post-conviction relief is granted. So assuming the 
Court recognizes the trial courts’ discretion to bar retrial, the next question becomes: 
Under what circumstances should re-trial be barred? 
In federal habeas proceedings, courts have found re-trial to be an inadequate 
remedy, and have therefore barred re-trial, in three situations:  
(1) where the act of retrial itself would violate petitioner’s constitutional 
rights, for example, by subjecting him to double jeopardy; (2) where a 
conditional writ has issued and the petitioner has not been retried within 
the time period specified by the court; and (3) “where the petitioners had 
served extended and potentially unjustifiable periods of incarceration 
before the writ was granted.” 
Morales, 165 F.Supp. 2d at 609 (quoting Latzer v. Abrams, 615 F.Supp. 1226, 1230 
(E.D.N.Y.1985)). This appears to be a reasonable standard that would guide Idaho’s 
trial courts in barring re-trial only in extraordinary cases. 
Whether this Court adopts the foregoing federal standard, or some other 
standard recognizing that re-trial should be barred in extraordinary cases, it should 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to bar a re-trial in 
Mr. Charboneau’s case.  
2. Standard Of Review 
The standard for reviewing trial courts’ discretionary decisions is well-established 
in Idaho: 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (quoting Associates Northwest, Inc. v. 
Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
3. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because It Failed To Act 
Consistently With Applicable Legal Standards And Reach Its Decision By 
An Exercise Of Reason 
Under the federal standard discussed above, the first consideration is whether 
“the act of retrial itself would violate petitioner’s constitutional rights, for example, by 
subjecting him to double jeopardy . . . .” Morales, 165 F.Supp. 2d at 609. Under this 
standard, it would be clear that the district court abused its discretion in this case since: 
(a) at this point, Mr. Charboneau could not possibly receive a fair re-trial due to the loss 
of evidence over the past 30+ years; and (b) a re-trial would likely violate 
Mr. Charboneau’s double jeopardy rights under Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Indeed, even if this Court does not adopt the federal standard discussed 
above, these considerations are so extraordinary that they required the district court to 
bar a re-trial. 
a) Due To The Loss Or Destruction Of Evidence, Mr. Charboneau 
Could Not Possibly Receive A Fair Re-Trial 
 At this point, it is impossible for Mr. Charboneau to receive a fair re-trial. 
Ms. Arbaugh was killed in the middle of 1984 (nearly 32 years ago); Mr. Charboneau 
was tried in 1985 and sentenced to death in 1985; and Mr. Charboneau was re-
sentenced to fixed life in 1991. In the interim, in 1989, Tira wrote her letter to Judge 
Becker alleging her own perjury and the State’s manipulation of the physical evidence. 
Had Tira’s letter been disclosed to Mr. Charboneau, he not only could have used it (or 
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Tira’s live testimony) at his re-sentencing, but he could have moved for a new trial while 
Tira and the other witnesses were still alive, and while the evidence in the case still 
existed. At that time, Mr. Charboneau could have received a fair re-trial.  
However, by the time the Tira Arbaugh Letter was disclosed in 2011, and the 
district court granted post-conviction relief in 2015, most of the evidence in 
Mr. Charboneau’s case was irretrievably lost. Tira is now dead. (R. Ex. Vol. 1, p.973.) 
Sheriff Elza Hall is now dead.90 (R. Vol. 3, p.262; R. Vol. 4, p.339.) Sheriff Larry Gold is 
now dead. (R. Vol. 1, p.600; R. Vol. 2, p.431; R. Vol. 4, pp.162-63.) Deputy Roger 
Driesel is now dead.91 (R. Vol. 2, p.433; R. Vol. 3, p.262; see also R. Vol. 4, p.337.) And 
Deputy Ernie Coats is now dead.92 (R. Vol. 3, p.262.) In addition, Tiffnie’s whereabouts 
are apparently unknown, as the State has been unable to find her as of March 2013. 
(R. Vol. 2, p.432.) Without Tira, and potentially without even Tiffnie, available to testify, 
the only way for the State to offer evidence of the events of July 1, 1984, would be to 
                                            
90 Sheriff Hall was the Jerome County Sheriff when Ms. Arbaugh was killed. (Trial 
Tr., p.1393, Ls.11-17.)  He supervised the whole investigation into Ms. Arbaugh’s death. 
(Trial Tr., p.1393, L.21 – p.1394, L.4.)  As such, to the extent the prosecution was 
manipulating physical evidence and suborning perjury, Sheriff Hall would have known 
about it. 
91 Deputy Driesel was one of the first few police officers to report to the Arbaugh 
residence following the shooting of July 1, 1984. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.631, 645.)  Deputy 
Driesel was not only the one to first discover Ms. Arabaugh’s body, but he was also the 
first one to take statements from Tiffnie and Tira. (16339 R., p.535.)  As noted, the Tira 
Arbaugh Letter alleges Deputy Driesel was involved in encouraging Tira’s false 
testimony. 
92 Deputy Coats visited the Arbaugh residence approximately two weeks after 
Ms. Arbaugh was killed. (See Trial Tr., p.905, Ls.14-19.)  He was accompanied by the 
original prosecutor on Mr. Charboneau’s case, Mr. Adamson, as well as a number of 
members of the Arbaugh family. (Trial Tr., p.905, L.22 – p.906, L.10.)  While they were 
there, they found a spent .22 shell casing on the ground behind the sheep wagon. (Trial 
Tr., p.906, L.24 – p.907, L.16.)  He testified Mr. Adamson told him the spent casing was 
not important and could be discarded, and he eventually threw the casing in the trash. 
(Trial Tr., p.914, L.14 – p.915, L.25.)  (Mr. Adamson denied telling Deputy Coats the 
casing could be discarded. (See Trial Tr., p.966, L.20 – p.968, L.5, p.971, Ls.2-13.)) 
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offer Tira and Tiffnie’s prior testimony. However, it would be fundamentally unfair for the 
State to be allowed to do so, given that we now have good evidence to suggest their 
prior testimony was false, and now Mr. Charboneau has no ability to cross-examine 
them based on the new evidence. It would be a poor substitute to allow the State to 
offer the prior testimony and allow Mr. Charboneau to offer Tira’s letter in response 
because the jury would not be allowed to see whether Tira truly had a change of heart, 
or to see how Tiffnie reacted when confronted with evidence of the truth. Nor could 
Sheriff Hall be confronted with the evidence showing that his investigation was tainted 
by planted evidence, destroyed evidence, and false statements, or could Deputy Driesel 
be confronted with the evidence showing he coached Tira to file a false report and, 
ultimately, testify falsely. 
In addition, the investigative files for Mr. Charboneau’s case have gone 
missing.93  (See R. Vol. 1, pp.434-38, 565, 595-98, 600-01; R. Vol. 3, pp.230-31, 977-
78; R. Vol. 4, pp.21, 358-60, 600; 9/19/14 Tr., p.647, L.22 – p.649, L.1.) Although no 
one can ever know at this point all of what was included in the original investigation, we 
do know that among the missing files were a number of critical pieces of evidence. First, 
the police apparently recorded an interview of Tira on January 15, 1985, but that 
recording has been lost. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.231, 279-80; R. Vol. 4, pp.21, 490, 600; 
9/19/14 Tr., p.648, Ls.13-15, p.662, Ls.21-22.) That recording, had it been preserved, 
might have provided insight into which of Tira’s stories is true. Even if her recitation of 
events did not match her 1989 letter, the nature of the questioning (e.g., leading versus 
open-ended questions), whether she exhibited ready recall or, instead, had to be 
                                            
93 As John Horgan, the current Jerome County prosecutor said, “[W]ho knows where the 
file is[?]  Somebody could have taken it home for a souvenir.” (R. Vol. 4, p.360.) 
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coached, and the tones of voice of Tira and her interviewer, could have given a jury a 
clue as to whether she was being honest in her testimony. Second, a palm print was 
apparently lifted from the nylon Remington and, although it could go a long way toward 
determining whether Mr. Charboneau had possession of that rifle (as the State claimed 
at trial in 1985), or whether Tiffnie did (as Tira’s 1989 letter claims), that print has been 
lost. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.231, 244, 283-84, 296, 478; R. Vol. 4, pp.459, 490, 507; 9/19/14 
Tr., p.648, Ls.15-24, p.662, Ls.13-19, p.738, Ls.17-18.) Third, Tiffnie had undergone a 
polygraph examination, but the report from that examination was among the lost files. 
(See R. Vol. 3, pp.231, 244, 266-67, 275, 283, 459; R. Vol. 4, pp.21, 459, 473, 490, 
507, 600; 9/19/14 Tr., p.648, Ls.14-15, p.662, Ls.20-21.) Fourth, there was a 
compositional bullet analysis that has been lost as well. (See R. Vol. 3, pp.231, 244, 
284, 459, 977; R. Vol. 4, pp.459, 490; 9/19/14 Tr., p.648, L.25 – p.649, L.1, p.662, 
Ls.21-22.) 
Finally, a critical piece of physical evidence is missing now as well. Tira’s letter 
provides a fairly specific description of where Ms. Arbuagh’s family buried her Calamity 
Jane rifle. (See R., pp.126-27.) Had Tira’s letter been disclosed to Mr. Charboneau in 
1989, there is every reason to believe that the rifle could have been found, thus 
corroborating Tira’s then-recent disclosures. However, by the time Mr. Charboneau 
(through counsel) went looking for the rifle in 2008, it was too late. By that time the 
property had been completely excavated. (R. Vol. 3, pp.242-43 n.6.)  
In light of the foregoing, the district court recognized the prejudice attendant to 
the passage of time and loss of evidence. (See 9/19/14 Tr., p.740, L.25 – p.741, L.6, 
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p.748, L.14 – p.749, L.6, p.752, L.23 – p.753, L.12.) And, in doing so, it even 
acknowledged that a new trial is an inadequate remedy: 
If the [Tira Arbaugh Letter] in all respects was true—and I want to 
make this point very, very clearly—the letter would raise a reasonable 
probability of a change in the outcome of trial, in big capital letters, if 
everything in the letter was true. We don’t know that; we won’t know that; 
and a new trial won’t tell us that. It’s too late. There’s too much evidence 
gone, files gone, witnesses, reports, statements. We will never know 
whether the claims in the letter are true. 
Right now I have all the evidence I’m going to get. 
(9/19/14 Tr., p.748, L.21 – p.729, L.6 (emphasis added).) Indeed, at one point it even 
hypothesized that the State could not even re-try Mr. Charboneau now:  “I don’t think 
the State has got a prayer in hell of getting the case to trial.” (9/19/14 Tr., p.752, L.25 – 
p.753, L.2.) 
Nevertheless, the district court denied Mr. Charboneau’s motion to bar a re-trial. 
This was an abuse of the district court’s discretion. Because of the passage of time, 
which has caused a monumental loss of evidence, Mr. Charboneau could not now—in 
2016 or 2017—possibly receive a fair re-trial. Accordingly, a new trial would do little to 
vindicate Mr. Charboneau’s rights. Cf., e.g., Morales, 165 F. Supp.2d at 611-12 (barring 
further prosecution, in part, because two witnesses (one of whom was deceased and 
the other of whom could not be located) would be unavailable for a re-trial). Further, 
because the 22-year delay and the attendant loss of evidence is wholly attributable to 
the State’s egregious misconduct in concealing the Tira Arbaugh Letter for so long, the 
State can hardly be heard to complain about the equities of the situation. Indeed, to do 
anything other than bar further prosecution would be to reward the State for its gross 
misconduct. Cf., e.g., id. at 612-14 (barring further prosecution, in part, because the 
prosecution engaged in serious misconduct suggesting it was more interested in 
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obtaining and protecting a conviction than seeking justice). Thus, Mr. Charboneau 
requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to bar 
further prosecution, and that it remand the case for entry of such an order. 
b) A Re-Trial Would Likely Violate Mr. Charboneau’s Rights Under 
The Double Jeopardy Provision Of The Idaho Constitution 
The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that no person shall “be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
Under this double jeopardy clause, a defendant is protected “from repeated 
prosecutions for the same offense. . . . As a part of this protection against multiple 
prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause affords a criminal defendant a ‘valued right 
to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.’” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 
671-72 (1982) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)). However, this right 
is not absolute; it does not always bar a second trial in the same case. See id. at 672. 
For example, a re-trial is not barred if there is “manifest necessity” for a second trial, as 
where there is a hung jury. Id. Likewise, a second trial generally is not barred where the 
defendant himself has requested a mistrial. Id. at 672-73. 
Even in the latter scenario though, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that a second trial will be barred if the defendant was goaded into requesting a mistrial 
as part of a prosecutorial effort to subvert his double jeopardy rights. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
at 673-76. In so holding though, the Supreme Court was careful to limit its holding to 
those scenarios where the prosecutor intended to goad the defense into moving for a 
mistrial; it specifically declined to adopt a broad rule whereby the double jeopardy 
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clause would preclude re-trials whenever it was found that the prosecution acted in bad 
faith.94 See id.  
Just as the Supreme Court has held that a mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct does not prohibit the defendant’s re-trial, so too has it suggested that a 
finding of error (such as prosecutorial misconduct) on appeal does not prohibit his 
retrial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (explaining that the double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment bars re-trial following an acquittal, but it does 
not bar re-trial following an appellate “determination that a defendant has been 
convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, 
e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial 
misconduct”). Taken together, Kennedy, Burks, and their progeny suggest that the Fifth 
Amendment’s double jeopardy clause will not bar a criminal defendant’s re-trial even in 
cases of the most extreme prosecutorial misconduct.95 
                                            
94 The Kennedy Court adopted the narrower standard for two reasons: first, the Court 
felt divining the prosecutor’s intent is relatively easy compared to evaluating the extent 
of prosecutorial “overreaching”; second, the Court claimed the narrower standard is 
more defendant-friendly in that it encourages trial courts to grant defense motions for 
mistrials (or at least avoids a disincentive to granting such motions). Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
at 674-75, 676.  
95 Some courts have broadened Kennedy somewhat, holding the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment will not only bar the defendant’s re-trial where the 
prosecutor engages in misconduct in order to goad the defendant into moving for a 
mistrial, but also where the prosecutor engages in misconduct “with the deliberate intent 
of depriving him of having his trial completed by a particular tribunal or prejudicing the 
possibility of an acquittal that the prosecutor believed likely.” United States v. 
Pavloyianis, 996 F.2d 1467, 1473 (2d Cir. 1973). See, e.g., State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 
339, 346 (Conn. 1995); State v. Lettice, 585 N.W.2d 171, 180-81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
Cf. People v. Batts, 68 P.3d 357, 380-81 (Cal. 2003) (“[W]e conclude that the double 
jeopardy clause of California Constitution article I, section 15 bars retrial following the 
grant of a defendant's mistrial motion . . . when the prosecution, believing in view of 
events that unfold during an ongoing trial that the defendant is likely to secure an 
acquittal at that trial in the absence of misconduct, intentionally and knowingly commits 
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Nonetheless, each state is free to give its citizens greater protection than that 
which is afforded under the United States Constitution. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 
511, 519 (2012) (“In some instances, we have construed Article I, section 17, to provide 
greater protection than is provided by the United States Supreme Court’s construction 
of the Fourth Amendment. ‘[W]e provided greater protection to Idaho citizens based on 
the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence.’”). 
This is true even where state constitutional protections use similar language as those in 
the United States Constitutions, as there is no reason why states must interpret their 
own constitutions in the same way the United States Supreme Court interprets the 
United States Constitution. Id. at 518. “Long gone are the days when state courts will 
blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the 
process of interpreting their own constitutions.” Id. In light of this, Mr. Charboneau 
submits that the double jeopardy clause of Idaho’s Constitution should be read as being 
more protective of Idahoans than that of the Fifth Amendment.96 
Over the past 30+ years, Kennedy has been criticized for adopting a standard 
that does too little to protect a criminal defendant’s right to have his trial completed by a 
particular tribunal. For example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii criticized the Kennedy 
test on the basis that its subjective “specific-intent” standard is virtually impossible for a 
defendant to meet. State v. Rogan, 984 P.2d 1231, 1248 (Haw. 1999). Further, that 
                                                                                                                                  
misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal—and a court, reviewing the 
circumstances as of the time of the misconduct, determines that from an objective 
perspective, the prosecutor's misconduct in fact deprived the defendant of a reasonable 
prospect of an acquittal.”). 
96 Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution states, in relevant part, “No person shall 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . .” Thus, he concedes its language is 
comparable to that of the Fifth Amendment. 
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court observed the constitutional focus ought to be on the deprivation of the defendant’s 
rights—an objective consideration—not the motive or intent of the actor. Id. Finally, the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii explained that the Kennedy plurality incorrectly sought to 
attribute the cause for a new trial to the defendant, when in fact it is the prosecutor’s 
misconduct which is the true cause of the second trial. Id. at 1249. Thus, in Rogan, that 
court interpreted the Hawaii Constitution to grant greater protection than the Fifth 
Amendment, and it held that, “under the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 
of the Hawai’i Constitution, . . . reprosecution of a defendant after a mistrial or reversal 
on appeal as a result of prosecutorial misconduct is barred where the prosecutorial 
misconduct is so egregious that, from an objective standpoint, it clearly denied a 
defendant his or her right to a fair trial.”97  Id.  
Hawaii is not alone in granting greater protection under its own double jeopardy 
clause. The appellate courts of at least six states have rejected Kennedy in interpreting 
their own state constitutions, and have held that sufficiently egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct, regardless of whether that misconduct was intended to goad the defendant 
into moving for a mistrial, may warrant an order barring a new trial. See, e.g., State v. 
Jorgenson, 10 P.3d 1177 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (holding that after a conviction was 
vacated on appeal owing to egregious prosecutorial misconduct which overwhelmed a 
viable insanity defense, the Arizona Constitution’s double jeopardy clause barred retrial 
of the defendant); People v. Dawson, 397 N.W.2d 277, 282-84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and, because the misconduct was 
                                            
97 The text of the double jeopardy clause appearing in the Hawaii Constitution is 
comparable to that of the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. See HAW. CONST. Art. I § 10 (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy . . . .”). 
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intentional and sufficiently egregious that it could not have been cured by further 
instructions from, or actions by, the court, retrial was barred under the double jeopardy 
clause of the Michigan Constitution); State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 803 (N.M. 1996) 
(“Retrial is barred under Article II, Section 15, of the New Mexico Constitution, when 
improper official conduct is so unfairly prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be 
cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial, and if the official knows 
that the conduct is improper and prejudicial, and if the official either intends to provoke a 
mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal.”); State v. 
White, 354 S.E.2d 324, 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (declining to apply the Kennedy 
Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment to the North Carolina Constitution, and 
holding the double jeopardy protections of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit re-
trying a defendant where “egregious prosecutorial misconduct has rendered 
unmeaningful the defendant’s choice to continue or abort” the original trial); State v. 
Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983) (“We therefore conclude that a retrial is 
barred by article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution when improper official conduct 
is so prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial, 
and if the official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial and either intends 
or is indifferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal.”)98; Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 
A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (“We now hold that the double jeopardy clause of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial 
misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also 
when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the 
                                            
98 This case represents the Oregon Supreme Court’s handling of the Kennedy case 
following remand from the United States Supreme Court. 
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defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.”).99  See also Commonwealth v. 
Murchison, 465 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass. 1984) (“To implicate double jeopardy 
protections, and support a dismissal of the indictment or complaint, prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of a specific character:  (1) Where the governmental conduct in 
question is intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, [Commonwealth v. 
Lam Hue, 461 N.E.2d 776 (1984)], quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 
S.Ct. 2083, 2089, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); or (2) Where the governmental conduct 
resulted in such irremediable harm that a fair trial of the complaint or indictment is no 
longer possible, [Lam Hue], 461 N.E.2d 776.”).100 
Idaho’s appellate courts have never decided whether the double jeopardy clause 
of Article I, Section 13 grants Idahoans greater protection than the Fifth Amendment, as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy.101  The issue was raised in 
                                            
99 With the exception of North Carolina, the double jeopardy clauses of the constitutions 
of all of these states are substantially similar to the Fifth Amendment and Article I, 
section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. See Ariz. Const. art. 2 § 10; MICH. CONST. art. 1 § 
15; N.M. CONST. art. II § 15; OR. CONST. art. I § 12; PA. CONST. art. I § 10. In White, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals cited Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina 
Constitution; however, that provision does not contain traditional double jeopardy clause 
language. Rather, its language is somewhat similar to that of the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See N.C. CONST. art. I § 19. 
Presumably, North Carolina’s courts have read a double jeopardy guarantee into its 
constitutional right to due process. 
100 In neither Murchison nor Lam Hue, did the Massachusetts Supreme Court cite the 
Massachusetts Constitution. In fact, Lam Hue was based on court rules. However, 
because the Murchison Court spoke in terms of “double jeopardy,” it appears that Court 
was actually speaking in terms of Massachusetts’ double jeopardy protection. That 
double jeopardy protection apparently arises out of the common law and/or a statute, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 263, § 7. See Commonwealth v. Steward, 483 N.E.2d 1091, 
1092 (1985).  
101 In State v. Sharp, the Idaho Supreme Court had occasion to apply Kennedy, and 
ultimately concluded the defendant could be re-tried because there was no evidence the 
prosecutor attempted to goad the defendant into seeking a mistrial; however, the 
defendant in that case based his double jeopardy arguments solely on the Fifth 
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State v. Avelar; however, the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the issue. See 
129 Idaho 704, 706 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Mr. Charboneau requests this Court reach the issue, and that it hold Idaho’s 
double jeopardy clause provides greater protection than the Fifth Amendment when it 
comes to convictions that have been vacated based on extreme prosecutorial 
misconduct. Idaho already has a history of providing greater protection in the area of 
double jeopardy. Specifically, Idaho has long employed a broader test for determining 
whether an offense is an included offense of another. While the United States Supreme 
Court employs the “statutory theory” for determining whether an offense is an included 
offense of another under the Fifth Amendment,102 Idaho’s courts have long recognized 
that Idahoans enjoy greater protection, as they have held that one offense is an 
included offense of another if it satisfies either the “statutory theory” or the “pleading 
theory.” See State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527, 529 (2011). Idaho’s use of the 
pleading theory dates back to at least 1960, see State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 
(1960) (“This Court has . . . in effect has held that an offense is an included offense if it 
is alleged in the information as a means or element of the commission of the higher 
                                                                                                                                  
Amendment and never argued the Idaho Constitution’s double jeopardy clause grants 
greater protection. See 104 Idaho 691, 693-94 (1983), overruling on other grounds 
recognized by State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 585, 599 (1985). 
 Somewhat similarly, in State v. Pugsley, the Court of Appeals had occasion to 
apply Kennedy, and ultimately concluded the defendant could be re-tried because there 
was no evidence the prosecutor attempted to goad the defendant into seeking a 
mistrial; however, there, although it appears the defendant may have raised a challenge 
under Article I, Section 13, there is no indication he argued the Idaho Constitution 
provides greater protection than the Fifth Amendment. 128 Idaho 168, 173-74 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
102 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“The applicable rule is 
that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only 
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”). 
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offense.”), and has since been tied to the double jeopardy clause of Article I, Section 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(explaining that under the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause the determination 
of whether an offense is an included offense of another is based on the “statutory 
theory,” whereas, under the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 13, the 
determination is based on the “pleading theory” as well).)103 Thus, the Idaho 
Constitution’s double jeopardy clause has already been recognized to be more 
protective than that of the Fifth Amendment.104 
                                            
103 In older cases such as Anderson, Idaho’s use of the pleading theory was often tied 
to an Idaho statute, I.C. § 19-2312, which provides: “The jury may find the defendant 
guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which 
he is charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit the offense.” Although 
originally connected to a statute, the pleading theory is also appropriately tied to the 
Idaho Constitution, as the Court of Appeals recently pointed out in Moad. The current 
version of the statute has its roots in a statute that existed at statehood. Compare 
I.C. § 19-2312 with Idaho Cr. Prac. § 411 (1863-1864) and Idaho Rev. Stat. § 7926 
(1887).  See also State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, _, 64 P. 1014, 1018-19 (1901) (quoting  
Idaho Rev. Stat. § 7926, and revealing that provision to be identical to section 19-2312 
as it existed in 1960 and as it still exists today). Thus, when Idaho’s double jeopardy 
clause was written into the Constitution, it would have been under understood at the 
time to have embraced the pleading theory. 
104 In other contexts, the Idaho Supreme Court has declined to interpret Idaho’s double 
jeopardy clause as being more protective than that of the Fifth Amendment. For 
example, in State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 457-58 (1996), the Idaho Supreme 
Court rejected an argument that the principles underlying a different statute (former 
I.C. § 18-301, which has since been repealed, but which had prohibited charging the 
defendant with multiple crimes under different statutory provisions for the same act of 
omission) which had pre-dated adoption of the Idaho Constitution was embraced within 
the double jeopardy clause in Article I, Section 13. In that case, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reasoned section 18-301 dealt with “acts” or “omissions,” whereas the 
Constitution speaks in terms of the “offense.” Reichenberg, 128 Idaho at 458 (quoting 
State v. Gutke, 25 Idaho 737, 740 (1914)). Here, however, the statute at issue also 
speaks in terms of the “offense.” See I.C. § 19-2312. Thus, this case is distinguishable 
from Reichenberg and Gutke. 
 Further, in Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., the Court, citing Reichenberg, made the 
sweeping statement that:  “We recently held that the Idaho Constitution does not 
provide greater protection against double jeopardy than does its federal counterpart. 
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C. Under Its General Supervisory Power, This Court Should Enter An Order 
Precluding Mr. Charboneau’s Re-Trial 
Mr. Charboneau contends that even if this Court cannot conclude that the district 
court abused its discretion in refusing to bar his further prosecution (or that it even had 
discretion to bar his further prosecution), it should exercise its supervisory power and 
enter its own order barring his further prosecution.  
The Idaho Constitution vests judicial power for the State of Idaho in the 
“Supreme Court, the district courts, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court 
as established by the legislature.” IDAHO CONST. art. V § 2. This provision has been read 
to vest in the Supreme Court certain “inherent power,” including the power to supervise 
the administration of the courts statewide, and to supervise all court personnel 
statewide, including the judges. State v. Lee, 156 Idaho 444, 445 (2014). 
In the past, the Supreme Court has used this supervisory authority over the 
courts to adopt new procedures to protect the rights of the accused. See, e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 86 Idaho 51, 58-62 (1963) (adopting a bifurcated trial system where a 
defendant is charged with an enhancement based on prior convictions, and explaining 
that, “Absent legislative direction, [the Idaho Supreme Court] not only has the authority, 
but the duty to adopt procedure designed to safeguard the rights of an accused to a fair 
                                                                                                                                  
Because we held that the reimbursement order did not violate the United States 
Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause, we now hold that it does not violate the Idaho 
Constitution.” 129 Idaho 752, 757 (1996) (citation omitted). However, that statement 
was made in a wholly different context. There, the operative question was whether the 
forfeiture of worker’s compensation benefits for making false statements placed him “in 
jeopardy” within the meaning of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and 
Idaho Constitutions, and the Supreme Court held that because the statutory provision in 
question was civil and non-punitive, the double jeopardy clause was not even 
implicated. See id. at 755-57. Since the double jeopardy clauses were not even 
implicated in Berglund, it does not follow that the Court’s sweeping language in that 
case constrains subsequent interpretations of the scope of Idaho’s double jeopardy 
clause. 
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and impartial trial”). It has also used this authority to correct irregularities in individual 
cases. See, e.g., Lee, 156 Idaho at 446 (remanding a case for entry of an amended 
judgment of conviction where, though not technically violating any statute or court, the 
original judgment contained superfluous language editorializing on the case).  
In this case, Mr. Charboneau asks that this Court to exercise its supervisory 
authority to bar his further prosecution. As is explained in Part VII.B.3, supra, at this 
point, he could not possibly receive a fair trial and, besides, his re-trial could run afoul of 
the double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Charboneau respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the district court’s grant of post-conviction relief, but reverse its denial of 
Mr. Charboneau’s motion to bar further prosecution. He requests that this post-
conviction case be remanded solely for an order granting his motion to bar further 
prosecution. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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